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INTRODUCTORY ESSAY:
INTERNATIONAL LAW IMPLICATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES'
"WAR ON TERROR"
VED P. NANDA*

I. INTRODUCTION

The term "war on terror" has undoubtedly entered our common usage,
notwithstanding heavy criticism that instead of using it as a metaphor, as in the
"war on poverty" or the "war on drugs," terminology which has primarily served a
rhetorical purpose, the US views the struggle against al Qaeda and associated
terrorist groups and individuals as a real war.' Other critics have argued that
employing the law of armed conflict is not an effective tool to counter terrorism,
urging instead to consider terrorism as primarily a law enforcement problem.
Thus, they suggest using the traditional criminal justice system to arrest, prosecute,
and punish terrorists if they are found guilty. 2 President George W. Bush directly
and unequivocally responded to such critics in his 2004 State of the Union Address
to the Congress:
I know that some people question if America is really in a war at
all.

They view terrorism more as a crime, a problem to be solved

mainly with law enforcement and indictments.

After the World Trade

Center was first attacked in 1993, some of the guilty were indicted and
tried and convicted, and sent to prison. But the matter was not settled.
The terrorists were still training and plotting in other nations, and
drawing up more ambitious plans.

After the chaos and carnage of

September the 1lth, it is not enough to serve our enemies with legal
papers.

The terrorists and their supporters declared war on the United
3
States, and war is what they got.

John Evans Professor, University of Denver; Thompson G. Marsh Professor of Law and
Director, International Legal Studies Program, University of Denver Sturm College of Law
1. Lord Goldsmith, the UK Attorney General from 2001 to 2007, considers the term "not only
misleading but positively dangerous." Lord Goldsmith, Justice and the Rule of Law, 43 INT'L LAWYER
27, 29 (2009) [hereafter Goldsmith]. In his words, "saying 'War on Terror' then justifies holding
people without trial after the international armed conflict has come to an end until this amorphous 'War
on Terror' has come to an end -- and who is going to say when it has? And secondly, it has a powerful
impact on legal questions, like whose job it is to deal with. My perception reading U.S. Supreme Court
decisions is that calling it 'War on Terror' is designed to give to the Executive powers without the
control of Congress because as military action it falls to the President as Commander-in-Chief to make
decisions." Id.
2. See, e.g., Leila Nadya Sadat, Terrorism and the Rule of Law, 3 WASH. UNIV. GLOBAL
STUDIES L. REV. 135 (2004).
3. President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2004) available at
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Although Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reportedly said in March 2009
that the new Administration had dropped "war on terror" from its lexicon, as she
told reporters, "the [Obama] administration has stopped using the phrase and I
think that speaks for itself.
, President Barack Obama stated in his national
security remarks on May 21, 2009, "Now let me be clear. We are indeed at war
with al Qaeda and its affiliates."5
It seems appropriate to acknowledge that if and when terrorist acts are
committed in situations of armed conflict, the laws of war apply to such acts,
which may constitute war crimes; and when they are committed outside of
situations of armed conflict, individuals suspected of committing such acts are not
subject to the laws of war.6 And along with the application of the laws of war,
when they are applicable, human rights norms, some of which are non-derogable,
must govern trial and detention of suspected terrorists. Also, suspected terrorists
must be entitled to independent judicial review and the application of customary
international law principles enshrined in Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions 7 and the pertinent provisions of Additional Protocols 18 and 119 of
1977.

http://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingroom (last visited Aug. 8, 2009).
4. Sue Pleming, Obama team drops "war on terror rhetoric, REUTERS, March 31, 2009
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/idUSTRE52T7MH20090330.
5. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on National Security (May 21, 2009)
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-Office/Remarks-by-the-President-On-NationalSecurity-5-21-09/ [hereafter President's National Security Remarks].
6. See International Commission of Jurists, Report of the Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism,
Counter-terrorism, and Human Rights, Assessing Damage, Urging Action: Executive Summary, at 9
(Feb. 16, 2009) available at http://ejp.icj.org/IMG/ExecSumm.pdf [hereafter Eminent Jurists Panel].
The Panel stated:
The laws of war only apply when there is a situation of armed conflict according
to objective criteria recognised under international law. Thus, when terrorist acts
are committed outside of such situations, they are not governed by international
humanitarian law, but by domestic criminal law and international human rights
law and, perhaps, international criminal law. Accordingly, individuals who are
suspected of terrorist offences committed outside of situations of armed conflict
cannot legally be labelled, tried, and/or targeted as combatants. Where terrorist
acts trigger or occur during an armed conflict, such acts may well constitute war
crimes, and they are governed by international humanitarian law, together with
international human rights law. Persons suspected of having perpetrated such
offences during an armed conflict cannot legally be placed beyond the protection
of the law. As a minimum, they must be treated in accordance with nonderogable human rights guarantees as well as with the customary law standards
embodied in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Article
75 of Additional Protocol I, or Articles 4 and 6 of Additional Protocol II, of
1977.
Id.
7. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.. Common Article 3 appears in all four Geneva Conventions. It
prohibits "violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and
torture," (Article 3(l)(a)) and "outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment" (Article 3(l)(c).
8. Protocol Additional (No. I) to the Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the
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The Bush administration's counter-terrorism policies in waging war on terror
raised questions about the administration's real--contrasted with its professedcommitment to faithfully adhere to the rule of law. The administration's
questionable practices included the following: designating "suspected" terrorists
accused of belonging to or associated with the Taliban or al Qaeda terrorist
network as "illegal/unlawful enemy combatants"; the initial decision by the
administration not to apply the Geneva Conventions to these detainees subjected to
indefinite detention without trial and with inadequate review and the establishment
of military commissions to try some of them; secret detention of "high value
detainees;" harsh interrogation techniques to which several were subjected
resulting in systematic infliction of pain and suffering, rising to the level of torture;
warrantless electronic wiretapping and searches and invasive surveillance; and the
use of extraordinary renditions of prisoners to countries where they were tortured.
As the Bush administration characterized its efforts in combating terrorism as
fighting a global war on terror, its claim to use force for targeted killings even
beyond the zone of active armed conflict, such as in Yemen, and the US invasion
of Iraq, justified, in part, on Saddam Hussein's alleged contacts with al Qaeda and
terrorism, also came under scrutiny.
While campaigning for president, then-Senator Barack Obama promised to
close the military detention facility at Guantdnamo Naval Base if elected, and was
critical of several of the Bush administration's counter terrorism practices
mentioned above. True to his promise, on his third day in office, President Barack
Obama signed several executive orders charting a new direction by reversing most
of these questionable policies and practices, some of which will be the subject of
review in this essay.
I.

SELECTED COUNTERTERRORISM POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF THE BUSH

ADMINISTRATION AFTER

9/11

AND THE NEW DIRECTION TAKEN BY THE OBAMA

ADMINISTRATION

The following selected policies and practices will be reviewed here:
detention; interrogation techniques; military commissions; extraordinary rendition;
and targeted killing.

Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, concluded at Geneva, 8 June 1977, entered into
force 7 December 1978, 1977 U.N.J.Y.B. 95, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977), Article 75 prohibits
violations mentioned earlier under Common Article 3, including the right to be tried in one's presence
(Article 75, sec. 4(e)).
9. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.
609, 1977 U.N.J.Y.B. 135, 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977). Article 4 prohibits violations as mentioned earlier
under Common Article 3. Article 6 applies to the prosecution and punishment of criminal offenses
related to armed conflict, including the right to be tried in one's presence (Article 6(e)).
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A. The Guant6namo Detention Camp and the Issue of Detention
1.Trends
On January 22, 2009, President Barack Obama issued an Executive Order
directing that Guantdnamo detention facility be closed within one year.10 This was
based on the findings that over the past seven years the Department of Defense had
detained at Guantdnamo approximately 800 suspected terrorists as "enemy
combatants," raising "significant concerns nationally and internationally," 1 and
that "prompt and appropriate disposition of the individuals currently detained at
Guantdtnamo and closure of the facilities in which they are detained would further
the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States and the
interests of justice. ,1 2 The Executive Order also stated that the Guantdnamo
13
detainees have the constitutional privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
The President ordered 1) immediate review of the status of each Guantfnamo
detainee1 4 and 2) the detainees' confinement to be in accordance with humane
standards, including the application of Common Article 3 of the Geneva

Conventions. 15 During the review period, all proceedings before military
commissions were halted.1 6 The approximately 240 who remained in detention
(more than 525 detainees were released before President Obama took office) "shall
be returned to their home country, released, transferred to a third country, or
transferred to another United States detention facility in a matter consistent with
17
law and the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States.,
Subsequently, in his May 21, 2009, address, President Obama discussed in
detail the detainees' cases at Guantdnamo, which he said fell into five distinct
categories: 1) to try those who have violated American criminal laws in US federal
courts whenever feasible; 2) detainees who have violated the laws of war to be
tried through revised and reformed military commissions which are "fair,
legitimate, and effective;" 3) detainees who have been ordered released by the
courts; 4) detainees who can be transferred safely to another country; and 5)
detainees who cannot be prosecuted for past crimes because, for example, evidence
may be tainted, but who pose a clear danger to the security of the United States
will not be released.1 8 As of July 21, 2009, eleven prisoners had been
to Saudi Arabia, and one each to Chad, Iraq,
transferred-four to Bermuda, three
19
France, and the United Kingdom.

10. Exec. Order No. 13,492, Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at the Guantdnamo
Bay Naval Base and Closure of Detention Facilities, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,897 (Jan. 27, 2009).
11. Id. § 2(a).
12. Id. § 2(b).

13. Id. § l(c).
14. Id. § 4(a).
15. Id. § 6.
16. Id.§7.
17. Id.§3.
18. President's National Security Remarks, supra note 5.
19. Amnesty International, USA, Sounding a Note of Urgency, Judge Loses Patience Over
Guantanamo Case; Detention and Interagency Policy Task Forces Delay Reports, Al Index: AMR
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Elaborating on the fifth category, the President stated:
Al Qaeda terrorists and their affiliates are at war with the United States,
and those that we capture-like other prisoners of war-must be
prevented from attacking us again. Having said that, we must recognize
that these detention policies cannot be unbounded. They can't be based
simply on what I or the executive branch decide alone. That's why my
administration has begun to reshape the standards that apply to ensure
that they are in line with the rule of law. We must have clear,
defensible, and lawful standards for those who fall into this category.
We must have fair procedures so that we don't make mistakes. We
must have a thorough process of periodic review, so that any prolonged
detention is carefully evaluated and justified.2 °
He said that the objective is to construct a legitimate legal framework for the
remaining Guantdnamo detainees whom the administration cannot transfer and will
not release.
Earlier, on March 13, 2009, the Justice Department filed a memorandum in
the District of Columbia District Court regarding the administration's detention
authority pertaining to Guantdnamo detainees. 2' While it abandoned the Bush
administration's term "enemy combatant," the Obama administration argued in the
memorandum for the continued detention of Guantdnamo detainees. This, it said,
was pursuant to a valid exercise of the administration's authority to use force
against "members of an opposing armed force ... [including] the irregular forces
of an armed group like al-Qaeda" or "members of enemy forces," even if "they
have not actually committed or attempted to commit any act of depredation or
entered the theater or zone of active military operations." ,22
The Obama administration relied on the principles of the laws of war and on
the statutory authority given by Congress in its Authorization for the Use of
Military Force (AUMF) 23 to contend that "the President has authority to detain
persons who he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks" of September 11, 2001, and persons who harbored those responsible for
these attacks, and also
to detain in this armed conflict those persons who were part of, or
substantially supported Taliban or al-Qaeda forces or associated forces
that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition

51/084/2009,
July
ENGUSA20090721001.

21,

2009

available at

http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?id=

20. Id.

21. Respondents' Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention Authority Relative to
Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, In re Guantanamo
Bay Detainee Litigation, Misc. No. 08-442 (TFH) (D.C. 2009) [hereafter Obama Administration's
Memorandum].
22. Id., at 5-6.

23. Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub.L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
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partners, including any person who has committed a belligerent act,24 or
has directly supported hostilities, in aid of such enemy armed forces.
The Memorandum stated that the position the administration was asserting
was not "meant to define the contours of authority for military operations
generally, or detention in other contexts," but was limited to the Guantdnamo
detainees, as "[a] forward-looking multi-agency effort is under way to develop a
comprehensive detention policy with respect to individuals captured in connection
with armed conflicts and counterterrorism operations, and the views of the
Executive Branch may evolve as a result. 25 This was a reference to another
executive order signed by President Obama on January 22, 2009, for conducting a
review of detention policy options.26 Under this executive order, a Special Task
Force on Detainee Disposition was established
to conduct a comprehensive review of the lawful options available to
the Federal Government with respect to the apprehension, detention,
trial, transfer, release, or other disposition of individuals captured or
apprehended in connection with armed conflicts and counterterrorism
operations, and to identify such options as are consistent with the
national security and foreign policy interests of the United States and
27
the interests ofjustice.
The Task Force was to submit a report within six months but the Order provided
for an extension if necessary and the Task Force did seek an extension.
Finally, the November 20, 2008, Report of the US Senate Committee on
Armed Services on the Detainees' Treatment in U.S. Custody28 is revealing. It
indeed is a harsh indictment of those responsible for the abuse, as it states in its
Executive Summary:
The abuse of detainees in U.S. custody cannot simply be attributed
to the actions of"a few bad apples" acting on their own. The fact is that
senior officials in the United States government solicited information on
how to use aggressive techniques, redefined the law to create the
appearance of their legality, and authorized their use against detainees.
Those efforts damaged our ability to collect accurate intelligence that
could save lives, strengthened the hand of our enemies, and
compromised our moral authority. This report is a product of the
29
Committee's inquiry into how those unfortunate results came about.

24. Obama Administration's Memorandum, supra note 21, at 1-2, quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317
U.S. 1, 38 (1942).
25. Id. at 2.
26. Exec, Order No. 13,493, Review of Detention Policy Options, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,901 (Jan. 27,
2009).
27. Id. § 1(e).
28. Senate Armed Services Committee Inquiry Into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody,
110th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Nov. 20, 2008) available at http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/supporting/2008/
Detainees. 121108.pdf.
29. Id. at xii.
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The comprehensive report, comprising more than 230 pages, detailed the various
memoranda, opinions, recommendations, orders, and discussions and debates of
specific aggressive interrogation plans and techniques discussed above.
2. Appraisal and Recommendation
While abandoning the "enemy combatant" label, the Memorandum's new
definition authorizes detention, adding a requirement that a detainee would have to
have "substantially supported," and not merely "supported" al-Qaeda, the Taliban,
or forces associated with them in order to justify the detention. This definition
would obviously not have satisfied those who were critical of the Bush
administration's Guantdnamo detention policies-indefinite detention without
trial-because it seemed merely a continuation of the prior policies initiated by
President Bush. Joanne Mariner, terrorism and counterterrorism director at Human
Rights Watch, said, "By bringing the practice of indefinite detention without
charge onto US soil, the Obama administration would be closing Guantdnamo in
name only. President Obama should think hard about whether he wants to
institutionalize the discredited practice that made Guantdnamo a stain on the
reputation of the United States., 30 She added, "Pursuing a policy of indefinite
detention without charge would send the Obama administration down the same
misguided path as its predecessor. It would be a major break from longstanding
31
principles of American justice.
According to Steven A. Engel, who was a senior lawyer in the Bush
administration's Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel and responsible for
detainee issues, the term "enemy combatant" was not the issue. He observed that
the Memorandum's definition "seems fundamentally consistent with the positions
of the prior administration.", 32 He added, "The important point
is that they
33
recognize that we can detain members of the enemy" during a war.
The major issue of contention is the US assertion that it is engaged in a global
war against al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and their affiliated forces. Consequently, the
US claims the authority to capture a person from anywhere in the world and not
merely from the theater of an armed conflict, and detain that person indefinitely.
This authority it claims on the grounds of the person's support for or association
with al-Qaeda or the Taliban. As the Memorandum argued,
the AUMF is not limited to persons captured on the battlefields of
Afghanistan. Such a limitation "would contradict Congress' clear
intention, and unduly hinder both the President's ability to protect our
country from future acts of terrorism and his ability to gather vital

30. Human Rights Watch, US: Drop Plansfor Indefinite Detention Without Charge, June 29,
2009, available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/06/29/us-drop-plans-indefinite-detention-withoutcharge.
31. Id.
32. C. William Glaberson, U.S. Won't Label Terror Suspects as "Combatants, " N.Y. TIMES,
March 14, 2009, at Al available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/14/us/politics/14gitmo.html?
_r- 1&partner-msnbcpolitics&emc-rss.
33. Id.
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intelligence regarding the capability, operations, and intentions of this
Under a functional analysis,
elusive and cunning adversary."
individuals who provide substantial support to al-Qaeda forces in other
parts of the world may properly be deemed part of al-Qaeda itself. Such
activities may also constitute the type of substantial support that "in
international armed conflict, is
analogous circumstances in a traditional
34
detention.
justify
to
sufficient
Relying on Articles 3 and 4 of the Third Geneva Convention and Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols to the Geneva
Conventions and their Commentaries, the Memorandum rejected the Petitioner's
contention that the US can detain only those "directly participating in hostilities,"
35
Human Rights Watch's
and that all detainees must be treated as civilians.
Mariner urged the administration to reconsider its views and prosecute "terror
suspects in the federal courts, not [look] for ways to circumvent the criminal
justice system.36
Although the United States claims the power to capture a suspected terrorist
anywhere in the world, in reality those captured are primarily in Afghanistan,
which is the theater of the armed conflict, or the neighboring Pakistan, which
arguably is also part of the armed conflict theater. Thus, above all, the main issue
is the form, structure, and content of the preventive detention regime and the
nature of the legal protections afforded the detainees. As President Obama has
stated, the US detention policies must embody "clear, defensible, and lawful
standards" in line with the rule of law, with fair procedures and a thorough process
of periodic review to carefully evaluate and justify any prolonged detention.3 7 This
suggests that there will be adequate safeguards so that detainees' treatment is not
subject to an arbitrary decision process.
The President's call for the US detention policies to comply with the rule of
law implicitly suggests that the detainees will be treated fairly. Does this mean
that they will have the right to an independent hearing? Will an impartial body
providing adequate due process hear an appeal from the detainees? Will they be
informed of the reasons for which they are being held? Finally, will there be
judicial review of their detention? The President's Task Force has yet to provide
answers to these questions, and I hope that the Task Force report recommends that
38
detainees be entitled to these rights.

34. Obama Administration's Memorandum, supra note 21, at 7.
35. Id. at 8-10.
36. Human Rights Watch, US: Obama Should Reconsider New Position on Guantanamo
Detainees, March 13, 2009, available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/03/13/us-obama-shouldreconsider-new-position-guantanamo-detainees
37. See supra text accompanying note 20.
38. For similar suggestions see Anthony Dworkin, Beyond the "War on Terror: Towards a New
TransatlanticFrameworkfor Counterterrorism,EUR. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. 6-7 (May 27, 2009),
availableat http://ecfr.3cdn.net/1el8727eafdddcceb7_81 m6ibwez.pdf.
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B. Coercive InterrogationTechniques
1. Trends
The torture memos written by the Department of Justice in the Bush
administration have been the subject of much discussion in the recent past. In his
National Security Remarks, President Obama discussed his release of these
memos. In his words,
I did not do this because I disagreed with the enhanced interrogation
techniques that those memos authorized, and I didn't release the
documents because I rejected their legal rationales-although I do on
both counts. I released the memos because the existence of that
approach to interrogation was already widely known, the Bush
administration had acknowledged its existence, and I had already
39
banned those methods.
The Bush administration's authorization of coercive techniques was based on
the Department of Justice's memos and legal opinions. To illustrate, Jay S. Bybee,
then-Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel to Alberto
Gonzales, Counsel to the President, stated in his memo regarding Standards of
Conduct for Interrogation:
We conclude that for an act to constitute torture as defined in Section
2340, it must inflict pain that is difficult to endure. Physical pain
amounting to torture must be equivalent in intensity to the pain
accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure,

impairment of bodily function, or even death. For purely mental pain or
suffering to amount to torture under Section 2340, it must result in
significant psychological harm of significant duration, e.g., lasting for
months or even years. We conclude that the mental harm also must

result from one of the predicate acts listed in the statute, namely: threats
of imminent death; threats of infliction of the kind of pain that would
amount to physical torture; infliction of such physical pain as a means
of psychological torture, use of drugs or other procedures designed to
deeply disrupt the senses, or fundamentally alter an individual's
personality; or threatening to do any of these things to a third party.
The legislative history simply reveals that congress intended for the
statute's definition to track the Convention's definition of torture and
the reservations, understandings, and declarations that the United States
submitted with its ratification. We conclude that the 4statute, taken as a
whole, makes plain that it prohibits only extreme acts. 0

39. President's National Security Remarks, supra note 5.
40. Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee, Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to
the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogations under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Aug. 1,
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/
2002)
available
dojinterrogationmemo20020801.pdf.
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In another memo, regarding Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and
Taliban Detainees, Bybee concluded that the Geneva Conventions "do not protect
members of the al Qaeda organization, which as a 41non-State actor cannot be a
party to the international agreements governing war.,
It was on the basis of this second memo and on the legal opinion rendered by
the Attorney General in his letter of February 1, 2002, to President Bush, that the
President announced his decision that "none of the provisions of Geneva apply to
our conflict with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan or elsewhere throughout the world
because, among other reasons, al-Qaeda is not a High Contracting Party to
Geneva. 42 He further determined that although he had "the authority under the
Constitution to suspend Geneva as between the United States and Afghanistan," he
declined "to exercise that authority [at the time]" and thus determined "that the
provisions of Geneva will apply to [the] present conflict with the Taliban[,
reserving] the right to exercise this authority in this or future conflicts. 4 3 He also
determined that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions did not apply to
either al Qaeda or Taliban detainees, 44 and that, as unlawful combatants the
Taliban detainees do not qualify as prisoners of war under Article 4 of the Geneva
Conventions, nor do al Qaeda detainees, because the Conventions do not apply to
the US conflict with al Qaeda.4 5
The International Committee of the Red Cross issued a report on the treatment
of the "high-value" detainees held by the CIA, concluding that in many cases the
detainees had been tortured, a report that was leaked to the press in March 2009.46
The response of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the British Parliament was
telling, as in its 2007 Annual Report it contended that "given the clear differences
in definition, the UK can no longer rely on US assurances that it does not use
torture, and we recommend that the government ...not rely on such assurances in
the future. 47
President Obama rejected the Bush administration's interpretations of
international law redefining torture and thus allowing the infliction of pain and
suffering through coercive interrogation methods, such as "water-boarding," a
simulated drowning technique which results in near suffocation of suspected

41. Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee, Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to
the President, and William J. Haynes I1,General Counsel of the Department of Defense, Re:
Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan. 22, 2002) available at
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/012202bybee.pdf.
42. President George W. Bush, Memorandum for: the Vice President; the Secretary of State; the
Secretary of Defense; the Attorney General, et al., para. 2(a), at 1 (Feb. 7, 2002) available at
http://www.pegc.us/archive/WhiteHouse/bushmemo_20020207ed.pdf.
43. Id. para. 2(b).
44. Id. para. 2(c).
45. Id. para. 2(c) and (d).
46. International Committee of the Red Cross, ICRC Report on the Treatment of Fourteen "HighDetainees" in CIA Custody 26, February 2007 availableat www.nybooks.com/icrc-report.pdf.
Value '"
47. UK FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, HUMAN RIGHTS ANNUAL REPORT 2007 25

(2008) available at http://www.fco.gov.ul/en/about-the-fco/publications/publications/annual-reports/
human-rights-report I/.
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terrorists. The reversal came in an executive order he signed on January 22, 2009,
entitled EnsuringLawful Interrogations.48 The executive order revoked the earlier
Executive Order of 13440 of July 20, 2007, which had interpreted Geneva
Conventions Common Article 3 as applied to a program of detention and
interrogation operated by the Central Intelligence Agency. It also revoked all other
"executive directives, orders, and regulations inconsistent with this order issued
from September 11, 2001 to January 20, 2009, "concerning detention or the
interrogation of detained individuals.49
Henceforth, detainees are to be treated consistent with the pertinent laws and
treaties, including the Convention Against Torture and Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions.5 ° The CIA's interrogation techniques or treatments related
to interrogation must comply with nineteen interrogation methods outlined in the
Army Field Manual interrogation techniques and treatments. 51 Interpretations of
Common Article 3 must also be in conformity with the Army FieldManual and not
on any interpretations of federal criminal laws, the Convention Against Torture
and Common Article 3 issued by the Department of Justice between September 11,
2001, and January 20, 2009.52
Furthermore, the CIA's secret prisons are abolished and the CIA is prohibited
from operating any such detention facility in the future.53 The International
Committee of the Red Cross is to have access to detained individuals.54 Finally, a
Special Interagency Task Force is established to review interrogation practices
allowed by the Army Field Manual, "and, if warranted, to recommend any
additional or different guidance for other departments or agencies," and transfer
policies of individuals to other nations. 55 The Task Force was to report to the
President within six months or seek extension if necessary. It should be noted that
the report was delayed as the Task Force sought such extension. However, on
August 24, 2009, Attorney General Eric Holder announced that the Task Force on
Interrogations and Transfer Policies had proposed the establishment of a
"specialized interrogation group" of law enforcement, intelligence, and defense
officials "to conduct interrogations in a manner that will strengthen national
56
security consistent with the rule of law."

48. Exec. Order No. 13,491, Ensuring Lawful Interrogations, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (January 27,
2009).
49. Id.§l.
50. Id. § 3(a).
51. Id. § 3(b).
52. Id. § 3(c).
53. Id. § 4(a). On August 24, 2009, Attorney General Eric Holder appointed a federal prosecutor
to investigate CIA interrogation practices "after the Justice Department released a long-secret report
showing interrogators choked a prisoner repeatedly and threatened to kill another detainee's children."
Mark Mazzetti & Scott Shane, Investigation Is Ordered Into C.I.A. Abuse Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
25, 2009, at Al.
54. Id. § 4(b).
55. Id. § 5.
56. Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Special Task Force on Interrogations and Transfer
Policies Issues Its Recommendations to the President (Aug. 24, 2009) available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2009/August/09-ag-835.html.
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2. Appraisal and Recommendation
The Obama administration's unequivocal rejection of the coercive
interrogation techniques used against detainees under the Bush administration has
given a powerful message to the world community that the United States is setting
a new course, that it is renewing its commitment to strictly comply with
international human rights standards, and that its interrogation policies are now in
synch with the accepted international law norms on torture.
Along with issuing the executive order prohibiting torture, President Obama
has strongly expressed his opposition to torture, including the "core principle that
torture is never justified." On the 25th anniversary of the Torture Convention,
June 26, 2009, the President stated:
Torture violates United States and international law as well as human
dignity. Torture is contrary to the founding documents of our country,
and the fundamental values of our people. It diminishes the security of
those who carry it out, and surrenders the moral authority that must
form the basis for just leadership. That is why the United States must
never engage in torture, and must stand against torture wherever it takes

place.57
However, as the United States would rely upon the Eighth Amendment to the
Constitution's prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishments," its
interpretation may vary from an interpretation under the Convention Against
Torture mandate prohibiting "cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment." These
varying interpretations notwithstanding, the outcomes resulting from the
application of these standards may not be that different. Consequently, this is not
likely to create any major problem. But there still remains an outstanding issue
regarding the questioning of detainees held overseas by other countries and the use
of information received from such questioning. There is a need to formulate
common standards on this critical point, on which the US and its allies can agree. 5t
C. Trial by Military Commissions
1. Trends
President Obama's reversal of the Bush administration's counterterrorism
policies did not include the rejection of military commissions, which he supported
as having "a history in the United States dating back to George Washington and
the Revolutionary War. 59 He said they provide an appropriate venue to try
detainees accused of violating the laws of war, because they "allow for the
protection of sensitive sources and methods of intelligence-gathering; they allow
for the safety and security of participants; and for the presentation of evidence

57. Press Release, The White House, Statement by President Barack Obama on United Nations
International Day in Support of Torture Victims (June 26, 2009) http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/Statement-by-President-Barack-Obama-on-United-Nations-Intemational-Day-inSupport-of-Torture-Victims/.
58. For a similar recommendation, see Dworkin, supra note 38, at 7.
59. President's National Security Remarks, supra note 5.
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gathered from the battlefield that cannot always be effectively presented in federal
60

courts."

In 2006 the US Supreme Court held in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,61 that the
military commission procedure violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice, as
well as the Geneva Conventions.62 The Court observed that the military
commission's procedures must include the protections of Common Article 3,
of the accused to be present at trial and to have access to
including the right
63
evidence of guilt.
In response to Hamdan, where the Court had also ruled that the military
commission to try the suspected terrorist was not properly authorized by any
Congressional act, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act of 2 00 6 ,64
under which detained aliens determined to be enemy combatants were denied
jurisdiction with respect to habeas actions. 65 In a challenge on this issue before the
Supreme Court, Boumediene v. Bush,66 the Court ruled five-to-four that "the
privilege of habeas corpus entitled the prisoner to a meaningful opportunity to
demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to 'the erroneous application or
68
67
interpretation' of relevant law.", It held that the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA)
procedures under which the accused was being tried, and pursuant to which the
court reviews the legality of standards and procedures of Combatant Status Review
Tribunal determinations, was "an inadequate substitute for habeas corpus." 69 In
dissent, Chief Justice Roberts stressed that habeas may be suspended only under
the Suspension Clause and thus only when public safety requires it in times of
rebellion or invasion.70
It is also worth noting that the US Human Rights Council's Special
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental
freedoms while countering terrorism, Martin Sheinin, criticized the use of military
commissions to try terrorist suspects.7' In his report following his mission to the
United States of America in May 2007, Sheinin noted "issues surrounding the
independence of the commissions, their potential use to try civilians, and their lack
60. Id.
61. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). It was a five-to-three decision, with Chief Justice
Roberts recusing himself as he had voted in favor of the government when the case was heard by the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia as Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
62. Id. at 615-625.
63. Id. at 635.
64. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub.L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (Oct. 17, 2006).
65. Id. § 7.
66. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008).
67. Id. at 2266, citing IN.S.v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 302 (2001).
68. Detainee Treatment Act (DTA), Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680, 2739 (2005), (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd(a) (2006)).
69. Id. at 2274.
70. 128 S.Ct. at 2296.
71. U.N. Human Rights Council, Martin Sheinin, Promotion and Protection of all Human Rights,
Civil, Political,Economic, Social and CulturalRights, Including the Right to Development: Report of
the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights while countering terrorism,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/6/17/Add.3, at 2-3 (Nov. 22, 2007).
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of appearance of impartiality," and also addressed various issues concerning
evidentiary proceedings before these commissions and the consequences of
acquittal or completion of sentence following conviction.72
As mentioned earlier, President Obama did not reject the use of military
commissions to try detainees, although he considered them as constituted under the
Bush administration "flawed" and needing reform. He stated his proposed plan of
reform:
We will no longer permit the use of evidence-as evidence statements
that have been obtained using cruel, inhuman or degrading interrogation
methods. We will not longer place the burden to prove that hearsay is
unreliable on the opponent of the hearsay, and we will give detainees
greater latitude in selecting their own counsel, and more protections if
they refuse to testify [, thus making] our military commissions a more
credible and effective means of administering justice..."'3
The President said that he would work with Congress to reform the military
commissions system. The legislation backed by his administration for revising the
military commissions was included in section 1031 of the National Defense
Under the proposed Act, alien
Authorization Act for fiscal year 2010. 74
individuals previously labeled "unlawful enemy combatants" are now called
"unprivileged enemy belligerents," who, having engaged in hostilities or supported
hostilities against the United States can be tried before the commissions for
violation of the laws of war and other offenses. The Act would establish
procedures governing the use of these commissions.
2. Appraisal and recommendations
The military commissions system came under criticism both nationally and
internationally. For example, Lord Goldsmith, then Attorney General of the
United Kingdom, said in May 2006 that he was "unable to accept that the US
military tribunals proposed for those detained at Guantanamo Bay offered
sufficient guarantees of a fair trial in accordance with international standards. 7 5

72. Id., ch. Ill.
73. President's National Security Remarks, supra note 5.
74. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, S. 1390, H.R. 2647, 11 1th Cong.
Ch. 47A, Subch. I, § 948(b)-(d) (2009).
75. UK calls for Guantanamo closure, BBC NEWS, May 10, 2006, available at
More recently, Lord Goldsmith has shared
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk-news/politics/4759317.stm.
his reflections:
[M]y view of the original Military Commissions for those detained at
Guantanamo Bay are well known. When British nations were slated for trial I
went to Washington to negotiate. My position was simple: put them on trial, a
fair trial in accordance with international standards or release them. I considered
the rules and regulations in detail over a period of months in the summer and fall
of 2003. My clear conclusion was that the Military Commissions did not provide
such guarantees. I advised that we should not allow our citizens to stand trial in
such circumstances and insisted that they be returned to the UK -- which
ultimately they were.
Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 30.
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That was before the Congress adopted the Military Commissions Act of 2006.
However, even after the new legislation was adopted, the system was not
acceptable to many critics, especially since it did not prohibit the use of evidence
obtained through coercion, it treated aliens and US citizens differently, and it
76
excluded the application of habeas corpus.
Now that President Obama has prohibited the use of evidence obtained
through "cruel, inhuman, or degrading" interrogation methods, a major stumbling
block is lifted. Also, he has indicated that US proceedings will comply with
generally accepted international standards of due process. The reformed military
commissions must be seen as impartial, capable of providing fair trials, and they
should offer essential procedural guarantees, such as those embodied in the
These include the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.77
78
publicly, 79
pronounced
judgment
the
have
to
right
the
innocence,
presumption of
the right to be informed promptly of the charges,80 the right to have counsel of
one's choosing,81 the right to be tried without delay,8 2 the right to be tried in one's
presence,8 3 the right to call witnesses and to cross-examine the prosecution's
the right not to be compelled to testify against oneself, or to
witnesses, 84 and
85
confess guilt.
86
D. ExtraordinaryRendition
1. Trends
The policy of rendition means "the return of a fugitive from one state to the
state where the fugitive is accused or convicted of a crime. 87 Such a transfer is
outside the official process of extradition to return the fugitive to the receiving
country to face legal process. Renditions undertaken by the Bush administration
are termed "extraordinary" because after September 11, 2001, the CIA was
authorized to engage in transporting outside any judicial process suspected
terrorists to undisclosed locations around the world where they were kept
76. Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 30. Lord Goldsmith considered these provisions to be the major
problems, along with the provision which "allows evidence that would not be admitted normally to be
relied on." Id.
77. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, entered into force March 23, 1976, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967).
78. Id. art. 14(2).
79. Id. art. 14(1).
80. Id. art. 14(3)(a).
81. Id. art. 14(3)(b).
82. Id. art. 14(3)(c).
83. Id. art. 14(3)(d).
84. Id. art. 14(3)(e).
85. Id. art. 14(3)(g).
86. See generally Leila Nadya Sadat, Extraordinary Rendition, Torture, and Other Nightmares
from the War on Terror, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1200 (2007); Louis Fisher, ExtraordinaryRendition:
The Price of Secrecy, 57 AM. UNIV. L. REV. 1405 (2008); Robert Johnson, Note: Extraordinary
Rendition: A Wrong Without a Right, 43 UNIV. RICH. L. REV. 1135 (2009); Mario Silva, Extraordinary
Rendition: A Challenge to Canadian and United States Legal Obligations Under the Convention
Against Torture, 39 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 313 (2009).
87. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1322 (8th ed. 2004).
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Those transferred included detainees at Abu Ghraib where they were initially
abused. Subsequently, the CIA employed private contractors to transfer suspected
terrorists in private jets to selected destinations where they faced real risk of torture
or other ill treatment. Investigations have revealed that those rendered were
subjected to brutal, harsh techniques and many were treated in violation of the
Convention Against Torture.88 Several countries were reportedly involved in
allegedly facilitating extraordinary renditions or assisting in the rendition process.
These included Afghanistan, Bosnia, Canada, Egypt, Germany, Indonesia, Italy,
Japan, Jordan, Macedonia, Morocco, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden,
Syria, and the United Kingdom.89
The veil of secrecy was eventually lifted after investigative reporting by
journalists, 90 reports by human rights organizations, 9 1 studies conducted by the

88. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, G.A. Res. 39/46 (Annex), U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess.,
Supp. No.51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1985), reprintedin 23 I.L.M 1027 (1984).
89. See STEPHEN GREY, GHOST PLANE: THE TRUE STORY OF THE CIA TORTURE PROGRAM, at
app. B (2006) [hereafter Ghost Plane]; Eminent Jurists Panel, supra note 6, at 81.
90. See, e.g., Ghost Plane, supra note 89; Comm. on Int'l Human Rights of the Ass'n of the Bar of
the City of N.Y. & Ctr. for Human Rights and Global Justice, N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Torture by
Proxy: Internationaland Domestic Law Applicable to "ExtraordinaryRenditions " 15 (2004) available
at http://www.chrgj.org/docs/TortureByProxy.pdf; Dana Priest, Memo Lets CIA Take Detainees Out of
Iraq, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2004, at Al; Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of
America's "Extraordinary Rendition" Program, NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005 available at
www.newyorker.com; Douglas Jehl & David Johnston, Rule Change Lets C.I.A. Freely Send Suspects
Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, March 6, 2005, at Al; Dana Priest, CIA's Assurances on Transferred Suspects
Doubted, WASH. POST, March 17, 2005, at Al; Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret
Prisons: Debate is Growing Within Agency About Legality and Moralit, of Overseas System Set Up
After 9/11,WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2005, at Al; Dana Priest, CIA Program Withstands New Furor,
WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2005, at Al; Dan Bilefsky, European Inquiry Says C.I.A. Flew 1,000 Flights in
Secret, N.Y. TIMES, April 27, 2006, at AI2; Craig Whitlock, European Probe Finds Signs of CIA-Run
Secret Prisons,WASH. POST, June 8, 2006, at A16; Craig Whitlock, European Report Details Flights by
CIA Aircraft, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2006, at A14; Stephen Grey & Doreen Carvajal, Secret Prisons in
2 Countries Held Qaeda Suspects, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2007, at A12; Molly Moore,
Report Gives Details on CIA Prisons,WASH. POST, June 9, 2007, at Al.
91. See, e.g., Amnesty International, USA, Below the Radar: Front Companies Used in Secret
Flights to Torture and "Disappearance," At Index No. AMR 51/054/2006, April 4, 2006; Human
Rights Watch, Sweden Violated Torture Ban in CIA Rendition: DiplomaticAssurances Against Torture
Offer No ProtectionFrom Abuse (Nov. 9, 2006) available at www.hrw.org. A 2008 report by Amnesty
International details several European states' role in rendition and secret detention, Amnesty
International, State of Denial: Europe's Role in Rendition and Secret Detention, Al Index No. Eur.
01/003/2008 (2008). The organization reports
European states concealed their role in renditions and secret detention until
2004. Today, after painstaking research by Amnesty International, other NGOs,
journalists, lawyers, prosecutors in a few European states, and two bodies of the
Council of Europe and the European Parliament, some of the facts are now
known -- as is the suffering of the victims of rendition and enforced
disappearance and their families. But much remains concealed, due largely to
the failure of states to co-operate with investigations or to carry their own
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Council of Europe 92 and the United Kingdom, 93 and hearings before the US
Congress.94 Congress subsequently enacted the Detainee Treatment Act 95 to ban
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.
In a news conference on June 9, 2006, President Bush eventually confirmed
the existence of the CIA's rendition program.96 Subsequently, on September 6,
2006, he revealed further information on the CIA rendition program. 97 He said
that, in addition to the suspected terrorists held at Guantdnamo,
a small number of suspected terrorist leaders and operatives captured
during the war have been held and questioned outside the United States,
in a separate program operated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This
group includes individuals believed to be the key architects of the
September the 1 th attacks and attacks on the USS Cole, an operative
involved in the bombings of our Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and
individuals involved in other attacks that have taken the lives of
innocent civilians across the world. These are dangerous men with
unparalleled knowledge about terrorist networks and their plans of new
our citizens depend
attacks. The security of our Nation and the lives of
98
know.
terrorists
these
what
learn
to
ability
on our

independent and impartial investigations.
Id. at 2.
92. See, e.g., Report, Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Committee on Legal Affairs
and Human Rights, Rapporteur Dick Marty, Alleged Secret Detentions and Unlawful Inter-State
Transfers Involving Council of Europe Member States, Doc. 10957, June 12, 2006 available at
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc06/EDOC 10957.htm (revealing a
global "spider's web" of CIA detentions and transfers and alleged collusion by 14 Council of Europe
Member States); Report, Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Committee on Legal Affairs and
Human Rights, Secret Detentions and Illegal Transfers of Detainees Involving Council of Europe
Member States: Second Report, Explanatory Memorandum, Rapporteur Dick Marty, Doc. 11302 rev.,
June 11, 2007 (reporting that secret agreements developed around NATO authorization agreed on
October 4, 2001, led to grant of blanket overflight rights and access to ports and military bases by
European countries for covert CIA operations, including secret detentions and rendition); Comm. on the
Alleged use of Eur. Countries by the CIA for the Transportation and Illegal Detention of Prisoners, Eur.
Par]. Doc. A6-0020/2007 (2007) availableat www.europarl.europa.eu.
93. See, e.g., All Party Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition, Briefing: Torture by
Proxy: International and Domestic Law Applicable to "Extraordinary Renditions" (Dec. 2005),
available at http://www.chrgj.org/docs/APPG-NYU%20Briefing%2OPaper.pdf.
94. See, e.g., Rendition to Torture: The Case of Maher: Hearing before the Subcomm. on
International Organizations,Human Rights, and Oversight of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs and the
Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th
Cong. (2007).
95. DTA, supra note 68.
96. President's news conference with Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen of Denmark, 42
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1105, 1111 (June 9, 2006).
97. President George W. Bush, Remarks on the War on Terror, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1569, 1570 (Sept. 6, 2006). President Bush said, "[W]hat I'll tell the Prime Minister, is that in cases
where we're not able to extradite somebody who is dangerous, sometimes renditions take place. It's
been a part of our Government for quite a period of time ... in order to protect people. And as we do
so, we protect the sovereign rights of nations that we're involved with." Id.
98. Id.
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President Bush also disclosed that fourteen suspected terrorists, who were
then held in CIA custody, were to be transferred to Guantdnamo and their
questioning there would comply with the new Army Field Manual. 99
As mentioned above, early in his administration President Obama ordered the
closure of CIA secret prisons and prohibited the Agency from operating any such
detention facility in the future. l00 However, he did not ban the transfer of
suspected terrorists to other countries, but instead appointed a Task Force to
review transfer policies of individuals to other countries. On August 24, 2009,
Attorney General Eric Holder announced the Task Force's proposal of new
policies under which the practice of transferring terrorism suspects to third
countries for detention and interrogation will continue but will "ensure that U.S.
practices in such transfers comply with U.S. law, policy and international
obligations and do not result in the transfer of individuals to face torture."' 0 '
2. Appraisal and Recommendations

Extraordinary renditions conducted by the CIA came under heavy criticism,
both domestically and internationally. The US policy and its practices were seen
as violations of the basic human rights norms, as prisoners were reportedly tortured
and ill-treated. The case of Maher Arar'0 2 brought home the abuses associated
with such renditions. Arar, who holds dual citizenship of Canada and Syria and
lives and works in Canada, was detained at Kennedy Airport in New York while in
transit to Canada in September 2002 under suspicion of association with al Qaeda.
He was arrested and held for thirteen days by the US authorities and interrogated
without access to counsel, and was then transferred to Syria, notwithstanding his
objection that he risked torture there. Held in Syria for nearly a year, he was
repeatedly tortured there. Eventually Syria concluded that Arar had no terrorist
links and released him.
The Canadian government came under heavy criticism as it was considered
complicit in this rendition. A commission of inquiry established by the Canadian
government found Arar to have no association with al Qaeda and also confirmed
that he had been tortured. 10 3 He received financial compensation from Canada, 10 4
since Canada had likely supplied the US with information that was "inaccurate."
The Commission concluded that both the Canadian and US officials violated their

99. Id. at 1573-74.
100. Exec. Order No. 13,491, supra note 53.
101. Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Special Task Force on Interrogations and Transfer
Policies Issues Its Recommendations to the President (Aug. 24, 2009) available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2009/August/09.ag0835.html.
102. Comm'n of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, Report
of the Events Relating to Maher Arar, Vol. I
Factual Background, Vol. I1 Analysis &
Recommendations, Canada, Sept. 18, 2006 [Arar Commission].
103. Id.
104. lan Austen, Canada Will Pay $9.75 Million to Man Sent to Syria and Tortured, N.Y. TIMES,

Jan. 27, 2007, at A5.
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obligations under Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and violated
the
10 5
principle of non refoulement by carrying out the extraordinary rendition.
Arar brought suit in a US federal district court seeking money damages and
declaratory relief from the government and several officials, including Attorney
General John Ashcroft, 10 6 but he was denied a remedy. The Bush administration
claimed that the lawsuit implicated national security and foreign policy
considerations. The district court's response was that
the task of balancing individual rights against national-security concerns
is one that courts should not undertake without the guidance or the
authority of the coordinate branches, in whom the Constitution imposes
responsibility for our foreign affairs and national security. Those
branches have the responsibility to determine whether judicial oversight
is appropriate. Without explicit legislation, judges should be hesitant to
fill an arena that, until now, has been left untouched-perhaps
deliberately-by the Legislative and Executive branches. To do
otherwise would threaten "our customary policy of deference to the
President in matters of foreign affairs."... [citations omitted.] In sum,
whether the policy be seeking to undermine or overthrow foreign
governments, or rendition, judges should not, in the absence of explicit
direction by Congress, hold officials who carry out such policies liable
for damages even if such conduct violates our treaty obligations or
07
customary international law.
On Arar's appeal, the Second Circuit characterized the case as an immigration
case, thus denying Arar any remedy'0 8 on his claim invoking alleged violations
under the Torture Victim Prevention Act and the Fifth Amendment of the US
Constitution."
It is worth noting that the Convention Against Torture's ban on torture is
absolute. In Saadi v. Italy,11 ° the European Court of Human Rights unequivocally
stated that a state's obligation not to expel or extradite an individual to the
receiving state where s/he would face a real risk of torture was subject to no
exceptions whatsoever, no matter how "undesirable or dangerous" the involved
person's conduct may be. 1 1' This is the existing standard and it is the one the US
must follow.

105. Arar Commission, supra note 102, Vol. II, at 13-16.
106. Arar v. Ashcrofi, 414 F.Supp.2d 250 (E.D. N.Y. 2006).
107. Arar, 414 F.Supp.2d at 283.
108. Arar v. Ashcroft, 537 F.3d 157, 184 (2d. Cir. 2008) (denying private right of action for a
victim claiming alleged rendition to a receiving state where there was a likelihood that torture would

occur).
109. Arar, 537 F.3d at 163.
110. Saadi v. Italy, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 37201/06 (2008). See also U.N. Human Rights Comm.,
Views of 6 November 2006, Alzery v. Sweden, Communication No. 1416/2005; U.N. Comm. against
Torture, Views of 20 May 2005, Agiza v. Sweden, Communication No. 233/2003, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/34/D/233/2003 (2005).
111. Saadi, supra note 110.
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The Eminent Jurists Panel has aptly described extraordinary rendition as
violating "numerous human rights, including the rights protecting individuals
against arbitrary arrest, enforced disappearance, forcible transfer, or subjection to
12
The Panel further
torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment."'
noted:
When a rendered person is held in secret detention, or held for
interrogation by authorities of other States, with no information
supplied to family members or others regarding the detention, this
constitutes an enforced disappearance, a crime under international law.
Where renditions are part of a widespread and systematic government
policy, they may also amount to crimes against humanity. A raft of
and international criminal law standards
international human rights
13
apply to such situations.
If the United States continues to use the practice of rendition, it must ensure
that it scrupulously abides by its obligations under international law. If there are
substantial grounds to believe, based on past practices, that the receiving country is
likely to subject the transferred individual to torture or cruel and inhuman
assurances from the receiving
treatment, no transfer should take place. Diplomatic
4
"
suffice.
not
must
torture
not
will
it
that
country
E. TargetedKilling
1. Trends
The United States, along with Israel, has faced world-wide criticism for the
policy of targeted killing. 1 5 Those who distinguish targeted killing from extrajudicial executions rely upon the invocation of international humanitarian law
instead of human rights law. They also would distinguish targeted killing from
assassination, which they would argue involves treachery or perfidy and is the
killing of a political leader." 6 The US has continued its use of unmanned Predator
drones in the aftermath of 9/11 for launching missiles and targeting suspected
terrorists. The case of the US targeting an associate of Osama Bin Laden in
Yemen, along with several other suspected terrorists, in November 2002, received
wide attention, especially as there was no armed conflict in the area where the
attack took place."17
As the US pursues its global "war on terror," accounts of such attacks are
reported every day. While the critics consider these attacks a violation of
112. Eminent Jurists Panel, supra note 6, at 80.
113. Id. at 81 (citation omitted).
114. See, e.g., JULIA HALL, NOT THE WAY FORWARD: THE UK'S DANGEROUS RELIANCE ON

Oct.
22, 2008) available at
Watch
Rights
(Human
ASSURANCES
DIPLOMATIC
http://www.hrw.org/en/node/75603/section/9 (asserting that diplomatic assurances cannot be trusted).
115. See generally W. Jason Fisher, Targeted Killing, Norms, and InternationalLaw, 45 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 711 (2007); Amos Guiora, TargetedKilling as Active Self-Defense, 37 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 319 (2005).
116. See Guiora, supra note 115, at 330.
117. See David Kretzmer, Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-JudicialExecutions or
Legitimate Means of Defence?, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 171, 171-173 (2005).
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international law,I18 others consider them legal and effective, 119 as they satisfy the

international humanitarian law requirement of "proportionality." It is also argued
that the norm permitting targeted killing as a counter-terrorism tactic is emerging
and evolving, 120 and that international lawyers should respond to the likely
emergence of this norm by defining "the limits of targeted killing's legitimate use
execution so as to
and distinguish[ing] it from assassination and extra-judicial
2
protect the strength of those legal rules and norms."'1 '
One could justify the targeted strikes by the US in Pakistan on the ground that
the geographical region of conflict stretches from Afghanistan to Pakistan, that
suspected al Qaeda and Taliban terrorists and their associates often cross that
porous frontier, and that Pakistan has implicitly consented to such attacks.
While the Obama administration has prohibited the Central Intelligence
al Qaeda leaders, the practice of targeted killings is
Agency's plans to 2assassinate
2
likely to continue. 1
2. Appraisal and Recommendation
Critics are likely to consider the attempt to distinguish targeted killings from
either extra-judicial killings or assassinations as nothing more than playing with
semantics. The key debatable issue remains the United States' claim of conducting
a global war on terror and hence its justification for targeted killing of suspected
terrorists anywhere in the world instead of its being limited to the area of
hostilities. It is recommended that the Obama administration review its policy
authorizing the killing of suspected terrorists outside the geographical region of
armed conflict. However, as the Obama administration continues to follow the
global "war on terror" paradigm, it is likely to consider suspected terrorists all over
the world as valid targets. It is recommended that the administratioli review this
policy with respect to its geographical aspects; and if killings are sought outside
the area of hostilities the "proportionality" element be strictly adhered to, and that
if terrorists can be apprehended killings should be a last resort.
III.

OTHER PERSPECTIVES

The contributions in this Symposium issue of the Denver Journal of
InternationalLaw & Policy analyze the Bush administration's claim that it was at
war against the terrorists, that the war was global, and that, pursuant to the nature
of the conflict, the administration followed reasonable policies and practices to
118. See, e.g., Orna Ben-Naftali & Keren R. Michaeli, We Must Not Make a Scarecrow of the Law:
A Legal Analysis of the Israeli Policy of Targeted Killings, 36 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 233 (2003);
Kretzmer, supra note 117; Vincent-Joel Proulx, If the Hat Fits, Wear It, If the Turban Fits, Run For
Your Life: Reflections on the Indefinite Detention and Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists, 56
HASTINGS L. J. 801 (2005)
119. See, e.g., Daniel Byman, Do Targeted Killings Work?, 85 FOREIGN AFF. 95 (2006); Asa
Kasher & Amos Yadlin, Assassination and Preventive Killing, 25 SAIS REV. 41 (2005); Guiora, supra
note 115.
120. Fisher, supra note 115.
121. Id. at 751.
122. See Mark Mazzetti & Scott Shane, CIA Had Plan to Assassinate Qaeda Leaders, N.Y. TIMES,
July 14, 2009.
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protect the US and its interests. As this symposium took place in October 2008,
even in their revised submissions the participants had little opportunity to address
the incoming administration's approach.
Based on the Henry and Mary Bryan Distinguished Lecture delivered by
Professor Leila Sadat, the lead essay is A Presumption of Guilt: The Unlawful
Enemy Combatant and the U.S. War on Terror. Sadat is highly critical of the Bush

administration's labeling of suspected terrorists as "unlawful enemy combatants,"
which she calls a "euphemistic and novel term." This classification, she argues,
has led to the deprivation of "normal" legal protections, such as the presumption of
innocence, to those so classified. She asserts that the US violated both
international human rights law and international humanitarian law in continuing
this practice, and concludes with recommendations for the new administration,
several of which the Obama administration has already followed. These include
the closing of the Guantdnamo facility, the establishment of a task force to evaluate
detention policies, mandating humane treatment for all detainees in US custody,
recommitment to the adherence to the domestic and international rule of law, and
to give serious consideration to ratifying the American Convention on Human
Rights.
In Immigration and Immigration Law After 9/11: Getting it Straight,

Professor James A.R. Nafziger rigorously analyzes the US immigration policy in
the wake of the 9/11 tragedy. He studies in detail the contemporary trends in the
US among migrants, law enforcement, and public opinion, which he rightly
considers are essential to understand before one explores options to shape the
future US immigration law and policy. Nafziger suggests that since 9/11, the
public agenda in the United States has been primarily concerned with issues related
to border security, guest workers, more rigorous sanctions for employing
undocumented persons, and expanding the opportunities for legal residency and
citizenship. However, he notes that unfortunately Congress has not been able to
pass a single comprehensive bill addressing all these concerns. He finds that after
9/11 terrorist threats and the presence of undocumented workers in the US were
seen as closely associated and he recommends that the issues of migration be decoupled from terrorist threats to homeland security.
Professor David Aronofsky and Matthew Cooper, Esq., ask in their essay, The
War on Terror and InternationalHuman Rights: Does Europe Get it Right? After

an in-depth study of what they consider to be intractable problems in US litigation
regarding the war on terror, they answer that Europe does indeed get it right as it
wages its "war on terror" without violating fundamental legal rights. And, if
violations occur, European courts provide meaningful redress to the victims of ill
treatment by their governments.
The authors study several selected cases in US courts in which suspected
terrorists detained were denied fundamental due process rights at trial. They
meticulously analyze the case law addressing extraordinary renditions, "enemy
combatant" status, warrantless wiretapping and searches, US collaboration with
human rights violators in other countries, habeas corpus violations, and military
tribunals. They highlight what they consider to be some of the fundamental legal
policy problems with the results of US litigation on these issues as they find them
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to be inconsistent with both human rights principles and sound national security
law principles.
The authors next study pertinent cases before European courts, which are
similar to those addressed by US courts. The difference is that European courts,
contrasted with their US counterparts, have scrupulously adhered to guaranteeing
human rights to the accused. These rights include full investigations, fair trials, no
refoulement of suspected terrorists to a receiving state where there is a substantial
likelihood of torture and other ill treatment, effective investigations of allegations
of government abuses, adjudication of allegations of mistreatment, inadmissibility
of evidence obtained by coercive interrogations, prohibition of judicially
unsupervised electronic surveillance, and finally, adequate legal remedies to
victims of abuses. They recommend that the US examine and learn from the
European practice.
Professor David Akerson and Natalie Knowlton, Esq., raise a difficult issue in
their article President Obama and the International Criminal Law of Successor
Liability. The question relates to the doctrine of command responsibility, which is
codified in international humanitarian law and applied as a form of individual
criminal liability by all the international tribunals created since the establishment
of the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia.
Under the
command responsibility theory, a commander could face criminal liability for
failing to punish his subordinates who committed the crimes. But what if the
commander in question has assumed command after the commission of the crime?
That is precisely the issue regarding successor liability-does one who has had no
involvement in the crimes, or opposed the policies of her/his predecessor have a
duty to punish and face criminal liability for failure to discharge that duty?
The authors analyze the recent developments regarding the current status of
successor liability under international law and then review the allegations of
torture and unlawful detainment committed by the Bush administration. Under the
US Constitution the President as Commander-in-Chief has the superiorsubordinate relationship as he has effective control over subordinates. The
question is: is President Obama, as Commander-in-Chief, who also has the
knowledge that under the Bush administration these alleged criminal acts occurred,
criminally liable if he does not punish these subordinates? The authors provide
policy arguments both in favor of and against successor liability. They conclude
that, while the law is unclear, the call on President Obama to appoint a special
prosecutor to investigate crimes allegedly committed during his predecessor's term
raises the relevance of this topic.
Professor Upendra D. Acharya addresses the perennial intractable problem of
defining terrorism in War On Terror or Terror Wars: The Problem in Defining
Terrorism. He traces the history of myriad attempts by the international
community to find a definition on which there can be consensus and how the
failure to do so resulted in a patchwork of substitutes rather than a comprehensive
approach. The outcome was the negotiation of thirteen international treaties
relating to terrorism in specific contexts-civil aviation, internationally protected
persons, maritime issues, nuclear material, plastic explosives, taking of hostages,
suppression of the financing of terrorism and of terrorist bombings, safety of the
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continental shelf, and violence at airports. These treaties established international
standards designating specific criminal acts as terrorism.
Acharya studies in depth these treaties related to terrorism and then reviews
the UN General Assembly and Security Council pronouncements of terrorism as a
crime in the various resolutions these bodies have adopted. This is followed by a
detailed look at how in the post-9/11 era terrorism was transformed into an act of
war from an act of crime and what the implications of this change are. He is
critical of the war on terror paradigm and concludes that the failure internationally
to define terrorism has led to international "lawlessness" and "unilateral
vigilantism." He makes a plea to the international community to agree on a
broader definition of terrorism which includes the terrorist activities conducted by
all states-failed, non failed, and powerful states, as well.
In the final paper, Krishma C. Parsad, Esq., examines the interpretation and
application of international law by the United States in its practice of extraordinary
renditions in Illegal Renditions and Improper Treatment. An Obligation to Provide
Refugee Remedies Pursuantto the Convention Against Torture. Her focus is on
the principle of non-refoulement embodied in the 1951 Refugee Convention and
subsequently it is made non-derogable in the Convention Against Torture.
After assessing the pertinent law applicable to renditions-the Convention
Against Torture, cases by the Committee Against Torture and other international
tribunals, and domestic US legislation, especially US refugee law-Parsad stresses
the importance of judicial review for asylum-seekers and strict scrutiny
surrounding diplomatic assurances. She calls for the application of human rights
treaties by states when they act outside of their respective territories, and
specifically for extraterritorial application of refugee law and policy, which
provides remedies for people in of being sent to countries that engage in torture
and other unlawful treatment.
IV. CONCLUSION

There is broad consensus that the Bush administration's war on terror led to
violations of international human rights law as well as international humanitarian
law.
There is equally wide consensus that the Obama administration is
endeavoring to change the prior policies so as to conform its practices to what the
international community would perceive as adherence to the rule of law, both
domestically and internationally.
Notwithstanding this shift under the Obama administration, the global "war
on terror" nomenclature has serious implications. How far can the US reach in its
use of force against suspected terrorists? How long can it detain them? Can or
should it render individuals to other countries for interrogation and intelligencegathering? Can or should it try suspected terrorists in special security courts or
military tribunals? How to balance the law enforcement model and the laws of war
in order to accomplish the goal of ensuring national security remains as yet
unresolved. Similarly, how to ensure both national security and personal liberty
(which includes fundamental human rights and basic due process guarantees) has
yet to be decided. Given that international terrorism is likely to endure at least for
some time in the future, the Obama administration and its successors, as well as
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other liberal democratic states, will have to struggle with these questions. The
work in progress must not lose sight of the need to strengthen international human
rights law and not even inadvertently dilute it.

A PRESUMPTION OF GUILT:
THE UNLAWFUL ENEMY COMBATANT AND THE U.S.
WAR ON TERROR
LEILA NADYA SADAT*

I. INTRODUCTION

Since the advent of the so-called "Global War on Terror," the United States of
America has responded to the crimes carried out on American soil that day by
using or threatening to use military force against Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, North
Korea, Syria, and Pakistan. The resulting projection of American military power
resulted in the overthrow of two governments - the Taliban regime in Afghanistan,
the fate of which remains uncertain, and Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq - and
"war talk" ebbs and flows with respect to the other countries on the U.S.
government's "most wanted" list. As I have written elsewhere, the Bush
administration employed a legal framework to conduct these military operations
that was highly dubious - and hypocritical - arguing, on the one hand, that the
United States was on a war footing with terrorists but that, on the other hand,
because terrorists are so-called "unlawful enemy combatants," they were not
entitled to the protections of the laws of war as regards their detention and
treatment. 1 The creation of this euphemistic and novel term - the "unlawful enemy
combatant" - has bewitched the media and even distinguished justices of the
United States Supreme Court. It has been employed to suggest that the prisoners
captured in this "war" are not entitled to "normal" legal protections, but should
instead be subjected to a r~gime d'exception - an extraordinary regime-created

de novo by the Executive branch (until it was blessed by Congress in the Military
. Henry H. Oberschelp Professor of Law and Director, Whitney R. Harris World Law Institute,
Washington University in St. Louis. This article was originally given as the Henry & Mary Bryan
Lecture at the 2008 Sutton Colloqium held on Oct. 25, 2008 at the University of Denver Sturm College
of Law.
I would like to thank both Denver College of Law & The Nanda Center for International Law for
this invitation, and express my gratitude to Ved and Kathryn Nanda and their wonderful students for
their gracious hospitality. This is a very special opportunity for me, as my work in this area began at a
conference held here in 2002, at a time during which it was very difficult to criticize Bush
administration policy. I, and others like me, are deeply indebted to Ved Nanda, who provided a safe
space in which to speak truth to power at a time when not many law schools or universities were willing
to do so. I am honored to return here today, in the final days of the Bush presidency, to reflect upon
what the past seven years have wrought, and consider the way forward.
1. Leila Nadya Sadat, Terrorism and the Rule of Law, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 135,
140 n.16 (2004).
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Commissions Act of 2006)2 _ in which any protections afforded the suspects
become simply a matter of grace.
One cannot find the term "unlawful enemy combatant" in the Geneva
Conventions or other treatises on the law of war. The administration traces its use
to the case of Ex parte Quirin, a World War II opinion addressing the question
whether Nazi "spies and saboteurs," who had entered the United States during the
war, could be tried before a U.S. military commission.3 Like many other Bush
administration "legal opinions," the use of Quirin as the legal foundation not only
for the invention of this new legal category, but to justify indefinite detention,
coercive interrogation and other mistreatment, is deeply problematic. What the
Court held in Quirin was that because the defendants (mostly German saboteurs)
had entered the United States to engage in acts of spying and sabotage, they were
not only liable to be captured and detained (like all POWs), but could, in addition,
be tried before a military commission for acts violating the laws of war.4 The
Quirin opinion makes reference to "acts which render their belligerency unlawful,"
and from this language, which meant nothing more than that enemy prisoners who
are accused of violating the laws of war may be tried as such, the Executive
Branch developed a doctrine of "unlawful enemy combatant (UEC)," as
subsequently defined in the Military Commissions Act of 2006. 5 Yet the United
States Supreme Court, while admitting the uncertain contours and origin of the
term, accepted the President's invocation of it in the Hamdi case. Indeed, the
Court held only that Hamdi, a "citizen-detainee" seeking to challenge his
classification as an enemy combatant could receive notice of the basis for his
classification, and an opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions.6
Only Scalia and Stevens squarely addressed the question of Hamdi's status, finding
that "absent suspension [of the writ of habeas corpus] the Executive's assertion of
military exigency has not been thought sufficient to permit detention without
charge."7 The same is true of the Supreme Court's opinion in Boumediene, which
although striking down the suspension of habeas corpus in the Military
Commission's Act of 2006, did not question the legitimacy of the classification
scheme in the first place. 8 Indeed, like the plurality's view in Hamdi, Justice
Kennedy's opinion only permits the detainee to have a meaningful right to rebut
the Pentagon'sevidence.9

2. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified in scattered
sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Military Commissions Act of 2006].
3. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942)
4. Id. at 36-37, 47-48.
5. Military Commissions Act of 2006, supra note 2, §948a.
6. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004).
7. Id. at 554. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia and Stevens appear to have been correct: like John
Walter Lindh, the so called "American Taliban," Hamdi should have been tried for a crime or released.
Indeed, after the Supreme Court's decision, he was exiled to Saudi Arabia and denaturalized. No
charges were ever filed.
8. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 2234-35 (2008).
9. Id. at 2238-39.
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This dehumanization of a whole category of human beings - the "suspected
terrorist" or "unlawful enemy combatant" - has had pernicious effects upon the
American legal system and severely harmed America's international standing.
These doctrines and the propaganda supporting them have led to the systematic use
of torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment used on prisoners detained
in the legal limbo known as Guantanamo Bay, Kandahar prison in Afghanistan,
and Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, as well as the rendition of terror suspects to third
countries and to "black sites" scattered around the world for detention,
interrogation, mistreatment, and sometimes death.10 Although most (but not all) of
the individuals subjected to this regime have been foreigners, the impact of this
Executive Activism has been on the American legal regime and the American
psyche, for it has been U.S. investigators, U.S. courts, and U.S. lawyers, that
carried out the government's plan. To this extent, all Americans are responsible
for and affected by these policies, which have been carried out in our names, even
if those targeted are, for the most part, aliens. Indeed, the Los Angeles Times
recently reported that the officers in charge of the detention of Jose Padilla and
Yasser Hamdi, both U.S. citizens detained as "unlawful enemy combatants," in
military jails inside the United States, became increasingly uncomfortable and
even alarmed that they were being directed to handle their prisoners under
"Guantanamo Rules" - depriving them of all natural light for months, repeatedly
interrogating them, denying them access to attorneys and mail from home,
allowing them no contact with anyone other than guards, and depriving them, for
years, even of minor distractions such as a soccer ball or a dictionary."l
This is a serious problem, both quantitatively and qualitatively, because the
notion of creating a legal classification whereby all rights granted by law domestic and international - become simply a matter of executive grace violates
not only separation of powers principles but several other foundational principles
of the American legal system, including equality before the law and the right to be
presumed innocent before being subjected to criminal proceedings (whether civil
or military). Indeed, these policies have turned U.S. legal principles upside down,
resulting in a presumption of guilt applicable to anyone accused of acts of
terrorism by the government - that the terror suspect, or "UEC" must rebut in
order to defeat his or her imprisonment - under circumstances that hardly result in
the kind of equality of treatment required by international law and U. S.
Constitutional principles.
I will briefly survey the application of international human rights law,
international humanitarian law, and the U.S. enemy combatant cases litigated thus

10. See, e.g., Leila Nadya Sadat, Ghost Prisonersand Black Sites: ExtraordinaryRendition under
International Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 309 (2006); Leila Nadya Sadat, Extraordinary
Rendition, Torture, and Other Nightmares from the War on Terror, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1200
(2007) [hereinafter Sadat, Extraordinary Rendition]; Leila Nadya Sadat, Shattering the Nuremberg
Consensus: U.S. Rendition Policy and InternationalCriminalLaw, 3 YALE J. INT'L AFF. 65 (2008) (no
access to the YJIA, but should be on file with the author).
11. Pamela Hess, Officer Wrote of harsh treatment of U.S. detainee, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2008, at
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far, before venturing some thoughts on the continuing dangers of these policies,
and what might be done to reverse them. I conclude on a cautionary note.
Although the new administration may wish to break with the Bush legacy, it may
be difficult to do so. "Guantanamo rules" penetrated quickly and deeply into the
American legal system, and many of the individuals who wrote them continue to
exercise influence and to assert their applicability, extension or incorporation into
new legal doctrines and institutions, such as the establishment of so called
"national security courts." This essay concludes with seven recommendations to
President Obama to strengthen America's human rights infrastructure, and help
prevent future human rights violations by the United States of America.
II.

HISTORY AND ORIGIN OF THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE

A. InternationalHuman Rights Law
The presumption of innocence is found in all modem day human rights
instruments. The presumption has a long pedigree, and is codified in the famous
French Declarationsdes droits de l'homme et du citoyen12 and enshrined in many,
if not most, of the world's constitutions in some form or another, or is incorporated
by judicial interpretation, as is the case in the United States. 3
It was included in article 11(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, and subsequently codified in article 14 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, which provides that "[e]veryone charged with a criminal
offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according
to law.' 14 A government could argue that the kind of preventive (indefinite)
detention provided for in Guantanamo Bay is not covered by this prohibition
because the individuals held there have never actually been accused of a crime;
instead, they have been incarcerated as "unlawful enemy combatants" who will,
for the most part, never face charges brought before a court of law or a military
commission. Yet, earlier drafts of the Universal Declaration referred not to
persons charged with crimes but to "any person" or "everyone," and the view of
Eleanor Roosevelt and Ren6 Cassin, two principal drafters of the UDHR, was that
the guarantee should benefit "everyone," regardless of whether they were involved
in criminal proceedings or not.' 5 Accordingly, the presumption is particularly
important for those charged in criminal proceedings, but still applicable to those
who are not. Moreover, article 9 of the Covenant also prohibits arbitrary detention
and provides that "no one" shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention, or
deprived of liberty except on "grounds and in accordance with [legal

12. See Declaration des Droits de L'homme et du Citoyen de 1789, art. IX, available at
http://www.assemblee-nationale. fr/histoire/dudh/ 1789.asp.
13. See, e.g., Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974) ("The purpose of the trial stage from the
State's point of view is to convert a criminal defendant from a person presumed innocent to one found
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.").
14. International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights, art. 14(2), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966)
[hereinafter ICCPR]; See also, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 11(1),
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg. U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
15. STEFAN TRECHSEL, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 155

2005).

(Oxford Univ. Press
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procedures]. 16 The classification of an individual by the Executive Branch as an
"unlawful enemy combatant" subject to indefinite detention violates this provision,
as well.
The United States could have derogated from articles 9 and 14 of the
Covenant, for the Covenant specifically permits derogation from certain of its
provisions "intimes of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation,"
subject to certain requirements: the measures taken must be "strictly required by
the exigencies of the situation," "consistent with international law," and nondiscriminatory, that is, taken "solely on the grounds of race, colour, sex, language,
religion or social origin."' 7 Other countries have filed formal derogations when
confronted with acts of terrorism, including the United Kingdom.' 8 The United
States has not. Moreover, international human rights tribunals, including the
European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
have condemned indefinite detention without charges even in terrorism cases,
holding in one case that even a fourteen day period without judicial intervention is
"exceptionally long."' 9
Finally, while a formal derogation permits some
innovation in criminal proceedings there can be no derogation from the ban on
torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment found in article 7 of the
Covenant. 20 Guantanamo-style interrogations run afoul of this provision, as well.
Finally, it is worth noting that, while acts of terrorism may violate the
international human rights of victims, the individuals suspected of committing
those acts are not, by virtue of their classification as "terrorists" by the executive
branch or media, stripped of their fundamental human rights. Indeed, the
European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
have unequivocally stated that alleged terrorists - even undisputed terrorists remain protected by human rights law.2 '
What, then, of the application of international human rights law or the
constitution during war; is it correct, as Cicero wrote, that inter arma enim silent
leges - that the laws fall mute in times of war? Or that they, to paraphrase former
'22
Chief Justice William Rehnquist, "speak with a somewhat different voice?
While the United States has argued otherwise, courts, as well as treaty monitoring
bodies such as the Torture Committee and the Human Rights Committee, have

16. ICCPR, supra note 14, art. 9(i).
17. ICCPR, supra note 14, art. 4(i).
18. See DAVID ANDERSON & JEMIMA STRATFORD, JUSTICE, RESPONSE TO THE JOINT COMMITTEE
ON HUMAN RIGHTS INQUIRY INTO UK DEROGATIONS FROM CONVENTION ON RIGHTS 3

(2002),

http://www.justice.org.uk/images/pdfs/derogations.pdf.
19. Aksoy v. Turkey, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2260, at para. 78.
20. See ICCPR, supra note 14, art. 4(2).
21. See, e.g., Brogan v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 117 (ser. A), 62 (1988) (finding that
the UK had violated Article 5(1) protections of the European Convention on Human Rights after
detaining alleged terrorist suspects for several days.); see also Durand & Ugarte Case, 2001 Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 68, at 118 (Aug. 16, 2000) (finding that the military forces in Peru used excessive
forces disproportional to the perceived threat to confront alleged terrorists).
22. WILLIAM REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES N WARTIME 225 (Vintage
Books 1998).
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found that human rights law continues to apply in armed conflict, subject to
23
specialized rules that may be carved out by international humanitarian law, a
body of law to which I now turn.
B. InternationalHumanitarianLaw

What is an individual's status under international humanitarian law when
captured during an armed conflict? Under the laws of war, once the United States
determined to invade Afghanistan and Iraq, the applicable law was primarily set
out in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, which have, since World War II, been
the gold standard regarding the capture, detention, treatment, and trial of prisoners
of war and civilian internees.24 Indeed, the four Geneva Conventions enjoy
unparalleled support among States, having been ratified by virtually every country
in the world, including the United States, Afghanistan, and Iraq, 25and are, without
a doubt, part of the customary laws of war.26 Geneva law, as it has come to be
called, requires that prisoners be treated humanely, forbids secret detention sites,
and appoints the International Committee of the Red Cross as the international
monitor for Geneva compliance.27 The United States was a principal mover and
negotiator of the four Geneva Conventions in 1949, and not only became a party to
them, but their custodian too, with the original signed copies residing in a vault at
the U.S. Department of State.28
Early in the GWOT, however, over the objections of U.S. Secretary of State,
30
Colin Powell, 29 and the State Department's Legal Advisor, William H. Taft, IV,

23. For judicial decisions see, e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8), at para. 25; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9), at para. 106; Coard et al. v.
United States, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 109/99, OEA/ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 6 rev. 39
(1999); accord Sadat, supra note 1, at 140-142.
24. See generally Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC Ill]. Nonetheless, even if not classified as
POWs, those captured would fall within the provisions of Geneva IV, on civilians. See generally
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC IV]; see also COMMENTARY ON GENEVA CONVENTIONS
OF 12 AUGUST 1949: GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN

TIME OF WAR 271 (Oscar Uhler & Henri Coursier eds., 1958) [hereinafter ICRC COMMENTARY].
25. ICRC, International Humanitarian Law, Treaties & Documents by Date, http://www.icrc.
org/ihl.nsf/INTRO?OpenView (scroll down and follow « State parties > hyperlink for all Geneva
Conventions).
26. See, e.g., The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-GeneralPursuantto Paragraph2 of
Security Council Resolution 808, 35, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3,
1993). This report was unanimously adopted by the Security Council. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
27. Protocol I elaborates upon the Geneva Conventions, and although it has not been ratified by
the U.S., many of its provisions, particularly those regarding the humane treatment of prisoners are
considered part of customary international law. See, e.g., Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 75, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
28. JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE 9 (2008).

29. See Memorandum from Colin Powell, Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State to Alberto R.
Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Draft Decision Memorandum for the President on the Applicability
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lawyers in the U.S. Department of Justice argued that the United States should
abandon the provisions of the Geneva Conventions in favor of a de novo legal
regime that they believed would be superior for the capture, detention, treatment,
and trial of enemy prisoners, whether captured in the United States or abroad. In
the words of then Counsel to the President, Alberto Gonzales, the "new paradigm"
of "the war against terrorism render[ed] obsolete Geneva's strict limitations on
questioning of enemy prisoners and render[ed] quaint some of its provisions ...
,31

President Bush ultimately accepted the Department of Justice's arguments,
and declined to apply Geneva law to either al Qaeda or Taliban detainees in U.S.
custody.32 A diplomatic and legal furor ensued, and the extremely negative
international reaction generated by the creation and operation of the U.S. prison at
Guantanamo Bay, as well as other U.S. detention centers, is summarized by the
words of Amnesty International, which, in its 2005 annual report, suggested that
the U.S. detention center at Guantanamo Bay had become the "gulag of our
33
times.
Nearly two years after the September 11 th attacks and the Afghan invasion,
Iraq was invaded by the United States and a "coalition of the willing," 34 one
justification for which was the continuation of the GWOT.35 Although the United

of the Geneva Convention to the Conflict in Afghanistan (Jan. 26, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE
PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB, at 122-23 (Karen J. Greenberg & Johsua L. Dratel eds., 2005)
[hereinafter TORTURE PAPERS].

30. Memorandum from William H. Taft, IV, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State to Alberto R.
Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Comments on Your Paper on the Geneva Convention (Feb. 2,
2002), reprinted in TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 29, at 129; see also Jordan J. Paust, Executive Plans
and Authorizations to Violate InternationalLaw Concerning Treatment and Interrogationof Detainees,
43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 811, 825-26 (2005).
31. Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President to George W. Bush,
President, Decision Re: Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with
Al-Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 29, at 119
[hereinafter Gonzales, Geneva Memo].
32. Memorandum from George W. Bush, President to Richard B. Cheney, Vice President et a].,
Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE
PAPERS, supra note 29, at 134. The memo is elliptical in its reasoning, concluding that al Qaeda
members do not receive the protection of the Geneva Conventions because "al Qaeda is not a High
Contracting Party to Geneva." Id. As regards the Taliban, although the memo concludes that Geneva
applies to the conflict with the Taliban, the President nonetheless determined that "the Taliban detainees
are unlawful combatants and, therefore, do not qualify as prisoners of war under Article 4 of Geneva."
Id. at 135.
33. Irene Khan, Foreword to AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT
2005: THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S HUMAN RIGHTS (2005), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/

library/asset/POL10/001/2005/en/6287f77f-d53a-11 dd-8a23-d58a49c0d652/pol100012005en.html.
34. See Steve Schifferes, U.S. Names "Coalition of the Willing," BBC NEWS, Mar. 18, 2003,
availableat http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2862343.stm.
35. The Bush administration repeatedly conflated al Qaeda and Iraq as enemies in the War on
Terror, leading more than seventy percent of all Americans to believe that Saddam Hussein was
responsible in some way for the September I 11hattacks. See, e.g., Bush Administration on Iraq 9/11
Link, BBC NEWS, Sept. 18, 2003, availableat http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3119676.stm.
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States determined that Geneva law applied to the conflict in Iraq,36 the decision not
to apply Geneva law to the detainees captured in the Afghan conflict clearly spilled
over to the Iraq theatre, where, once again, credible allegations of prisoner
mistreatment and violations of international law were made against the United
States.37 The most visible evidence of this abuse was shocking photos emanating
from the U.S. detention facility at Abu Ghraib. Indeed, the prisoner abuse problem
was much more serious, both quantitatively and qualitatively, as regards detainees
in Iraq, than the problems at Guantanamo Bay. In all U.S. detention facilities,
however, there has been egregious mistreatment of detainees, violations that have
contravened the minimum guarantees of common article 3, as well as many
specific provisos of the Geneva Conventions and the Uniform Code of Military
Justice.38 The United States has argued that it may deprive detainees of all
protections due to their UEC status; the International Committee of the Red Cross
has protested to the contrary. It is the view of the ICRC (correct, in my estimation)
that either the Third Geneva Convention applies if they are POWs; or the Fourth
applies if they are not. 39 Law, like nature, abhors a vacuum, and during armed
conflict, captives are presumptively entitled to POW status - unless an article five
Tribunal determines otherwise.4 °
III.

THE

U.S. ENEMY

COMBATANT CASES

A. Individuals Tried in U.S. Courts
Turning now to the treatment of detainees in U.S. courts or within U.S.
jurisdiction, the picture is more confused. Three detainees have been tried in U.S.
federal courts on criminal charges stemming from their connections to the
September 11 th attacks, Al Qaeda, or the Taliban: John Walker Lindh, the so-called
"American Taliban;" 4 1 Jos6 Padilla, the alleged "dirty bomber; 4 2 and Zacharias
Moussaoui, the "so-called" twentieth hijacker. 43 Two of those tried - Lindh and
Padilla - were U.S. citizens, and although Lindh was picked up in Afghanistan
following the U.S. invasion of that country on October 7 th, Padilla was arrested in
O'Hare airport returning from four years of living abroad. While these individuals
were nominally entitled to a presumption of innocence, certain irregularities
regarding their trials, particularly in terms of the evidence introduced against them
and credible allegations of coercive interrogation and cruel treatment (in the cases
of Lindh and Padilla), suggest that the administration's reversal of the presumption

36. See, e.g., Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
InternationalLaw, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 461, 476-77 (2002).
37. See Iraq: U.S. PrisonerAbuse Sparks Concerns Over War Crimes, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
April 29, 2004, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2004/04/29/iraq-us-prisoner-abuse-sparks-concems-overwar-crimes.
38. See id; see also 3 Soldiers Charged In Deaths of Iraq Detainees, CBS NEWS, June 19, 2006,
http://cbs3.com/national/3rd.Brigade.Combat.2.269173.html; TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 29, at 114041.
39. See GC III supra note 24; GC IV, supra note 24.
40. GC III, supra note 24, art. 5.
41. U.S. v. Lindh, 227 F.Supp.2d 565, 565 (E.D. Va. 2002).
42. Rumsfld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 426 (2004).
43. U.S. v. Moussaoui, 483 F.3d 220, 220 (4th Cir. 2007).
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of innocence for all captives in the "war on terror," spilled over into the federal
courts, potentially distorting the outcomes of trials held under "normal rules."
Padilla's case is particularly disturbing, because his arrest was based upon
testimony from two individuals - Abu Zubaydah and Binyam Mohammed whom, as it transpires, had provided unreliable information under torture. 4 After
Padilla's arrest, he was classified as an "enemy combatant" by an order of June 9,
2002 signed by President Bush, and accused of plotting to set off a dirty bomb, an
accusation that appears to have been erroneous, or at least unprovable.45 He was
transferred to military custody and litigation ensued - leaving him there for 1307
days until,46 just as it appeared that the Supreme Court might review his case and
decide against the President's authority to indefinitely detain a U.S. citizen, he was
finally indicted and transferred to the US District Court for the Southern District of
Florida for trial. The trial did not involve any of the earlier allegations against
Padilla - only that he had attended an al Qaeda training camp.4 7 The trial judge
refused to find that Padilla's long military confinement - in which he was
allegedly held in isolation in a 7 by 9 foot cell, deprived of sleep, hooded and
forced to assume stress positions for long periods - did not render him unfit for
trial nor deprive him of a speedy trial. 48 Padilla was convicted and sentenced on
prison
January 22, 2008 to 17 years and 4 months and is now in a supermax
50
49
facility here in Florence, Colorado. His mother is appealing the verdict.
B. Held in indefinite detention without trial or subject to military commissions?
Unlike Padilla, most Guantanamo detainees have not received a trial in
federal court. With respect to Guantanamo Bay, of the 775 originally brought
there, approximately 270 detainees remain, 200 of whom could be repatriated if a
country could be found to receive them. 51 Fewer than a dozen have been charged

44. Andrew Patel, Padilla v. Bush, in THE ENEMY COMBATANT PAPERS 663, 663 (Karen J.
Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2008).
45. See David Hancock, Judge: Charge Or Release Padilla, CBS NEWS, Feb. 28, 2005,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/02/28/terror/main677099.shtml; see also Marisol Bello, 'Enemy
combatant' Padillagets 17 yearsfor conspiracy, USA TODAY, Jan. 1, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/
news/nation/2008-01-22-padilla-sentencingN.htm; Enemy Combatant, CBS NEWS, http://www.
cbsnews.com/elements/2006/04/04/in-depth-us/timeline1469944_Omain.shtml (last visited April 16,
2009).
46. Stephen Vladek, The Anticlimactic Trial ofJose Padilla,JURIST, May 15, 2007, available at
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2007/05/anticlimactic-trial-of-jose-padilla.php.
47. United States v. Padilla, No. 04-60001-CR-Cooke, 2006 WL 3678567 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 17,
2006); see also Charles S. Doskow, Jose Padillaand Due Process of Law, 19 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 199,
221-22 (2006).
48. Padilla, supra note 47; see also Peter Whoriskey, Judge Refuses to Dismiss Padilla's
Charges, THE WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 24, 2007, at A9.
49. Hari M. Osofsky, The Geography of Justice Wormholes: Dilemmas From Property and
Criminal, 53 VILL. L. REV. 117, 136 (2008).
50. Padilla given long jail sentence, BBC News, Jan. 23, 2008, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7203276.stm.
51. Melissa A. Jamison, The Sins of the Father:Punishing Children in the War on Terror, 29 U.
LA. VERNE L. REv. 88, 98-99 (2008); see also Michael Isikoff, No Countryfor 270 Men, NEWSWEEK,
Jun. 23, 2008, availableat http://www.newsweek.com/id/l41513
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before a military commission leaving indefinite detention without charges to be
their fate.
The first detainee to be tried before a military commission at Guantanamo
Bay was Salim Ahmed Hamdan.53 Hamdan was captured in November 2001 by
the Northern Alliance, then turned over to U.S. military forces and sent to
Guantanamo in June 2002. 54 After years of litigation, he was the first individual to
be tried since the U.S. started transporting detainees to Guantanamo Bay in 2002.
His trial before a military commission came as a surprise, and in spite of a
perception of unfairness, resulted in at least a partial victory for the accused. He
was acquitted of the conspiracy charges and sentenced only to 5-1/2 years, with
credit for time served.55 He was scheduled to be released on December 31, 2008,
but the government recently announced its intention to return him to his home in
Yemen.56
IV. ONE STEP FORWARD,

Two

STEPS BACK

It is worrisome that matters may get worse before they get better. The
"Unlawful Enemy Combatant," category remains legally intact 57 and hundreds, if
not thousands, of detainees in and out of Guantanamo Bay have been subjected to
it. Even where it is not formally employed, "Guantanamo rules" appear to apply,
and the Bush administration has been persistent and unyielding in asserting its
ability to continue to hold individuals indefinitely under the UEC label. Indeed,
even following Hamdan's trial, President Bush continued to argue that he had the
right to hold Hamdan indefinitely - past the time of his sentence.58
The rendition program continues and access to the courts for victims is
blocked at every turn by the State secrets doctrine - even when it is clear that the
U.S. government has been mistaken in identifying a particular individual as a
suspected terrorist. This was the case with Maher Arar, a Canadian citizen who
was picked up mistakenly at Kennedy airport and rendered by U.S. officials to
Syria where he was tortured for 10 months until the Canadian government secured
his release.5 9 Cruel treatment has not been renounced, and earlier this fall the New

52. Baher Azmy, Rasul v. Bush and the Intra-TerritorialConstitution, 62 N.Y.U ANN. SURV. AM.
L. 369, 373-74 (2007).
53. Brian D. Fahy, Given an Inch, the Detainee Effort to Take a Mile: The Detainee Legislation
and the Dangers of the "Litigation Weapon in UnrestrainedEnemy Hands," 36 PEPP. L. REV. 129, 16667 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
54. Id.
55. Josh White & William Branigin, Hamdan to be Sent to Yemen, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 2008 at
Al.
56. Id.
57. This question is squarely presented by the al-Marri case, recently taken up by the Supreme
Court, and scheduled to be argued next year. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008) (en
banc), vacated and remandedsub nom. Al-Marri v. Spagone, No. 08-368, 2009 WL 564940 (U.S. Mar.
6, 2009).
58. Peter Finn, Judge Rejects Government Call to Reconsider Hamdan Sentence, WASH. POST,
Oct. 31, 2008, at A10, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/
10/30/AR2008103004661 .html.
59. THE COMM. ON INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. & CTR.
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York Times published a story stating that the administration is no longer committed
to closing the prison camp at Guantanamo
Bay, although President Obama has
60
prison.
the
closing
to
recommitted
Additionally, the racism and anti-muslim/anti-arab sentiment that emerged
following the 9/11 attacks continue to fuel and distort U.S. foreign and domestic
policy - to scare the public and whip up sentiment for government policies that are
indefensible as a matter of law. Moreover, it has led to a plunge in support for the
United States and its policies worldwide. The U.S. has been brought to task before
the Human Rights Committee, the Torture Committee, the European Parliament,
and the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights. 61 Racism and ethnic slurs
surfaced in the Presidential campaign, where it was widely reported that robocalls
alleging that Obama took his oath of office on a Koran, were apparently being
heard all around the United States. These scare tactics are self defeating in terms
of winning hearts and minds in the Muslim world and misshape U.S. foreign
policy, causing U.S. policymakers to base decisions on prejudice rather than
62

facts.

Finally, there are now individuals arguing that the way to "fix" the public
relations problem of Guantanamo Bay is to make it worse - by creating specialized
national security courts and/or "amending" the Geneva Conventions. 63e As to the
latter, the ICRC has steadfastly opposed amending the Conventions,64 and of
course, there are already two amendments, Protocols I and II, neither of which has
been ratified by the United States.65 If the United States is serious about working
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND GLOBAL JUSTICE, N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, TORTURE BY PROXY:
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW APPLICABLE TO "EXTRAORDINARY RENDITIONS" 11-12, 18
(2004). See also Sadat, ExtraordinaryRendition, supra note 10, at 1203 (describing Arar's detention in
Syria under the United States' rendition program).
60. Steven Myers, Bush Decides to Keep Guantdnamo Open, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2008, at A16,
1, 5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/21/washington/21gitmo.html.
61. See e.g., Human Rights Watch, U.N. Challenges U.S. Rights Record, July 26, 2006,
COMM.
AGAINST
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2006/07/26/un-challenges-us-rights-record;
U.N.
TORTURE, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention,
U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (July 25, 2006) available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/
UNDOC/GEN/GO6/432/25/PDF/GO643225.pdfOpenElement; European Parliament Resolution on
Guantanamo, EUR. PARL. DOC. P6 TA(2006)0070 (2006), available at http://www.derechos.org/
nizkor/excep/gtmoeng.html; David Swanson, Op-Ed., Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
Hears Complaints Against United States, OpEdNews.com, http://www.opednews.com/articles/InterAmerican-Commission-by-David-Swanson-090325-713.html (last visited April 17, 2009).
62. Leila Nadya Sadat, Do All Arabs Really Look Alike? Prejudiceand the U.S. "War" on Terror,
50 WAYNE STATE L. REV. 69, 74 (2004).
63. See, e.g., Obama and Guantanamo, Op-Ed., WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 2009, at A16, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123258578172604569.html.
64. See, e.g., Jakob Kellenberger, Statement by the President of the ICRC- 58th Session of the
Commission on Human Rights, 845 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 240 (2002) available at
http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/59KC9Y.
65. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, STATES PARTY TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND THEIR

ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS 7 (2003), availableat http://www.aiipowmia.com/legis/protocoles.pdf. There
is also a third protocol that is not of relevance to this essay. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem,
Dec. 8, 2005, 45 I.L.M. 555.
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with other countries on mutually agreeable rules regarding detainee treatment of
terrorists captured in military operations, ratifying those protocols, before opening
negotiations on a third, is probably required. Moreover, it is unclear what this new
treaty would look like. No democracy will sign on to a treaty permitting cruel
treatment or torture as lawful interrogation techniques, nor would it be conceivable
that indefinite detention would be approved, which are the primary elements of the
current legal regime that the Bush administration wanted to change.
Several legal scholars have suggested the establishment of national security
courts that would be staffed by civilian judges, but have specialized rules for the
trial of terror suspects. 66 The courts would be located on military bases, 67 and
could presumably try detainees from Guantanamo Bay, if it was closed, or perhaps
newly captured individuals. The very purpose of these courts would be to make
the UEC category a permanent one, as the proposals would permit indefinite
preventive detention, as well as trials in "special courts" where defendants would
have been deprived of their right to remain silent. This would presumably mean
that they were forced to speak through coercion or some other means. 68
This idea is deeply problematic and probably unconstitutional. Indeed, it too
is based upon a presumption of guilt and evinces a pernicious classification
between ordinary citizen A and suspected terrorist B. Proponents of these courts
admit that they would like them so they can cut "constitutional comers," by
eliminating a defendant's right to remain silent, among other modifications - and
69
presumably avoid the military justice system as well.
Yet the Moussaoui,
Padilla,and Lindh trials demonstrated the clear ability of U.S. federal judges to try
cases involving alleged terrorists.70 The establishment of these new terror courts
has been condemned by the Constitution Project - a blue ribbon commission that
found that "establishing a new, unprecedented, and unnecessary system of
tribunals risks undermining the constitutional protections enshrined in our criminal
justice system, and would ultimately create far more problems than it could
possibly solve."'" As one federal judge has pointed out, the Classified Information
Procedures Act provides a set of rules for criminal cases that protects classified
information and still maintains "some degree of transparency. 7 2 Moreover, if the

66. See, e.g., Amos N. Guiora, Qurin to Hamdan: Creating a Hybrid Paradigmfor the Detention
of Terrorists, 19 FLA. J. INT'L L. 511, 527 (2007); Jack L. Goldsmith & Neal Katyal, Op-Ed., The
Terrorists' Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2007, at A19; Glenn Sulmasy, Op-Ed., The National Security
Court: A Natural Evolution, JURIST:
Legal News & Res., May 11, 2006, available at
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2006/05/national-security-court-natural.php.
67. See, Sulmasy, supra note 66.
68. See id.; Editorial, Workable Terrorism Trials: A Special Federal Court Could Balance
FundamentalRights and NationalSecurity Needs, WASH. POST, July 27, 2008, at B6.
69. See generally Sulmasy, supra note 66; Kendall W. Harrison, The Evolving Judicial Response
to the War on Terrorism, 75 WIS. LAW. 14, 15,68 (Dec. 2002).
70. See John C. Coughenour, Op-Ed., How to Try a Terrorist, N.Y. TIMES, Nov, 1, 2007, at A27.
71. A Critique of National Security Courts, THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, June 23, 2008, at 6,
availableat http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/Critique-of the NationalSecurityCourts.pdf.
72. Coughenour, supra note 70.
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real issue is the use of evidence obtained through so called "enhanced interrogation
techniques," it cannot be constitutionally admissible in any federal court.
V CONCLUSION

America's legal system was sorely tested during the Bush years, and it is not
yet clear whether it will ever fully recover. At the same time, many lawyers
pushed back, particularly with regard to the more extreme departures from the law
advocated by Bush administration officials often risking their careers in so doing.
These included Navy General Counsel Alberto Mora and Navy Judge advocate
general Michael Lohr, 3 Lieutenant Commander Charles Swift, and the military
lawyers assigned to defend detainees at Guantanamo Bay, to name a few. Civilian
lawyers like Michael Ratner, Joe Margulies, and Tom Wilner also played a key
role in bringing the rule of law back into U.S. government policy, risking their
reputations in doing so. 74 British lawyer Clive Stafford Smith filed lawsuits on
behalf of Guantanamo detainees, and law professors wrote articles and amicus
briefs attempting to influence government policy and the courts.7 5
Recently, U.S. courts have upheld the rule of law, particularly the United
States Supreme Court, which has issued a quartet of decisions providing detainees
with access to the courts and affirming their minimum rights under the laws of
war. 76 At the same time, the Court did not address the fundamental problems with
the UEC classification itself, and its decisions were relatively narrow.
Nevertheless, the Rasul decision, holding that the detention facility at Guantanamo
Bay was within U.S. jurisdiction, the Hamdi decision upholding the right of
detainees to challenge the evidence against them, and the Hamdan decision finding
that no matter what their status, the detainees were entitled to the protection of
common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions (prohibiting cruel treatment) were
courageous and important decisions not just for the U.S. legal system, but
upholding the rule of law around the world. With the retirement of Justice
O'Connor, and the passing of former Chief Justice William Rehnquist, however,
the consensus on the Court is increasingly fragile, and the new President could
have a tremendous influence on these cases through his appointments.
Here are seven suggestions for President Obama's new administration:
First, close the U.S. detention facility at GuantanamoBay. The existence of
this prison camp has become a lightening rod for criticism of the United States and
a recruitment tool for international terrorists. It seems clear from what information
is available, that many of the approximately 250 detainees have been cleared for
release, but the administration has not been able to find a country willing to take

73. See, e.g., MAYER, supra note 28, at 224-28.
74. Id., at 205-07.
75. See Biography of Clive Stafford Smith, REPRIEVE UK, http://www.reprieve.org.uk/staff
clivestaffordsmith.htm; see also John Semmens, Condemned Murderer Endorses Obama, Jul. 27, 2008,
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-bloggers/2052 11 /posts.
76. See Hamdi, supra note 6; Boumediene, supra note 8; Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557
(2006); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 446 (2004).
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them. 7 This has been advocated by former Secretaries of State, military officers,
human rights groups and legal and political experts. President Obama announced
during the campaign that he plans to close Guantanamo and he should make it a
top priority to keep this promise.
Second, ensure respect for the U.S. Constitution by using existing, ordinary
courts - civilian and military - to try Guantanamo detainees who are accused of
serious crimes. During his campaign, President Obama announced that he felt the
existing legal system could handle the detainees yet to be tried. More recently, it
was reported that he was considering the establishment of a "new legal system" to
handle the most sensitive cases, which is presumably a reference to the national
security courts discussed above. Yet a close look at the proposals suggests a
disdain for time-tested rules of law eerily similar to the lawyering style that
pervaded the administration during the past eight years. The federal courts - and
regularly constituted military courts - are more than capable of trying individuals
accused of terrorism and violations of the laws and customs of war, as they have
done so before.
Third, the Presidentshould establish a Blue Ribbon Commission evaluating
U.S. detention policies over the past seven years. The Commission needs to
examine not only issues of accountability for violations of U.S. and international
law, but should make an authoritative record and issue recommendations regarding
victim reparations for those who were imprisoned by U.S. officials or under U.S.
authority by mistake. The Commission could also make recommendations
concerning items 4-7, below.
Fourth, the President should immediately issue an Executive Order
mandatinghumane treatmentfor all detainees in US. custody. It needs to be made
clear that there is no "CIA exception" to the Convention Against Torture, and that
the United States takes seriously not only its role as a beacon of freedom, human
rights and democracy, but its obligations under international law.
Fifth, the President should recommit the United States of America to the
internationaland domestic rule of law; by supporting and ratifying, when possible,
the many human rights and humanitarian law treaties that the United States has
eschewed during the past decade. In particular, the United States should support
the International Criminal Court, and ratify the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, the Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, the
Landmines Ban, the new cluster bomb treaty and the new Convention on Forced
Disappearances.
Sixth, the President should not issue pardons to individuals accused of war
crimes, crimes against humanity or facilitating torture or cruel, degrading or
inhumane treatment
Seventh, the President should seriously considerjoining the Inter-American
system by ratifying the American Convention on Human Rights. Additionally (or

77. Matt Apuzzo & Lara Lakes Jordan, Obama team developing plan to close Guantanamo, ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 1I, 2008, at A5.
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alternatively) the United States could also consider establishing its own human
rights commission. It seems clear that the European Convention on Human Rights,
for example, has had a moderating influence on European efforts to address
international terrorism. For example, in A. v. Secretary of State, the U.K. House of
Lords held in 2005 that Britain could not indefinitely detain aliens suspected of
78
connections to terrorism.
There is no doubt that governments have a duty to respond to national
security threats, but they have equally important obligations to ensure the human
rights of their citizens, and their prisoners. Fear causes governments to overreact;
strong institutions help nations to respond in a more measured way. Most
democracies are members of regional human rights regimes, and many have their
own national human rights commissions. The United States could consider these
examples as it looks for ways to strengthen its own human rights record and
enhance its world leadership.
The new President should consider implementing these suggestions even
though cynics could argue that the United States has "gotten away" with
conducting the war on its own terms, without regard to, or respect for, the opinions
of mankind and the legal and institutional framework of international law. In
addition to the obvious point of enlightened self-interest-that the United States
can only achieve its objectives if it acts with legitimacy and commands respectthere is the deeper moral question of deciding what we stand for. Do Americans
still believe that all human beings are created equal and endowed with inalienable
rights, beliefs that many generations of Americans have died fighting for, beliefs
that have inspired respect and admiration for the United States the world over, and
principles that President Obama invoked in his campaign?
The war that was launched from the nightmare of September 11 has produced
the nightmare of Guantanamo, the horror of Abu Ghraib, the broken lives of the
U.S. soldiers killed or wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan, the deaths of tens, maybe
hundreds of thousands of Afghan and Iraqi civilians, and the shattered psyches of
America's torture and rendition victims. The United States is better than thissurely it can temper its great power with moderation and reason, to paraphrase
Justice Jackson's famous phrase uttered at Nuremberg so many years ago. On
January 20, 2009, it is to be hoped that the 4 4 th President of the United States of
America will immediately begin to recommit the United States to respecting the
human rights of its enemies as well as its friends.

78. See A. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68 (H.L.) (appeal
taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
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I. INTRODUCTION

Few issues, other than the economy and the triple threat of Iraq, Iran, and
Afghanistan, have commanded more sustained attention in the United States
during the first decade of the 21st century than immigration. It loomed large
among policymakers, the broadcast media, and the public. Nativisim was in the
air. Racial profiling by the federal government to combat terrorism became
routine. Immigration even threatened to become a dominant theme of the 2008
presidential campaign during the primaries, but was eventually eclipsed by other
issues. We were left wondering: what caused the intense hand-wringing about the
threat of immigration? What, specifically, was the role of the suicidal aerial
hijackings and ensuing tragedy of September 11, 2001 (9/11)? Beyond the shrill
rhetoric of talk radio and cable television, what are the facts about undocumented
migration to the United States? Is it significantly linked with terrorism? And
what, if anything, should be done to reform the immigration law? Let us begin
with the migrants themselves.
Despite the global focus on infiltration of terrorists across national
boundaries, the motivation of most migrants is well-intentioned. Around the world
today, millions of people are on the move, for good reasons, living or trying to live
in countries not their own. An estimated 175 million people today reside outside
the country of their birth or nationality.' The impetus for this unprecedented
movement is varied. Sometimes the movement is voluntary. People move across
borders for work, education, pleasure, curiosity, or family reasons. Migration also
may be forced, as refugees flee across national borders for reasons of civil unrest,
war, natural catastrophes, and famine. Whatever the motivation, mass
communications and marketing have heightened the perceptions of opportunities in
promised lands. 2 In recent years, the internal displacement of people within their
own states also has accelerated-people who cannot even escape their national
territory to seek refuge under the protection of international law. The problem of

. Thomas B. Stoel Professor of Law and Director of International Programs, Willamette
University College of Law. The author presented this paper during the 2008 Sutton Colloquium at the
University of Denver College of Law on October 25, 2008.
1. Michael W. Doyle, The Challenge of Worldwide Migration,57 J. INT'L AFFAIRS 1, 1 (2004).
2. See ALEJANDRO PORTES & RUBtN G. RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA: A PORTRAIT 355 (3d

ed. 2006).
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internally displaced persons has only recently become a matter of international
law, lexferenda.
II. STATISTICS
The annual admission of permanent resident aliens into the United Statesthe so-called green-card holders-reached a peak of about 1.5 million in 2000, not
including temporary non-immigrants, who number some 39 million.4 Between
2000 and 2004, largely because of restrictions imposed after 9/11, immigration to
the United States declined substantially to less than 1 million annually. 5
Historically, the expansion and contraction of the U.S. economy seems to be the
best explanation of such fluctuations in migration. But anti-terrorist constraints put
in place after 9/11 may also have deterred visa applicants, thereby helping explain
the lower numbers in the years immediately following 9/11.
Perhaps most significant have been declines in quarterly estimates of the
undocumented population in the United States. 6 In 2007, for the first time in a
decade, the yearly estimated number of undocumented entries was substantially
below the number of newly-arrived permanent resident aliens.7
Likely
explanations are toughened border enforcement and, more significantly, the shaky
economy. Although the number of undocumented persons may swell again, the
important point is that since 9/11 the expansion in numbers is no longer continuous
as it had been for many years.
III.

TRENDS AND CHARACTERISTICS

Before we return to the main theme of 9/11 and its impact on immigration
matters, it will be helpful to review trends among migrants to the United States,
characteristics of law enforcement, and the gist of public opinion. All three of
these topics are essential as we struggle to get the facts, policy, and law concerning
immigration straight.

3. See London Declaration of International

Principles on Internally Displaced Persons,

INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE SIXTY-NINTH CONFERENCE 791-821 (2000); see

also Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (Feb. 11, 1998)
(containing an earlier and more limited set of Guiding Principles).
4. See JEFFREY S. PASSEL & ROBERTO SURO, PEW HISPANIC CENTER, RISE, PEAK, AND
DECLINE: TRENDS IN U.S. IMMIGRATION 1992-2004 3-4 (2005) ; RANDALL MONGER & MACREADIE
BARR, U. S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., ANNUAL FLOW REPORT: NONIMMIGRANT ADMISSIONS TO THE
UNITED STATES: 2008, at 3 (2009).
5. See NANCY F. RYTINA, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., ANNUAL FLOW REPORT: U.S. LEGAL
PERMANENT RESIDENTS: 2004, at 4 (2005); PASSEL & SURO, supra note 4, at 4.

6. Brian Whitley, With Fewer Jobs, Fewer Illegal Immigrants, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec.
30. 2008, at 3 (citing statistics on Latino migrants).
7. See id.; see also Miriam Jordan, Latest Immigration Wave: Retrea, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2,
2008, at A] (noting three-year decline of25% in estimated entries of undocumented persons).
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A. Trends Among Migrants
Four trends among migrants are noteworthy. First, the destinations in the
United States of newly-arrived immigrants have broadened substantially, thereby
engaging a much broader spectrum of American society and politics as well as
related anxieties.
For example, Iowa and North Carolina have attracted
surprisingly large numbers of foreign migrant workers eager for the kind of work
all over the country that nobody else wants. 8 After all, what American wants to cut
off a chicken's neck every six seconds in a meatpacking plant or clean toilets? A
second trend is that the flow of illegal crossings of the U.S.-Mexico border has
dropped significantly at major crossing points, quite likely as a result of both
fading economic prospects and the several thousand National Guard troops
patrolling the border. 9 Third, and surprisingly, the percentage of undocumented
persons who had entered the United States by legal means-that is, with visas or
visa waivers-has increased to about 50% of all undocumented persons.10 In other
words, half of all undocumented persons were once documented but have
overstayed their visas or violated other terms of entry. The other half are mostly
the "illegal border crossers" we usually think of. The fourth trend is toward more
permanent and less seasonal migration of undocumented persons." Building walls
and strengthening border police along the border have encouraged this trend. 12 By
inhibiting seasonal crossing, the walls actually may be keeping more
undocumented persons in than keeping them out of the United States.
B. Characteristicsof Law Enforcement
Since 9/11, the enforcement of our immigration law has relied heavily on
seven strategies-namely: increased denial and revocation of visas for admission
of foreign visitors, sanctions against employers of undocumented aliens, raids of
workplaces and elsewhere, self-reporting requirements, notification by local
13
authorities of foreign nationals, criminal prosecutions, and border controls.
Federal control is vested primarily in an agency called Immigration and Customs
Enforcement-chillingly known as ICE-which was created after 9/11 within the

8. See Nina Bernstein, Decline is Seen in Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2005, at A 1; Tamar
Jacoby, Immigration Nation, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Nov.-Dec. 2006, at 50, 56-7, 65.
9. See Faye Bowers, On the Border, Illegal Crossings Drop, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 15,
2007, at 1 [hereinafter On the Border]; Faye Bowers, For Economy's Future,Ask Illegalss, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, May 2, 2007, at 3 (with graph depicting the correlation between the state of the
economy and border apprehensions of undocumented persons since 1994).
10. See Jagdish Bhagwati, Borders Beyond Control, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Jan.-Feb. 2003, at 98, 102.
11. Mireya Navarro, Traditional Round Trip for Workers is Becoming a One-Way Migration
North, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2006, at Al.
12. Id.
13. See Raquel Aldana, Of Katz and "Aliens : Privacy Expectations and the Immigration Raids,
41 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1081 (2008) (summarizing tougher immigration enforcement): Editorial, They
Are America, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2007, at 11 [hereinafter They Are America].
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new Department of Homeland Security. 14 Other federal agencies 15are also
significant, especially the State Department and the Department of Labor.
To focus on the first strategy of law enforcement, the State Department's
zealous denial and revocation of visas after 9/11 was understandable, given the
origins of 9/11 in the government's failure to scrutinize visa applications carefully
or otherwise bar entry to terrorism suspects. Less understandable, however, have
been the puzzling, seemingly unwarranted denials and revocations of visas, often
without any explanation, that have exasperated professional associations,
institutions of higher education, and public forums, not to mention friends and
relatives of applicants for visas.16 Gone, too, is the hope, if not expectation, that
even the plenary power doctrine, by which the political branches of government,
without judicial review, exercise nearly unlimited authority over immigration,
would disappear. Judicial review of the government's actions is less likely today
than ever before. Gradually, the situation has improved since the immediate
aftermath of 9/11, but it remains an unfortunate consequence of the government's
overreaction to 9/11.
In pursuing the second and third strategies, which are directed against
employment of undocumented workers, the eponymous ICE has conducted
numerous raids and busts this past year in a program of stepped-up enforcement.17
Arrests by ICE, too often involving racial profiling, increased ten-fold between
2002 and 2007, reaching record numbers in 2008.18 Showcase examples, such as
the dramatic raid of Iowa meatpacking plants in 200619 and 2008,20 make the news,
but as law-enforcement measures, have only marginal impact in the long run.
State and local governments have also taken to the barricades against

14. See Chris Nwachukwu Okeke & James A.R. Nafziger, United States Migration Law:
Essentialsfor Comparison, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 531, 540 (Supp. 2006).

15. Okeke & Nafziger, supra note 14, at 540. For another overview of United States immigration
law and related institutions, see VICTOR C. ROMERO, EVERYDAY LAW FOR IMMIGRANTS 61-63 (2009)

(including a chart of "The Federal Immigration Bureaucracy").
16. The examples are legion. See, e.g., Historical Association Welcomes Bolivian Scholar at
Center of Visa Dispute, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., News Blog, Jan. 5, 2008; Press Release, American
Sociological Association, American Sociological Association Files Complaint Against the U.S.
Government for Excluding Prominent South African Scholar Adam Habib from the United States (Sept.
25, 2007); Nina Bernstein, Music Scholar Barred From U.S., but No One Will Tell Her Why, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 17, 2007, at 17; Burton Bollag, Academic Group Says It Won't Meet in U.S., CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 31, 2006, at 47.
17. See, e.g., Spencer S. Hsu, Immigration Raid Jars a Small Town, WASH. POST, May 18, 2008,
at Al.
18. Emily Bazar, Citizens Sue After Detentions, Immigration Raids, USA TODAY, June 24, 2008;
see also Press Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE Multifaceted Strategy Leads
to Record Enforcement Results: Removals, Criminal Arrests, and Worksite Investigations Soared in
Fiscal Year 2008 (Oct. 23, 2008).
19. Aldana, supra note 13, at 1101-02.
20. Hsu, supra note 17. The 2008 raid at the Agriprocessors plant, after a 16-month investigation,
was the largest in the Bush Administration, resulting in 389 arrests. Id. The plant, owned by a
Lubavitch Hasidic family, was the country's largest processor of glatt kosher beef, the strictest kosher
standard. Id. For background on Postville, see Emily Yoffe, Zip USA 52162: Midwest Kosher, NAT'L
GEOG., June 2005, at 116.
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undocumented persons by restricting their access to welfare benefits and driving
privileges, and by collaborating with ICE in law enforcement. 2 1 In court
challenges, these measures were largely struck down in 2007, but upheld in 2008.22
As to sanctions against employers of undocumented persons, fines range from
$275 to $11,000, depending on the offense. 23 In the 2006-07 fiscal year, ICE fined
employers more than $30 million for violating immigration laws and arrested 92
employers and 771 employees. 24 Nevertheless, the sanctions have had little effect
on hiring practices. 25 History has shown that raids and employer sanctions have
not been very effective, either in the United States or in such countries as
Switzerland and Germany.26
Self-reporting, the fourth law-enforcement strategy after 9/11, is just another
way of describing the Special Call-In Registration Program, as part of the post9/11 National Security Entry-Exit Registration System. The Program requires all
noncitizen males over age 16 from substantially Muslim countries and North
Korea to report for registration and fingerprinting, subject to removal proceedings
for improper status or documentation. 27 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
following other courts, upheld the Program, despite its patently discriminatory
elements, based on what the court determined to be a "rational national security
balance"-clearly, post-9/11 language.28
The fifth law-enforcement strategy, involving notifications by state police and
county sheriffs to ICE of all foreign-born suspects, has become commonplace. 29 It
is also largely ineffective because it inhibits undocumented criminal suspects from
acknowledging their foreign birth or nationality. Additionally, insofar as local
authorities take the initiative, the notifications have reduced the incentive for ICE,
with all of its more sophisticated resources, to proactively review county jail
registers online in order to single out particular suspects for status review.3 °
That leaves criminal prosecution and border controls as obvious strategies for
enforcing immigration laws. Again, the federal government has acted vigorously.
As early as 2004, immigration violations replaced drug crimes as the leading
category of federal prosecutions; so dramatic has been the rise in the number of
prosecutions for immigration offenses that they more than doubled over a four-

21. See, e.g., Bernard J. Pazanowski, E-Verify Creates Battleground Over Preemption of State
Immigration Laws, 57 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) AA-1 (2009).
22. See Julia Preston, In Reversal, Courts Uphold Local Immigration Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10,
2008, at 16. The most highly publicized of these measures involved four ordinances of Hazleton,
Pennsylvania that a federal district court struck down. See Aldana, supra note 13, at 1090, 1124-25.
23. Associated Press, Feds to Hike Finesfor HiringIllegal Immigrants, Feb. 22, 2008.
24. Id.
25. Bhagwati, supra note 10, at 103.
26. Id.
27. 8 C.F.R. § 264.1(f)(4) (2003).
28. Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427, 438-39 (2d Cir. 2008).
29. Marissa Taylor, Local Police Split Over Immigration Enforcement, MCCLATCHY
NEWSPAPERS, Dec. 7, 2007.

30. See id.
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year period. 31 This increase has occurred because of a deliberate shift in priorities
by federal law-enforcement agencies, largely in response to the threat of terrorism
after 9/11. Enforcement of drug laws and other criminal measures, of course, is
still substantial, but a significant part of the necessary resources has been diverted
to the investigation of immigration violations.32
The federal government responded to 9/11 in several ways at the Mexican
border. "Operation Jump Start" in 2006 deployed some 6,000 National Guard
troops along the border.33 The Secure Fence Act of 2006 authorized construction
34
In September 2008, the
of a 700 million dollar, 670-mile fence or wall there.
million to complete the
$400
additional
for
an
Bush administration asked Congress
wall because of unanticipated fuel, steel, and labor costs. 35 A related 28-mile
"virtual fence" of surveillance technology in Arizona has, so far, failed.36
It is easy to view the wall simply as a barrier to the entry of undocumented
Mexican farmworkers and their families, but the post-9/1l threat of terrorist
infiltration was instrumental in generating congressional support. 37 Despite lavish
appropriations, however, the wall has had little or no effect as a shield against
terrorism. 38 "Everyone can climb it," according to one border crosser; even the
Border Patrol itself has acknowledged that the wall is only "a speed bump in the
desert" that enables the Patrol to "respond., 39 To be sure, the wall may have
stemmed the normal flow of undocumented persons into this country, but even that
is not clear. As the then-Governor Janet Napolitano of Arizona famously quipped,
40
"[y]ou show me a fifty-foot wall, and I'll show you a fifty-one-foot ladder.,
Moreover, as General George Patton long ago observed, fixed fortifications are
monuments to the stupidity of man.41 Inevitably, one thinks of the Berlin Wall
when one thinks of the Mexican Border Wall.
C. The Gist ofPublic Opinion
Fundamentally, even after 9/11, Americans have generally favored a steady
flow of immigration in the national interest. The country has steadfastly kept its
arms open to prospective migrants, including appropriate levels of undocumented
migration.42 Cheap labor means cheap produce in the market. So long as there is

31. See Erich Lichtblau, Prosecutions in Immigration Doubled in Last Four Years, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 29, 2005, at A27; see also Gail Russell Chaddock, Hill Closes in on Immigration Reform,
CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Mar. 13, 2007, at 1 (arrests of employers tripled in 2006).
32. See Lichtblau, supra note 31, at A27.
33. Bowers, On the Border, supra note 9, at 1.
34. Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-367, § 3, 120 Stat. 2638, 2639 (2006).
35. Eileen Sullivan, Bush's Border Fence Costs Extra $400 Million, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 10,
2008, at A9.
36. Id.
37. See ROMERO, supra note 15, at 46, 89.
38. See Sean Holstege, Illegal Migrants Have a Higher Hurdle, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 13, 2008.
39. Id.
40. Timothy Egan, Disorderon the Border, N.Y. TIMES, March 29, 2008, at A17.
41.

WILLIAM WEIR, 50 BATTLES THAT CHANGED THE WORLD 233 (2004).

42. See, e.g., David Leonhardt, The Border and the Ballot Box, N.Y. TIMES, Week in Review,
March 2, 2008, at 1, 8 (summarizing substantial and growing recognition of the contributions of
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some process for regularizing their status, this tolerance has normally trumped
public concern about illegal border crossings. For example, according to a recent
USA TODAY Gallup poll, 78% of the American public favors putting
undocumented aliens on the path to citizenship.43 Even so, public opinion is
cyclical, sometimes preferring a more open door for migrants, sometimes a more
closed door. Often the doorkeeper is the media, which has certainly been the case
since 9/11.
As to the issue of border controls, public opinion polls have overwhelmingly
indicated disenchantment with efforts to protect U.S. borders from undocumented
migration. In one poll, for example, 41% of the public said they "worry a lot"
about the issue. 4 Public disenchantment about border controls is itself not
controlling, however. In fact, it is diminishing as the presence of undocumented
persons declines.45 The public, as it turns out, has a much bigger heart than the
flame-throwers in the media.
IV. THE EFFECT OF 9/11

The terrorist tragedy of 9/11 put the country on edge about migrants. It was
clear that the terrorist attacks were, as a federal appeals court found, "facilitated by
the lax enforcement of immigration laws. '" 6 Encouragement from media
personalities stirred the normal debate about immigration. The debate became
shrill and polarized, if not downright venomous. In particular, the threat of
terrorism was caught up with perennial issues related to the status of
undocumented workers in this country. The American public began to forget our
traditional hospitality to strangers. Self-appointed vigilantes began to patrol the
Mexican border.47 Members of Congress called for the criminalization of
undocumented status itself, and plans unfolded for a full-scale military defense of
the Mexican border. 48 Several proposals even called for the amendment of our
Constitution to deny citizenship to children of noncitizens.
Promising
negotiations with Mexico to find common solutions to the issues involved with
migration abruptly ended.5 °

immigrants and less blaiming of immigrants for the country's problems).
43. See Kathy Kiely, Public Favors Giving Illegal Immigrants in USA a Break, USA TODAY, Apr.
19, 2007, at 7A.
44. Daniel Yankelovich, The Tipping Points, FOREIGN AFF., May-June 2006, at 115, 119; see also
Jacoby, supra note 8, at 50 (noting that the public remains supportive of immigration but perceives a
need to fix the system).
45. See, e.g., Whitley, supra note 6.
46. Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427, 438 (2d Cir. 2008).
47. See Roger Lowenstein, The Immigration Equation, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2006, § 6, at 32.
48. See Sullivan, supra note 35, at A9.
49. See They Are America, supra note 13, at 11.
50. See Ricardo Sandoval, Key Concerns Unresolved After Talks between U.S., Mexico, DALLAS
MORNING NEwS, Nov. 27, 2002, at 18A.
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There is something old about this experience and something new. Public
opinion, though consistently supportive of immigrants, fluctuates cyclically within
a margin of appreciation of general support.51 It is a small wonder that Congress
has typically responded to public opinion in cycles of liberality and restriction.
Nearly every decade, almost on schedule, public concern about immigration rules
and procedures surges, and Congress responds with new law. 9/11 reinforced that
cycle.
Four issues normally have defined the public agenda in recurring cycles:
border security, guest workers, more rigorous sanctions against employers of
undocumented persons, and expanded opportunities for legalization of residency
and citizenship. Unfortunately, a congressional attempt to combine all four of
these concerns in a single comprehensive bill 52 failed in 2007. Essentially, the bill
had three purposes: to rationalize and liberalize immigrant visas, particularly for
workers; to provide for more effective enforcement of the law; and to offer a onetime opportunity for undocumented persons with sufficient roots in the United
States to regularize their status and put them on a long path to citizenship. 53 The
bill included an overhaul of the current, single-attribute system for issuance of
visas, replacing it with a sensible, finely calibrated consideration of multiple
attributes of a visa applicant, based on successful merit-point systems of Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.54
After the demise of the comprehensive immigration bill, several less
ambitious bills also failed. One, known as AgJOBS, for example, would have
conferred "blue card" status on any foreign worker who could demonstrate
previous agricultural work in the United States, his or her own eligibility for
admission, a criminal record free of felony or serious misdemeanor convictions,
and a timely application.55 Another bill would have enabled the children of
undocumented persons to become eligible for educational benefits, and still
another would have made undocumented high school graduates eligible for
citizenship after completion of two years of college or military service.56
Instead of substantial immigration reform by Congress, however, we have
witnessed seven developments: (1) stricter border enforcement, (2) more federal

51. "As ever, we Americans like to say that we live in a nation of immigrants. But we are also
prone to believing that the last great immigrants were the ones who arrived decades ago. The country
can never quite make up its mind how open it should be. It was in 1882, after all, that Congress
significantly restricted immigration for the first time, by passing the Chinese Exclusion Act. Only four
years later, the Statue of Liberty-'the Mother of Exiles,' in the words of the Emma Lazarus poem
inscribed inside the statue-rose above New York Harbor." Leonhardt, supra note 42, at 8.
52. See Amanda Paulson, Faye Bowers & Daniel B. Wood, To Immigrants, US Reform Bill is
Unrealistic,CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 21, 2007, at 11 (giving a capsule summary of the bill).
53. Julia Preston, In Increments, Senate Revisits Immigrant Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2007, at Al;
see also Chaddock, supra note 31.
54. See Peter Grier, Who Gets In? Skills vs. Family Ties, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 24,

2007, at 1.
55. Faye Bowers, Along Border, not Enough Handsfor the Harvest, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Feb. 22, 2007, at 2.
56. See Preston, supra note 53, at 1, 17.
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raids of workplaces, (3) local crackdowns on day laborers and a big debate about
their rights, (4) restrictions on the civil liberties and due process of non-citizens,
(5) massive fingerprinting of non-citizen visitors (the database currently numbers
90 million new fingerprints, with 20-23 million added every year) and proposals
for DNA testing of all noncitizens, (6) a pay-as-you-go maze for non-citizens
seeking to enter the country, adjust their status, or become citizens, and (7) an
alarming rise of anxiety about foreigners in this country and attacks on them.57 For
example, the FBI reports that anti-Latino hate crimes rose by almost 23% between
2003 and 2005.58
What is quite new about the immigration issue today has been the edginess of
the American public and greater political posturing, thanks to the audacity of
broadcast media personalities who took up the issue with little regard for the facts.
Their medium was entertainment, not journalism. Purely and simply, they
exploited public fear of terrorism for commercial ends. Suddenly, the public was
confronted with the specter of a porous border, allegedly wide open to terrorist
infiltration as well as such acknowledged threats to domestic security as drug
Suddenly, too, the ongoing search for effective controls over
trafficking.
undocumented migration took a radical turn, at least until the economy became the
number one public nightmare. In addition, this turn was not only radical but also
unrealistic. Just imagine, for example, trying to round up millions of newly minted
criminals if a House bill in Congress to make undocumented status itself a felony
had ever become the law.

V. GETTING IT STRAIGHT
The argument for drastic action against undocumented persons is often
expressed in terms of sheer numbers. The consensus is that there are an estimated
eleven to twelve million undocumented persons among us, 59 but nobody knows for
sure. The total number is actually nothing new. Over thirty years ago, in 1974, the
federal government estimated six to twelve million undocumented workers,6 ° much
the same as the estimates today. If we account for the substantial increase in the
general population as well as the much greater capacity of law-enforcement
agencies to detect undocumented persons, even the low number of six million is
roughly comparable to today's estimate.
Most studies, with a few exceptions, have shown that immigrants, fully
documented or otherwise, make an immense contribution to the national
economy.61 Surprisingly perhaps, the net contribution of immigrants as a whole is

57. See generally Aldana, supra note 13; They Are America, supra note 13. Regarding the
massive fingerprinting of foreigners in the name of anti-terrorism, see Alexandra Marks, More
Fingerprintingfor Tourists, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 27, 2008, at 3.
58. Brentin Mock, Furia Contra el Otro [Raging Against the Other], INTELLIGENCE REP., Winter
2007, at 32 (Spanish language source).
59. Thomas Frank, Number of Illegal Immigrants Declines, USA TODAY, Feb. 24, 2009, at 3A.
60. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT iii
(1974) (on file with author).
61. See Jacoby, supra note 8, at 50.

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 37:4

very positive, 62 even to the point that undocumented workers are given credit for
helping prop up the ailing social security system. 63 Moreover, immigrants
generally do not take jobs from citizens or depress fair and decent wages, so long
as the domestic labor force is adequately protected. That was the conclusion of a
research report by the well-respected Pew Foundation, subject to exceptions in
some local job markets.64 Indeed, immigrant workers tend to raise wages rather
65
than lower them by complementing rather than competing with native workers.
For example, a greater availability of daycare workers makes it possible for
homemakers to take outside employment. Studies also have confirmed the reliance
of consumers and the national economy on migrant labor above current authorized
levels of migration. 66 The United States is already facing long-term shortages of
unskilled workers,67 even taking into account cyclical and episodic downturns in
the economy, and the problem will only get worse in a graying society as some 75
million baby boomers retire.68
Other studies, focused on immigration processes in other countries, have
revealed a correlation between the character of immigration controls and the locus
of authority for those controls within governments. 69 For example, countries
whose military plays a significant role in immigration control are apt to be
particularly concerned about law enforcement, whereas vesting more authority
within a ministry of labor may betoken particular concern for protection of the
domestic workforce. Understandably, then, the shift of authority after 9/11 from
the Department of Justice to the new Department of Homeland Security has
involved a closer association between the endless terrorist threat and the presence

62. See Daniel Altman, Shattering Stereotypes About Immigrant Workers, N.Y. TIMES, June 3,
2007, § 3, at 4 (stating that the presence of illegal immigrants actually increases the overall supply of
labor in the United States).
63. See Editorial, How Immigrants Saved Social Security, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2008, at A26.
Several regional and state studies have also confirmed the positive economic contributions of
undocumented workers. For example, the Oregon Center for Public Policy issued a fact sheet in 2007
that estimated that undocumented workers in Oregon paid $134 million to $187 million in taxes in
2006, including state income, Social Security, Medicare, property and excise taxes. OREGON CENTER
FOR PUBLIC POLICY, UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS ARE TAXPAYERS, Too 4 (2007).

The center also

estimated that Oregon employers paid $97 million to $136 million in state unemployment, Social
Security and Medicare taxes on the wages of undocumented workers, Id. at 1. In addition, a substantial
portion of the state's unauthorized workers' roughly $2 billion earned in annual income is spent on
goods, services and taxes, which benefit the state's economy, the center's researchers said. Id. at 2.
64. PEW HISPANIC CENTER, GROWTH IN THE FOREIGN-BORN WORKFORCE AND EMPLOYMENT OF

NATIVE BORN (2006).
65. See Jacoby, supra note 8, at 57.
66. See id. at 50.
67. See DORIS MEISSNER ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND AMERICA'S FUTURE: A NEW CHAPTER 3

(2006); Immigration: Impact on U.S. Economy, 56(3) NAT'L VOTER 12, 12 (2007); Altman, supra note
62.
68. See Jacoby, supra note 8, at 50; Immigration: Impact on U.S. Economy, supra note 67, at 12.
See MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 67, at 3 (discussing the economic implications of immigrants).
69. See, e.g., James A.R. Nafziger, A Comparison of Processesfor Reforming Migration Laws in
TransitionalStates: China, Kazakhstan, andAlbania, 70 WASH. L. REV. 757 (1995).
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of undocumented
motivations.

565

workers in this country, regardless of their origins or

The administrative restructuring of federal authority over immigration after
9/11 should not stand in the way, however, of decoupling the normal, even
cyclical, issues of migration from terrorist threats to homeland security. We must
resist the siren call of media personalities. There simply is no correlation between
the number of undocumented workers and the security issues that beset us as a
society. If 9/11 made anything clear, it was the need for strengthening and finetuning enforcement of the law directed at specific terrorists and acts of terrorism,
expanding public resources on homeland security, and improving public education
in this nation of immigrants can help effectively achieve this goal.

THE WAR ON TERROR
AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS:
DOES EUROPE GET IT RIGHT?
1
DAVID ARONOFSKY AND MATTHEW COOPER
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I. INTRODUCTION
The global war on terror, spearheaded by the United States since September
11, 2001, has seen ongoing tensions between military, law enforcement and
political expediencies on the one hand, and protection of basic international human
rights law principles, including those reflected in national constitutions and
statutes, on the other. Seldom has any regime ostensibly committed to rule of law
as a core national value drawn more criticism outside its borders than the United
States over the waging of this "war.",3 Images of Guantanamo detentions, military

commissions with ambiguous jurisdictional authority, Abu Ghraib prisoner abuses,
extraordinary renditions, erratic U.S. court decisions, U.S. government memoranda
attempting to justify torture, and a U.S. administration that openly stated its
disagreement with applying international laws (human rights and otherwise) to
how this war is conducted, all combine to raise doubts about whether the U.S.
4
commitment to the rule of law is real, imagined, or somewhere in-between.
In 2002, reflecting upon the September 11 tragedy just a year after its
occurrence, Professor Aronofsky warned against arbitrary justice and making up
our anti-terrorism laws as we go along, contrary to the American way. Although

1. The Author has been General Counsel and an Adjunct Faculty Member in the Schools of Law
and Education at The University of Montana since 1994. His degrees include a J.D., with honors, and a
B.S. in education from the University of Texas at Austin; a Ph.D. in Higher Education from Florida
State University; and a Masters in Educational Counseling from Southern Methodist University. The
views reflected herein are solely his own personal ones and should not be attributed to The University
of Montana.
2. Matthew Cooper received his J.D., with honors, from the University of Denver Sturm College
of Law, and earned an L.L.M., with highest honors, in International Law and International Relations
from the University of Kent at Canterbury (Brussels School of International Studies).
3. See, e.g., Richard J. Wilson, United States Detaineesat GuantanamoBay: The Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights Responds to a "Legal Black Hole ", 10 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 2 (2003); Joan
Fitzpatrick, Jurisdiction of Military Commissions and the Ambiguous War on Terrorism, 96 AM. J.
INT'L L. 345 (2002).
4. Julie Mertus & Lisa Davis, Citizenship and Location in a World of Torture, 10 N.Y. CITY L.
REV. 411, 416 (2007) (describing the Bush administration intent to " respect international law only so
far as it chose to," and the Bush declaration that his authority permitted the U.S. to ignore international
treaties in times of conflicts) (citations omitted).
5. See David Aronofsky, September 11 Reflectionsfrom GroundZero: Parent,InternationalLaw
Teacher and Rule of Law Perspectives, 34 CASE WEST. RES. J. INT'L L. 185, 187 (2002).
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the U.S. Supreme Court has, at least to a limited extent, mitigated some of the
more egregious abuses of Guantanamo detainee legal rights, the Court's refusal to
apply the full range of substantive and procedural legal protections characterized in
both the U.S. Bill of Rights and in international human rights law treaties (modeled
in no small part from the U.S. Bill of Rights) continues to treat meaningful rule of
law values as undesirable annoyances. This is not to criticize or downplay the
ferocious legal advocacy engaged in to date within the U.S. court system in
defense of these legal protections, but instead to ask aloud here about how to make
such advocacy more effective in redressing two serious ongoing problems as to the
litigation of such U.S. cases: 1) the lack of viable causes of action, and 2) the
insufficient opportunities for remedial redress.
With the recent change in U.S. Administration, the question of how the U.S.
will (and should) approach the ongoing problems in the coming years is to date
unresolved. Although the present authors make no guess as to how the U.S. will
proceed, the answer of how the U.S. should proceed may well lie in Europe's welldeveloped human rights jurisprudence. This article will survey a number of U.S.
court decisions since September 2001, followed by an examination of the legal
policy problems with the Bush administration's tactics and the accompanying U.S.
litigation results, and conclude with a comparative examination of the European
human rights law approach. It is the position of the present authors that the U.S.
would be well served to, at the very least, examine Europe's relative success in
fighting the war on terror, while at the same time preserving the rule of law, and
incorporate the European experiences into the U.S. system of law.
II.

INTRACTABLE PROBLEMS IN U.S. LITIGATION REGARDING THE WAR ON
TERROR: THE LACK OF VIABLE CAUSES OF ACTION AND MEANINGFUL REMEDIAL
REDRESS

In considering both the procedural and substantive standards
used to impose detention to prevent acts of terrorism, the courts
must accord proper deference to the political branches . .
There are further considerations, however. Security subsists,
too, in fidelity to freedom's first principles. Chief among these
are freedom from arbitrary and unlawful restraint and the
personal liberty that is secured by adherence to the separation
6
ofpowers.
Despite protections outlined in the Bill of Rights, as well as safeguards in
both international customary and treaty law, many suspected terrorists detained in
the United States have been denied fundamental due process prior to, during, and
after trial. Included among such transgressions are "extraordinary renditions,"
insufficient "enemy combatant" status reviews, warrantless wire-tapping and
searches, collaboration with non-U.S. human rights violators, and the elimination

6. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 2277 (2008); see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
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of guaranteed congressional safeguards, such as habeas corpus.7 The lack of
viable causes of action and meaningful remedial relief has left detainees in a world
of limbo, in which they have suffered illegal treatment (sometimes as gross as
torture), but have nowhere to turn for legal redress. This fact has only served to
increase the already widespread criticism of the United States' response to
terrorism, both inside and outside the country. This section highlights some of
these failings.
A. ExtraordinaryRendition: No Viable Legal Claim
Although internationally condemned, the policy of "extraordinary rendition"
has met with tacit acceptance by U.S. courts, which have avoided the issue either
by refraining the question presented, or by excessively deferring to the discretion8
of Congress and/or the executive branch. Arar v. Ashcroft is a telling example.
After being removed in 2002 to Syria, where he was subjected to torture, Maher
Arar, a dual citizen of Syria and Canada, brought action against the United States
and several government officials, including Attorney General John Ashcroft. 9 Arar
alleged violations under the Torture Victim Prevention Act (TVPA) 10 and the Fifth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, claiming that after being detained and
unlawfully mistreated in the U.S., he was removed to Syria for the purposes of
interrogation and torture by Syrian authorities.11 Despite acknowledging its
obligation to accept the facts of the complaint as true (including the allegations of
torture), 12 and to draw inferences in favor of the plaintiff,1 3 the court found that
7. See infra Sections 11(a)-(g).
8. Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157, 184 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding no private right of action for
alleged rendition victim taken to a country where torture would likely occur).
9. "Arar alleges that the defendants directed the interrogations by providing information about
Arar to Syrian officials and receiving reports on Arar's responses. Consequently, the defendants
conspired with, and/or aided and abetted, Syrian officials in arbitrarily detaining, interrogating, and
torturing Arar. Arar argues in the alternative that, at a minimum, the defendants knew or at least should
have known that there was a substantial likelihood that he would be tortured upon his removal to
Syria." Id.at 199 (Sack, J., dissenting) (citing Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 257 (E.D.N.Y.
2006).
10. Arar, 532 F.3d 157 at 163.
11.

Id.

12. Id. at 168 (citing Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 152 (2d Cir. 2007); the dissent, at 203,
characterized the facts that must be accepted as follows: "1) Arar was apprehended by government
agents as he sought to change planes at JFK Airport; he was not seeking to enter the United States; 2)
his detention, based on false information given by the government of Canada, was for the purpose of
obtaining information from him about terrorism and his alleged links with terrorists and terrorist
organizations; 3) he was interrogated harshly on that topic-mostly by FBI agents-for many hours over a
period of two days; 4) during that period, he was held incommunicado and was mistreated by, among
other things, being deprived of food and water for a substantial portion of his time in custody; 5) he was
then taken from JFK Airport to the MDC in Brooklyn, where he continued to be held incommunicado
and in solitary confinement for another three days; 6) while at the MDC, INS agents sought
unsuccessfully to have him agree to be removed to Syria because they and other U.S. government
agents intended that he would be questioned there along similar lines, but under torture; 7) thirteen days
after Arar had been intercepted and incarcerated at the airport, defendants sent him against his will to
Syria. The defendants intended that he be questioned in Syria under torture and while enduring brutal
and inhumane conditions of captivity. This was, as alleged, all part of a single course of action,
conceived of and executed by the defendants in the United States. Its purpose: to make Arar 'talk."' Id.
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Arar had no right of action. It did so mainly by refraining a case of torture into
one of immigration.14
On September 26, 2002, Arar was detained at John F. Kennedy International
Airport in New York, while travelling from Tunisia to Montreal. 15 Upon review
by INS officials, Arar was deemed a member of Al Qaeda and therefore found to
be inadmissible to the United States. 16 However, instead of removing Arar to his
country of choice, Canada, as is customary under U.S. immigration law, Arar was
removed to Syria. 17 There, he was interrogated and tortured by Syrian government
officials. 18 Arar claimed that Attorney General Ashcroft, among others, was
responsible for his mistreatment, both in the U.S. and in Syria, and that
accordingly Arar should be given redress from the United States for the wrong he
endured.1 9 Such redress was denied.
In denying a right of action for all of Arar's claims, the court made several
puzzling findings. First, it relied upon the separation of powers, claiming that "the
creation of civil damage claims is quintessentially a legislative function, and the
protection of national security and the conduct of foreign affairs are primarily
executive., 20 Although one cannot readily dispute the separation of powers
argument per se, the court here misapplied the doctrine, combining "national
challenge" rhetoric with illusive reasoning to avoid tackling the potentially serious
due process problems that accompany "extraordinary rendition.",2 1 In one breath,
the court states: "Congress did not intend to preclude [the federal courts']
consideration of removal-related claims that raise questions of law or allege
constitutional violations, so long as they are properly before this [c]ourt.,, 22 In the
next breath, the court proclaims its loathness to interfere with "the prerogative of
Congress to determine the jurisdiction of the district courts,, 23 leading to a holding
finding no right of action.

at 203 (Sack, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 168.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 17-53.
15. Id. at 194.
16. Id. at 166.
17. Despite multiple attempts to force Arar to consent to removal to Syria, he refused; he was
rendered to Syria nonetheless. See id. at 196 (Sack, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 163.
19. Id. Count one of Arar's complaint requested relief under the Torture Victim Protection Act
(TVPA); counts two and three requested relief under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution for
Arar's alleged torture and detention in Syria; and, count four requested relief under the Fifth
Amendment for alleged mistreatment while Arar was detained in the United States. In conjunction,
Arar sought declaratory judgment "that defendants' conduct violated his 'constitutional, civil, and
international human rights,"' as well as compensatory and punitive damages for the alleged violations.
Id.
20. Id. at 165.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 170.
23. Id. at 171.
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As there is a "long history of judicial review of executive and legislative
decisions related to the conduct of foreign relations and national security," 24 the
court's conclusion will undoubtedly lead the reader to ask what led the court to this
seemingly contradictory conclusion. With regard to detention and torture in Syria,
the court first seemed to accept the Government's assertion that the "INA places
removal-related claims beyond the reach of a district court's federal question
jurisdiction by creating an alternative-and exclusive-mechanism for resolving those
claims," i.e. exclusive INA review pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). 25 Again, the
present authors have no argument with this process - i.e. Congressional
determination of proper remedies. However, what is troublesome is the court's
readiness to ignore (openly) the fact that the reason Arar was unable to exhaust this
remedy was the fault of the defendants, not Arar himself.26 The defendants denied
Arar access to counsel, concealed his location from his lawyer, and removed him
27
secretly before his lawyer could file a petition.
The court also faltered by refraining the issue of torture into one of
immigration. 28 The court deemed Arar an unadmitted alien, 29 and therefore
undeserving of the full protections of the Bill of Rights. 30 The court explained that
the Attorney General was specifically authorized to remove Arar "'without further
inquiry or hearing by an immigration judge' if the Attorney General, after
reviewing the evidence establishing his inadmissibility, determined that a hearing
'would be prejudicial to the public interest, safety, or security." '' 3' Accordingly,
the court found that Arar was not entitled to a hearing or counsel, as set forth in 8
U.S.C.A. § 1362 and reiterated in Montilla and Waldron.32 In so doing, the court
24. Id. at 213 (Sack, J., dissenting), (citing e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004)
(holding "[w]hatever power the United States Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges
with other nations or with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role
for all three branches when individual liberties are at stake."); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 523
(1985) (finding "despite our recognition of the importance of [the Attorney General's activities in the
name of national security] to the safety of our Nation and its democratic system of government, we
cannot accept the notion that restraints are completely unnecessary."); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934) (holding "even the war power does not remove constitutional
limitations safeguarding essential liberties."); Baker v. Carr,369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (finding "it is
error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial
cognizance."); see also Brief of Retired Federal Judges as Amici Curiae at 11 (stating "[t]he Supreme
Court has made clear that the Executive's power to protect national security or conduct foreign affairs
does not deprive the judiciary of its authority to act as a check against abuses of those powers that
violate individual rights.")).
25. Id. at 170-71.
26. Id. at 169-71, 180-81.
27. Id. at 171.
28. See id. at 185-90. Judge Sack echoes this position stating that the majority avoids addressing
the general principles of due process "by mischaracterizing this as an immigration case, when it is in
fact about forbidden tactics allegedly employed by United States law enforcement officers in a
terrorism inquiry." Id. at 193 (Sack, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 186.
30. Id. at 187 n.26.
31. Id. at 187.
32. See Waldron v. IN.S., 17 F.3d 511, 517 (2d. Cir. 1993); Montilla v. IN.S., 926 F.2d 162, 166
(2d. Cir. 1991); The court held, "[i]n sum, Arar is unable to point to any legal authority suggesting that,
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evades the ultimate cause of action. Arar was not merely seeking redress for
improper removal, but for being subjected to torture.
According to the dissent, the notion that Arar was not "physically present" in
the U.S., and therefore not subject to the protections of the Constitution, is "a legal
fiction peculiar to immigration law." 33 "Presence" is relevant only for determining
an alien's immigration status and related matters. 34 It is improper for assessing
35
mistreatment by law enforcement agents during detention and interrogation.
However, again by avoiding the heart of the issue, the court failed to allow the
proper process of redress, which would be to allow full pre-trial discovery
(at the
36
very least) in order to determine responsibility for Arar's mistreatment.
Ultimately, the court determined it would not apply Bivens relief (an equitable
judicial remedy), despite its availability to petitioners who have suffered damages
caused by constitutional violations at the hands of federal officers, such as Arar.37
The Bivens analysis requires the court to first determine whether Congress has
provided "any alternative, existing process for protecting the interest" in
question.3t If no alternative scheme exists, Bivens relief is a matter of judicial

as an unadmitted alien who was excluded pursuant to the procedures set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c), he
possessed any form of entitlement to the assistance of counsel-let alone a constitutional entitlement, the
violation of which could constitute a predicate for the Bivens relief he seeks. Accordingly, we conclude
that Arar's allegations about the various ways in which defendants obstructed his access to counsel fail
to state a claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment." Arar, 532 F. 3d 157 at188.
33. Id.at 206 (Sack, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 207 n.23 (Sack, J.,dissenting) (stating "[t]he Supreme Court's decisions and our own
invoke the entry fiction in cases related to the determination of an alien's immigration status, and the
procedural due process to which an alien is entitled by virtue of that status, not cases adjudicating
alleged violations of an alien's substantive due process rights during detention. See, e.g., Leng May Ma
v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 2 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1958) (concluding that temporary parole in
United States while alien's admissibility was being determined did not entitle alien to benefit of statute
giving Attorney General authority to withhold deportation of any alien "within the United States" if
alien would thereby be subjected to physical persecution); Menon v. Esperdy, 413 F.2d 644, 647 (2d
Cir. 1969) (noting that "since a parole does not constitute an admission into the United States ...th[e]
appeal involve[d] an exclusion... rather than an expulsion"); Dong Wing Ott v. Shaughnessy, 247 F.2d
769, 770 (2d Cir. 1957) (per curiam) (holding that the Attorney General's "discretionary power to
suspend deportation" did not apply to aliens "within the country on parole," because parole, "by statute
[, was] not [to] be regarded as an admission of the alien" (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 925, 78 S. Ct. 1368, 2 L.Ed.2d 1370 (1958); Knauffv. Shaughnessv
179 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir.1950) (per curiam) (alien stopped at the border and detained on Ellis Island
"is not 'in the United States' . . [and therefore] is not entitled to naturalization"); see also MartinezAguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 623 (5th Cir. 2006) (rejecting application of the entry fiction to
Bivens claims involving the use of excessive force), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1096, 127 S. Ct. 837, 166
L.Ed.2d 667 (2006); Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) ("The entry
fiction is best seen ...
as a fairly narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the
executive branch must follow before turning an immigrant away." (emphasis in original).").
36. Id. at 208 (Sack, J., dissenting).
37. See generally Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the FederalBureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971); CorrectionalServs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66 (2001).
38. Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S.Ct. 2588, 2598 (2007).
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discretion. 39 As the dissent points out, citing to Judge Posner, if there were ever a
strong case for these "substantive due process" procedures of relief, it would be in
a situation of gross mistreatment during a period of extra-legal confinement.4 °
Arar's torture certainly qualifies.
However, the court denied relief, mistakenly relying on the Supreme Court's
reluctance to permit such relief.41 In short, despite authority in support of Arar's
claim, 42 the court denied equitable relief because "no court has yet considered
whether official misconduct of the sort alleged by Arar may vitiate Congress's
determination that a federal district court is not the appropriate forum," and that the
43
nature of the complaint as unverified "heighten[ed] [the court's] hesitation.
When dealing with an allegation as serious as torture, neither rationale seems
sufficient to deny discovery proceedings, let alone a trial on the issue.
Nevertheless, as a consequence of the perplexing decision, Arar had no forum to
hear his constitutional claims.44
Even if one were to give full faith to this judgment and full respect to the
necessity of maintaining the United States' foreign and national security policies,45
the fact remains that there exists no cause of action for persons subject to torture
by means of extraordinary rendition (which violates jus cogens principles of
international law).46 Although protecting the international community from
terrorism is at the acme of international concern, the process of preventing
terrorism should not come at the expense of U.S. national commitment to the
protection of fundamental rights of due process and the preservation of human
dignity.47

39. Id.
40. Arar, 532 F.3d at 210 (Sack, J., dissenting) (citing Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 194 (7th Cir.
1989)), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1026 (1990) (stating "[i]f ever there were a strong case for -'substantive
due process," it would be a case in which a person who had been arrested but not charged or convicted
was brutalized while in custody. If the wanton or malicious infliction of severe pain or suffering upon a
person being arrested violates the Fourth Amendment-as no one doubts-and if the wanton or malicious
infliction of severe pain or suffering upon a prison inmate violates the Eighth Amendment-as no one
doubts-it would be surprising if the wanton or malicious infliction of severe pain or suffering upon a
person confined following his arrest but not yet charged or convicted were thought consistent with due
process.")).
41. Id. at 178.
42. Id. at 171 (stating "[tihere is authority for the proposition that official obstruction similar to
that alleged by Arar may (1) excuse a plaintiffs failure to comply with a filing deadline, see, e.g.,
Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1387 (3d Cir. 1994) (equitable tolling), or
(2) bar a defendant from asserting certain defenses, such as failure to exhaust administrative remedies,
see, e.g., Abney v. McGinnis, 380 F.3d 663, 667 (2d Cir. 2004) (equitable estoppel).").
43. Id.
44. Id. at 168-69.
45. The court explicitly stated, "[t]here can be no doubt that litigation of this sort would interfere
with the management of our country's relations with foreign powers and affect our government's ability
to ensure national security." Id. at 182.
46. E.g. Dinah Shelton, InternationalLaw and "Relative Normativity, " in INTERNATIONAL LAW
155 (Malcolm Evans ed., 2003).
47. Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1373 (5th Cir. 1987) (noting that "[t]he 'entry fiction'
that excludable aliens are to be treated as if detained at the border despite their physical presence in the
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Especially telling about this case is what happened to Arar in Canada. A
Commission established there to investigate Arar's situation found that Arar was
not Al Qaeda. 48 A press release issued by the Commission summarized the report
of the Commissioner, Dennis O'Connor, who stated: "I am able to say
categorically that there is no evidence to indicate that Mr. Arar has committed any
49
offence or that his activities constitute a threat to the security of Canada.,
Following the report, the Office of the Prime Minister announced its acceptance of
the Commission's findings and cooperated in a settlement with Arar for
compensation, as well as issued letters to both Syria and the U.S. formally
objecting to the treatment of Arar. 50 The U.S. has categorically refused to do the
same. This discrepancy between two closely allied neighboring countries with
similar legal systems in assuming responsibility for the illegal treatment afforded
Arar casts the U.S. in a particularly bad light regarding rule of law commitment.
B. Enemy CombatantStatus Review: Limited To Habeas Corpus Action
One of the most perplexing elements of the war on terror, at least to
international jurists, is the peculiar designation given to those detained. Nonsoldiers have been deemed "enemy combatants," falling somewhere in between the
cracks of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions (according to the U.S.
Government), while those caught on the battlefield have been termed "illegal
enemy combatants," with few given the POW status envisaged by the international
instruments dealing with international conflict. Equally perplexing are the
procedures available to those designated as "enemy combatant" to challenge the
designation. AI-Marri v. Pucciarellievidences one of the greatest dangers of the
"enemy combatant" designations - indefinite military detention of legal U.S.
residents, seized upon American soil, who have never taken up arms against the
51
United States, either abroad or in the U.S.
Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, a Qatari national, is a legal resident of the United
States.52 However, he was seized on American soil by military authorities and held
in military detention as an enemy combatant for over five years, without charge,
and with no indication of when his confinement would end.53 During the first year
and a half of his detention, al-Marri was not permitted any outside communication,

United States ...does not limit the right of excludable aliens detained within United States territory to
humane treatment").
48. See generally ARAR COMM'N, REPORT OF THE EVENTS RELATING TO MAHER ARAR (2006).
49. Press Release, Arar Comm'n, Arar Commission Releases Its Findings on the Handling of the
Maher Arar Case I (Sept. 18, 2006), available at http:// www.ararcommission.ca/eng!Release
FinalSeptl 8.pdf.
50. Arar, 532 F. 3d at 200 (Sack, J., dissenting); Press Release, Prime Minister Releases Letter of
Apology to Maher Arar and His Family and Announces Completion of Mediation Process (Jan. 26,
2007), availableat http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1509.
51. See generally Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (a decision
containing six separate opinions, with bare majority recognizing habeas as the only means available to
challenge designation).
52. Id.at 217 (Motz, J., concurring).
53. Id. at 220.
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including with his attorneys, his wife, and his children.54 Furthermore, according
to al-Marri, "he was denied basic necessities, interrogated through measures
creating extreme sensory deprivation, and threatened with violence. 5 5 Notably,
al-Marri was not seized on a battlefield in Afghanistan, or at an Al Qaeda training
camp; rather, he was taken from his home in Peoria, Illinois.56 Throughout the
entirety of al-Marri's detention, the government never alleged that he was a
member of any nation's military, fought with any foreign military, or that he bore
arms against the United States "anywhere in the world. 57
Consequently, al-Marri filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 5 8 After the
District Court erroneously denied all relief, a divided Fourth Circuit panel reversed
the judgment and ordered that al-Marri's military detention cease. 59 The case was
reheard en banc and the Court of Appeals again reversed the decision of the
District Court, remanding the case for proceedings consistent with the Fourth
Circuit's findings. According to the appellate court, even assuming that Congress
had empowered the President to detain al-Marri as an enemy combatant (provided
afforded sufficient
the allegations against him were true), al-Marri had not "been
60
combatant."
enemy
an
as
designation
process to challenge his
Despite this apparent outcome of justice, we are reminded that causes of
action and redress for individuals such as al-Marri are limited. This decision
recognized the writ of habeas corpus as the only means available to challenge an
erroneous detainee designation. Moreover, it did not articulate any possible means
of remedial redress for al-Marri, which from the other cases summarized herein
appears limited to non-existent. Therefore, it would be specious to argue that the
grant of habeas, after five years of unlawful detention and harsh mistreatment,
returns the plaintiff to the position he would have been in prior to the wrongdoing.
Not that reparation could fully restore al-Marri to pre-detention condition, but it
would be a step in the right direction.

54. Id.
55. Id. (noting that "[a] pending civil action challenges the 'inhuman, degrading,' and *abusive'
conditions of his confinement." (citing Complaint at 1, Al-Marri v. Rumsfeld, No. 2:05-cv-02259HFFRSC (D.S.C. Aug. 8, 2005)).
56. Id.at 217.
57. Id.
58. Id.at 216.
59. Id.(citing Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2007)).
60. Id.at 216-17 (Motz, J., dissenting) (stating that "[w]e would also grant al-Marri habeas relief.
Even assuming the truth of the Government's allegations, they provide no basis for treating al-Marri as
an enemy combatant or as anything other than a civilian. This does not mean that al-Marri, or similarly
situated American citizens, would have to be freed. Like others accused of terrorist activity in this
country, from the Oklahoma City bombers to the convicted September 11th conspirator, they could be
tried on criminal charges and, if convicted, punished severely. But the Government would not be able
to subject them to indefinite military detention.").
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C. WarrantlessElectronic Wiretapping & Searches: No Cause ofAction
The conduct giving rise to the alleged injuries is undisputed: the
NSA (1) eavesdrops, (2) without warrants, (3) on international
telephone and email communications ..61
Another unfortunate part of the Bush administration's "war on terror" was the
implementation of warrantless (illegal) wiretapping and invasive surveillance
through the National Security Agency's (NSA) Terrorist Surveillance Program
(TSP).62 The program was aimed at monitoring only those believed to have
contacts with Al Qaeda, but the deleterious privacy effects have gone much
further, reaching into the homes and offices of Americans all throughout the
United States and elsewhere.63 When the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
and other attorneys and professionals, who regularly communicate with individuals
Court remanded for dismissal of the
overseas, challenged the program, the Circuit
64
entire action, mainly for lack of standing.
The diverse group of plaintiffs65 brought suit seeking a permanent injunction
against the NSA's continuation of the TSP, as well as a declaration that the
warrantless wiretapping and data mining violate the First and Fourth Amendments,
the Separation of Powers Doctrine, the Administrative Procedures Act (APA),
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (Title III), and the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).66 The District Court dismissed the
data mining claim, but granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs with regard to
the warrantless wiretapping, finding the program
manifestly unconstitutional.67
68
holding.
latter
the
reversed
Appeals
of
The Court
While invoking a number of claims, the central claim of the plaintiffs can be
reduced to the fundamental interest in the expectation of privacy. The plaintiffs
claimed that TSP interfered with ethical duties to keep information confidential,
created a "chilling effect" to working effectively with overseas clients, and

61. ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 653 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding no private right of action to
challenge warrantless electronic surveillance of international communications).
62. See id. at 649 (citing Press Briefing by Att'y Gen. Alberto Gonzales and Gen. Michael
Hayden, Principal Deputy Dir. for Nat'l Intelligence (Dec.
19, 2005), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/ releases/2005/12/print/ 20051219-1 .html).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 687-88.
65. The plaintiffs included "journalists, academics, and lawyers who regularly communicate with
individuals located overseas, who the plaintiffs believe are the types of people the NSA suspects of
being al Qaeda terrorists, affiliates, or supporters, and are therefore likely to be monitored under the
TSP." Id. at 649.
66. Id. at 650.
67. ACLUv. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 771, 775, 776 (E.D.Mich. 2006) (construing the Fourth
Amendment as an absolute rule that "requires prior warrants for any reasonable search," and
announcing that "'searches conducted without prior approval by a judge or magistrate were per se
unreasonable," and holding that President Bush had "undisputedly violated the Fourth [Amendment]
and accordingly ha[d] violated the First Amendment Rights of these Plaintiffs as well.").
68. ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d at 688.
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violated their legitimate expectation of privacy. 69 Accordingly, they brought suit
and sought further information from the NSA. In response, the NSA invoked the
"state secrets doctrine" for the purpose of barring the discovery or admission of
evidence it deemed contrary to the interest of national security.7 ° The NSA
claimed that discovery would lead undesirably to71 the exposure of privileged
communications barred from disclosure to the public.
Again, the court's findings are disconcerting. First, the court refused to
It refused to
delineate between "lawful" and "warrantless" wiretapping.
acknowledge that the presence of illegal wiretaps has a different result than legal
wiretaps, at least regarding those subject to the intrusion. It stated:
[a]ll wiretaps are secret, and the plaintiffs are not challenging the secret
nature, but only the warrantless nature, of the TSP. Because all wiretaps
are secret, neither the plaintiffs nor their overseas contacts would knowwith or without warrants-whether their communications were being
tapped, and the secret possession of a warrant would have no more
effect on the subjective willingness or unwillingness of these parties to
"freely engage in conversations and correspond via email" than would
72
the secret absence of that warrant.
Such reasoning seems badly flawed. If applied in the same manner to
domestic cases, the outcome would be chimerical. Imagine a case in which a
police officer, suspecting criminal activity, set up a surveillance system that
recorded communications coming in and out of the suspect's home, doing so
without any judicial oversight, i.e., a warrant. The court would not simply turn a
blind eye, justifying the police officer's actions based on whether the suspect does
or does not know about the surveillance. The invasion is illegal, whether or not the
suspect knows of the surveillance, or of its status of legality. The same
constitutional limitations should apply in this case.
Turning to the more rational finding of the court, the present authors still find
reason to be concerned. Even though the court separated the analysis for each of
the claims to avoid confusion, as noted above, the analysis is basically the same for
each claim - invasion of privacy. In due course, the court found that the plaintiffs
lacked standing for all claims,7 3 because they were unable to show "concrete" and
"actual" injury.74
Up to this point, there is no problem at issue. A standing analysis is fairly
straightforward; a plaintiff must show: 1) injury in fact, 2) causation, and 3)
possibility for redress. The court noted that there was insufficient evidence to find

69. Id. at 654-55.
70. Id.at 650 n.2 (stating "[t]he State Secrets Doctrine has two applications: a rule of evidentiary
privilege," (citing United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10, 73 S.Ct. 528, 97 L.Ed. 727 (1953)), "and a
200
5)).
rule of non-justiciability," (citing Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 9, 125 S. Ct. 1230, 161 L.Ed.2d 82 (
71. Id.at 650.
72. Id.at 671-72.
73. See id.
74. Id.at 662.
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injury in fact, which whether or not this is true, is within the discretion of the court.
However, the court then continued:
[E]ven to the extent that additional evidence may exist, which might
establish standing for one or more of the plaintiffs on one or more of
circumstances
their claims, discovery of such evidence would, under the
75
Doctrine.
Secrets
State
the
by
of this case, be prevented

The court concluded that the "the plaintiffs do not-and because of the state
secrets doctrine cannot-produce any evidence that any of their own
communications have ever been intercepted by the NSA, under the TSP, or without
warrants., 76 Therefore, there is no standing and thus no relief.
According to the court's reasoning, the only way for a plaintiff to show
standing for the NSA's admittedly illegal program would be to show that
plaintiff's "privacy has actually been breached [emphasis added]. 77 Yet, the court
acknowledges that when the NSA invokes the state secrets doctrine, to do so is
impossible.7 8 In actuality, the only conceivable way that one could even survive
summary judgment would be if the government accidentally gave plaintiffs
information that they were under surveillance, as coincidently took place in AlHaramain.79 However, even then the state secrets doctrine ultimately barred the
evidence (discussed more fully below).
Therefore, because standing fails, FISA claims also fail. 80 FISA's civil suit
provisions supposedly allow "aggrieved person[s]," i.e., someone other than a
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, to bring a cause of action for
violations of the statute, which includes illegal subjection to "electronic
surveillance." 81 According to the court, however, "[T]he term [aggrieved person]
is intended to be coextensive [with], but no broader than, those persons who have
standing to raise claims under the Fourth Amendment with respect to electronic
surveillance." 82 Thus, as no plaintiff could ever conceivably show standing under
the Fourth Amendment (according to this court's reasoning), no plaintiff can ever
establish status as an "aggrieved person" under the FISA statute, and will thus be
unable to bring a claim under FISA either. The court implicitly acknowledged
75. Id. at 687 (citing United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1953); Tenenbaum v. Simonini,
372 F.3d 776, 777 (6th Cir. 2004); Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d 977, 981 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
76. Id. at 672; see also Tenenbaum, 372 F.3d at 777 (upholding dismissal because the defendants
-cannot defend their conduct
without revealing the privileged information [so] the state secrets
doctrine thus deprives [the d]efendants of a valid defense to the [plaintiffls' claims").
77. Id. at 655 (i.e., to show that her communications had actually been wiretapped).
78. Id. at 657 (noting "[t]he problem with asserting only a breach-of-privacy claim is that, because
the plaintiffs cannot show that they have been or will be subjected to surveillance personally, they
clearly cannot establish standing under the Fourth Amendment or FISA.").
79. See infra Section II.E.
80. SeeACLU, 493 F.3d at 681-83.
81. Id.at 682.
82. Id. at 683, (citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-1283, at 66 (1978), reprintedat 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904
(citing Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969)) Report by the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, in support of the proposed FISA bill and amendments).
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that, based on its reasoning, the Government's illegal action would effectively be
insulated from judicial review. 83 Nevertheless, it proceeded under the rationale
described herein, again leaving mistreated plaintiffs without possibility of redress.
D. United States Official Collaboration With Non-U.S. Human Rights Violators:
Political Question Bar
In the early 1970s, Chilean military officers staged a coup d'6tat, ousting
elected President Salvador Allende, and installing Augusto Pinochet. The abuses
presented at the hands of this ruthless dictator are so well known that they hardly
need mention here. 84 Less known, however, are the several cases that have alleged
U.S. funding and assistance for the coup, including aiding and abetting and/or
conspiring with known human right abusers. 85 Despite serious allegations of
torture, false imprisonment, wrongful death, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress brought against the U.S. and Henry Kissinger under the Alien Tort
Statute,86 U.S. courts have refused to address the claims, citing the political
87
question doctrine.
In Gonzalez-Vera v. Kissinger, the plaintiffs alleged that Kissinger
"purposefully act[ed] outside the proper channels of Congressional oversight,, 88
which led to collaboration with terrorists and human rights abusers, as well as
torture and other gross mistreatment.89 In response, the court found Kissinger's
actions merely measures taken to implement United States policy with respect to
Chile, which, even if outside Congressional oversight, were beyond the court's
powers of review. 90 In short, the court held that it could not evaluate the legality of
the actions because it would "require [the court] to delve into questions of policy
'textually committed to a coordinate branch of government."' 9 1

83. Id. at 675 (acknowledging the District Court's finding that if it "were to deny standing based
on the unsubstantiated minor distinctions drawn by Defendants, the President's actions in warrantless
wiretapping, in contravention of FISA, Title III, and the First and Fourth Amendments, would be
immunized from judicial scrutiny. It was never the intent of the Framers to give the President such
unfettered control . .
" but responding that "[t]he Constitution created a representative Government
with the representatives directly responsible to their constituents at stated periods of two, four, and six
years; that the Constitution does not afford a judicial remedy does not, of course, completely disable the
citizen who is not satisfied with the 'ground rules' established by the Congress for reporting
expenditures of the Executive Branch."). Id. at 676.
84. See generally Jonathan Kandeil, Augusto Pinochet, Dictatorwho Ruled by Terror in Chile,
Dies at 91, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2006) available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/11/
world/americas/1 lpinochet.html.
85. See, e.g., Gonzalez-Vera v. Kissinger, 449 F.3d 1260 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (refusing to permit
private right of action against U.S. officials allegedly collaborating with Chile's Pinochet military
government in torture and related human rights abuses, citing political question); Schneider v.
Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
86. E.g., Gonzalez-Vera, 449 F.3d at 1261 (citing Complaint
115, 152, 163, 175-76).
87. See, e.g., id.
88. Id. (citing Complaint
43, 65, 69).

89. Id.
90. Id.at 1264.
91. Id.at 1263.
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Notably, the court acknowledged its ability to address cases "in which a rogue
agent commits an act so removed from his official duties that cannot fairly be said
to represent the policy of the United States," but it unequivocally stated that this
was not such a case. 92 In so finding, the court seemed to ignore the plaintiffs'
referral to specific acts of torture, and their reference to Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
for support that "claims based on a narrow class of international norms, such as...
claims of torture and extrajudicial killing, should be protected [sic] and adjudicated
in U.S. courts." 93 Ultimately, the Gonzalez-Vera finding appears to stand for a
frightening proposition: if torture emerges from a policy of the government, then
the courts cannot hear such claims, especially if committed at the hands of or
instigated by U.S. officials.
E. State Secrets Doctrine. Claims Preclusion
1. Government Claims Preclusion
In some cases, the American legal process simply does not allow legal redress
for persons subjected to mistreatment at the behest of the "war on terror." As
alluded to above, the most damaging bar to recovery is the state secrets doctrine.
Under the doctrine, the United States government may prevent "the disclosure of
information in a judicial proceeding if 'there is a reasonable danger' that such
disclosure 'will expose military matters which, in the interest of national security,
should not be divulged.' 94 The privilege applies even if the court thinks there
may be a colorable claim or prima facie case.95 According to the jurisprudence,
when the state secrets privilege is presented, the court must resolve the matter by
use of a three-part analysis. 96 First, the court must be sure that the procedural
requirements for invoking the doctrine have been satisfied.97 Second, it must
decide whether the information that the government seeks to protect qualifies as
privileged under the state secrets doctrine. 98 Finally, if the privilege does apply to
the information in question, the ultimate question for the court is "how the matter
should proceed in light of the successful privilege claim." 99 When invoked, the
doctrine imposes an almost insurmountable challenge upon the plaintiff,100 and
cases are almost always dismissed.

92. Id. at 1264.
93. Id. at 1263 (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004)).
94. El-Masri v U.S, 479 F.3d 296, 302 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing state secrets doctrine bar to private
litigants seeking legal recovery for alleged rights abuses); United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S 1, 10
(1953).
95. See El-Masri,479 F.3d at 307-310.
96. Id. at 304.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338, 348 (4th Cir. 2005) (stating "[wle recognize that our
decision places, on behalf of the entire country, a burden on Sterling that he alone must bear.");
Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Intern., Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236, FN3 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding "[w]hen the state
secrets privilege is validly asserted, the result is unfairness to individual litigants-through the loss of
important evidence or dismissal of a case-in order to protect a greater public value.").
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To be sure, the doctrine performs an important constitutional function, as it
allows the executive branch "to protect information whose secrecy is necessary to
its military and foreign-affairs responsibilities." ' 01 Without such privilege, there
would be little protection against litigation resulting in detriment to the executive's
foreign-affairs responsibilities, and thus the security of the United States' citizenry
as a whole. Thus, the Supreme Court has traditionally given great deference to the
executive when it invokes the state secrets doctrine, 102 recognizing its
103
constitutional basis.
However, the doctrine often leaves injured plaintiffs in a situation of no
redress, and often precludes the possibility of holding government agents
responsible for their illegal actions. Although the courts have stated that "the State
Secrets Doctrine does not represent a surrender of judicial control over access to
the courts," '1 04 and that "dismissal on state secrets grounds is appropriate only in a
narrow category of disputes,"' 0 5 the practical effect has been the preclusion of
many otherwise potentially legitimate claims. Of primary concern, as articulated
by the plaintiff in El-Masri v. U.S., is that the invocation of the doctrine enables
"the Executive to unilaterally avoid judicial scrutiny merely by asserting that state
secrets are at stake in a given matter."' 0 6 Although the court in El-Masri addresses
this concern by recognizing the government's burden to prove the doctrine's
applicability, 10 7 and does so in an exacting analysis, 10 8 the situation still leaves one
wondering whether the state secrets burden is really a difficult burden for the
government to meet.
In El Masri, much of the information upon which the plaintiff relied was
public information. Khaled El-Masri claimed that the "subject of this action is
simply 'a rendition and its consequences,' and that its critical facts - the CIA's
operation of a rendition program targeted at terrorism suspects, plus the tactics
employed therein - have been so widely discussed that litigation concerning them
could do no harm to national security." 10 9 Even so, El-Masri suggested employing
special procedures during discovery to further protect any "sensitive
information."' 10 Nevertheless, the court found if the civil action were to proceed,
central facts that would potentiallybe exposed included: 1) the roles the defendants
played in the events and, thus, in the CIA organization, and 2) how the CIA
organizes and supervises its intelligence and operations. 1 1' The court also

101. El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 303.
102. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (observing that the privilege provides
strong protection because it concerns "areas of Art. II duties [in which] the courts have traditionally
shown the utmost deference to Presidential responsibilities.").
103. Id. at 711.
104. El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 312.
105. Id. at 313 (citing Sterling,416 F.3d at 348; Fitzgerald,776 F.2d at 1241-42).
106. Id. at312.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 308 (citing Appellant's Brief at 38).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 309.
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explained that the defendants would not be able to properly defend themselves
without using privileged evidence." 2 In short, the court averred, "virtually any
to El-Masri's allegations would disclose privileged
conceivable response
13
information."'
So, where does this leave an injured plaintiff If subjected to "extraordinary
rendition" or torture, is there truly no way for a claimant to find redress, or to even
get a chance at pre-trial discovery, let alone a trial? In a country purportedly
committed to the rule of law, there must be judicial procedures that can more
sufficiently balance the needs of state security with upholding fundamental human
rights and due process. Perhaps the question to be addressed is whether the courts
are giving too much deference to the executive in cases of alleged torture and gross
abuse.
2. Potential Relief Against Government Claims Preclusion
Despite the apparent comprehensiveness of the state secrets doctrine, some
decisions have indicated the possibility of relief. In 2006, Al-Haramain Islamic
Foundation' 14 brought suit against President Bush, claiming that it was subject to
warrantless electronic surveillance pursuant to the Terrorist Surveillance Program
(TSP),' which Al-Haramain claimed was in violation of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA). 116 The program became known to the public after The
New York Times exposed the controversial (if not outright illegal) surveillance
program.' 17The day after the story broke, President Bush attempted to explain the
program to the public, informing U.S. citizens that he had authorized the
program.118 As is now common knowledge, the program has led to widespread

112. Id.
113. Id. at 310 (holding "[i]f a proceeding involving state secrets can be fairly litigated without
resort to the privileged information, it may continue. But if 'the circumstances make clear that sensitive
military secrets will be so central to the subject matter of the litigation that any attempt to proceed will
threaten disclosure of the privileged matters,' dismissal is the proper remedy."). Id. at 306.
114. "Al-Haramain is a Muslim charity which is active in more than 50 countries. Its activities
include building mosques and maintaining various development and education programs. The United
Nations Security Council has identified Al-Haramain as an entity belonging to or associated with Al
Qaeda." Al-HaramainIslamic Found. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1194 (9th Cir. 2007).
115. Id. at 1192.
116. Id. In February 2006, Al-Haramain filed a complaint in the District of Oregon alleging
violations of FISA, the First, Fourth, and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution, the
doctrine of separation of powers, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Id at
1195.
117. Id. at 1192 (noting "General Hayden's statements provided to the American public a wealth of
information about the TSP. The public now knows the following additional facts about the program,
beyond the general contours outlined by other officials: (1) at least one participant for each surveilled
call was located outside the United States; (2) the surveillance was conducted without FISA warrants;
(3) inadvertent calls involving purely domestic callers were destroyed and not reported; (4) the
inadvertent collection was recorded and reported; and (5) U.S. identities are expunged from NSA
records of surveilled calls if deemed non-essential to an understanding of the intelligence value of a
particular report."); James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at Al.
118. Al-Haramain, 507 F.3d at 1192; President George W. Bush, President's Radio Address (Dec.
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indignation throughout the United States and the rest of the world. When suit was
filed, however, the government simply invoked the state secrets privilege to block
the litigation.
In 2004, the government had inadvertently given Al-Haramain a "Top Secret"
document during a proceeding to freeze the foundation's assets.1 19 The document
alerted the organization to the surveillance that it was under, and led to the suit.
Because of the public nature of the TSP program, the court surprisingly determined
that the case should not be dismissed outright. 20 However, the "Top Secret"
document was essential to verifying Al-Haramain's allegations, but its
consideration was precluded under the state secrets doctrine. 21 Because AlHaramain could not produce more than speculation outside the "Top Secret"
document, the court dismissed the claim for lack of standing. 122 Again, despite
good reason to believe (if not actual proof) that there had been a violation of both
domestic and international law at the hands of the U.S. government, the plaintiffs
were left in a situation of no redress.
Interestingly, however, the court alluded to potential relief, unlike in the
previously mentioned cases. The court did not dismiss Al-Haramain's claims that
the FISA preempts the common law state secrets privilege, but instead remanded
the case for further determination by the district court.123 Upon remand, the Court
found that FISA did indeed preempt the state secrets doctrine, 24 but that AlHaramain could not use the "Top Secret" document to establish "aggrieved
persons" status under the FISA. 125 However, the court did grant plaintiffs leave to
amend the complaint, 26 and it thus remains to be seen whether there is127indeed
some form of relief for those subject to unlawful surveillance through TSP.

17, 2005).
119. Al-Haramain, 507 F.3d at 1193.
120. Id. at 1197-98 (holding "[w]e agree with the district court's conclusion that the very subject
matter of the litigation-the government's alleged warrantless surveillance program under the TSP-is not
protected by the state secrets privilege. Two discrete sets of unclassified facts support this
determination. First, President Bush and others in the administration publicly acknowledged that in the
months following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the President authorized a communications
surveillance program that intercepted the communications of persons with suspected links to Al Qaeda
and related terrorist organizations. Second, in 2004, AI-Haramain was officially declared by the
government to be a "Specially Designated Global Terrorist" due to its purported ties to Al Qaeda. The
subject matter of the litigation-the TSP and the government's warrantless surveillance of persons or
entities who, like A1-Haramain, were suspected by the NSA to have connections to terrorists-is simply
not a state secret.").
121. Id. at 1193.
122. Id. at 1205.
123. Id.at 1193, 1206.
124. In reNSA Telecomm. Records Litig., 564 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1124 (D.D.C. 2008).
125. Id. at 1135.
126. Id. at 1137.
127. Compare Al-Haramain, 507 F.3d 1190 with El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (the AlHaramain court did not adopt the reasoning in El-Masri, where the court, according to Al-Haramain,
"merged the concept of 'subject matter' with the notion of proof of a prima facie case.'" Al-Haramain,
507 F.3d at 1201 (finding that "[a]ccording to the Fourth Circuit, the subject matter of a lawsuit requires
its dismissal if the action cannot be "litigatedwithout threatening the disclosure of state secrets"). In
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3. Private Claims Preclusion
Despite the slightly positive implications of Al-Haramain, subsequent cases
have shown further application of the state secrets doctrine. The doctrine can also
prevent a right of action against private individuals and corporations, even when
the government is not a party to a case. If the government deems that its interests
are affected, it can intervene, invoke the doctrine, and prompt the dismissal of
private action for tortious acts.

In Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, plaintiffs

claimed that under the policy of "extraordinary rendition" they were "unlawfully
apprehended, transported, imprisoned, interrogated and in some instances tortured
- all under the direction of the United States."'1 28 Plaintiffs brought suit against
Jeppesen Dataplan, a U.S. corporation, for its alleged participation in the illegal
renditions. 129 Jeppeson "provided the aircraft, flight crews, and the flight and
logistical support necessary for hundreds of international flights"' 30 resulting in the
illegal renditions.
The plaintiffs brought claims of "Forced Disappearance" and "Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment" under the Alien Tort Statute,

which gives the district courts jurisdiction over tortious conduct against aliens in
violation of international law.1 31 The plaintiffs claimed that Jeppeson provided
direct and substantial support for the illegal renditions and should have known that
detention, and torture in
the plaintiffs would be "subjected to forced 1disappearance,
32
countries where such practices are routine."

Upon filing of the suit, the United States intervened to assert the state secrets
doctrine on its own behalf and on that of Jeppesen. 33 With little trouble, the court
approved the intervention 34 and dismissed the action. 135 The Court found that the
contrast, the court refused to view "the 'subject matter' of a lawsuit as one and the same with the facts
necessary to litigate the case." Id. (noting "[i]n Kasza, we made the distinction between dismissal on
the grounds that the subject matter of an action is a state secret, and dismissal on the grounds that a
plaintiff cannot prove the prima facie elements of the claim absent privileged evidence (citing Kasza v.
.Because the Fourth Circuit has accorded an
Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998)).
expansive meaning to the "subject matter" of an action, one that we have not adopted, El-Masri does
not support dismissal based on the subject matter of the suit.").
128. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1129 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (finding no
state secrets privilege exception for suits against U.S. contractors and allowing U.S. Government to
intervene and block the suit).
129. See id
130. Id. at 1132 (citing First Amended Complaint 13).
131. Id.at 1129, 1132.
132. Id. at 1132.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1133-34.
135. Id. at 1134 (noting "[o]nce state secrets privilege is invoked, the Court should consider
whether the case may proceed under that circumstance. The invocation of states secret privilege is a
categorical bar to a lawsuit under the following circumstances: (1) if the very subject matter of the
action is a state secret; (2) if the invocation of the privilege deprives a plaintiff of evidence necessary to
prove a prima facie case; and (3) if the invocation of the privilege deprives a defendant of information
necessary to raise a valid defense. Since the Court finds that the very subject matter of this case is a
state secret, the Court does not reach the other circumstances").
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U.S. satisfied all requirements for intervention, noting the United States had an
important interest in the action "because it involves activities allegedly overseen
by the CIA. ' 13 6 The United States submitted that the proceeding could lead to
knowledge about whom the CIA contracts with, as well as what foreign
governments the CIA cooperated with, claiming that evidence regarding such
relationships would result in "extremely' 37grave damage to the foreign relations and
foreign activities of the United States."'
In supporting the U.S. position, the court referenced the findings of other
courts that have determined "the 'very subject matter' of a case to be a state secret
when the case involved classified weapons or other devices, or when the case
involved covert operations by agencies of the United States in foreign
countries."' 38 The court ignored plaintiffs' pleas that the program was already
public and thus not subject to the state secrets doctrine. 139 Accordingly, though no
particularized danger was articulated, the case was dismissed in traditional form.
Again the rationale of the court does not seem entirely erroneous, but once
more we are left with injured plaintiffs who have no means of redress. Moreover,
the reasoning of the court seems to suggest that anytime mistreatment is the result
of "covert U.S. military or CIA operations,"'' 40 there will be no cause of action.
Because all "extraordinary renditions" and state-sponsored torture falls under this
category, this is a troubling result.
F Alien Detention Claims. Limited To Habeas Relief
In the past decade, not only has judicial redress been stymied, but so has
remedial relief for inappropriately treated aliens. Sissoko v. Rocha presented a
case in which an alien brought suit against an immigration inspector based upon
141
false imprisonment and illegal detention in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
The court found that the district court lacked jurisdiction over Sissoko's claim
because it arose from a decision by the Attorney General to commence removal
proceedings.1 42 Sissoko, a native and citizen of Senegal, entered the U.S. in the
1980s and filed an application for legalization pursuant to a relief order resulting
from a class action suit.143 Initially denied status in the class, he was allowed to
provide further documentation, but instead filed a second legalization application

136. Id. at 1133.
137. Id. at 1135.
138. Id. (citing Hepting v. AT & T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 993 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (citing
exemplary cases)).
139. See id. at 1135-36. Note that the Al-Haramain court made this exact finding.
140. Id. at 1136 (noting "[i]n sum, at the core of Plaintiffs' case against Defendant Jeppesen are
'allegations' of covert U.S. military or CIA operations in foreign countries against foreign nationalsclearly a subject matter which is a state secret.").
141. Sissoko v. Rocha, 509 F.3d 947 (9th Cir. 2007) (barring alien's false imprisonment claim
against U.S. official by finding relief limited to habeas proceeding).
142. Id. at951.
143. Sissoko v. Rocha, 440 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir. 2006).
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in 1991.144 As a result of his two applications,
Sissoko was mistakenly assigned
145
two different alien registration numbers.
Upon return from his father's funeral in Senegal in March 1997, for which he
attained the necessary travel documentation, Sissoko was detained because the
duplicate applications caused suspicion in the eyes of the inspecting immigration
official. 146 Sissoko was placed in removal proceedings. 147 Subsequently, Sissoko
claimed a fear of persecution if forced to return to Senegal. 148 However, as would
a "credible fear interview" and he was placed in
be proper, he was never given
149
proceedings.
removal
regular
Ultimately, Sissoko was improperly detained for nearly three months.' 50 The
District Court found that his detention was illegal.' 51 However, upon appeal, in a
revised opinion, the court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction over
Sissoko's claim because it "aris[es] from the decision or action by the Attorney
General to commence [removal] proceedings.' 52 In refusing to apply a Bivens
claim, the court limited Sissoko's relief to habeas corpus. The court held that
"because Sissoko was never issued an expedited removal order, a habeas petition
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2) could have been successful in remedying his allegedly
false arrest." 153 The court noted the limited context to which 8 U.S.C § 1252(g)'s
"jurisdiction-stripping language" covers a false arrest claim. Nonetheless, Sissoko
was denied a Bivens remedy, which can be grantedat the court's discretion in the
absence of other adequate relief, and thus denied the opportunity for recovery of

any damages. 154 This is only one of many examples in which the effects of the
"war on terror" have adversely affected other areas of law, namely the humane
treatment of immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers.
G. Apparent Validity Of Military TribunalsNot Subject To Real JudicialControl

In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the U.S. Supreme Court produced one of its premier
opinions, which, in spite of executive pressure to the contrary, preserves a number
of fundamental due process rights owed to detainees under the U.S. Constitution as
well as international law. The Court held that the Military Commission used to try
Guantanamo detainees was not properly authorized by any congressional act, and
that its procedures violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the
Geneva Conventions.1 55 Nonetheless, there is reason to believe that despite the
144. Id. at 1149-50.
145. Id. at 1150.
146. Id.
147. Sissoko, 509 F.3d at 948-49.
148. Id. at 949.
149. Id.
150. Sissoko, 440 F.3d at 1149.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1155 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (May 11, 2005)).
153. Sissoko, 509 F.3d at 950.
154. Id. at 951.
155. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567 (2006) (suggesting that once Congress properly
legislates military commissions procedural safeguards, habeas corpus may be eliminated for
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landmark holding, if Congress properly legislates Military Commissions,
procedural safeguards, such as habeas corpus may be eliminated for Guantanamo
legal relief could be increasingly limited to non-existent if and
detainees, and other
1 56
occurs.
this
when
The Court highlighted the formal shortcomings of the Military Commissions,
as well as the broader failings on the part of the executive, to satisfy the basic
procedural preconditions. The Court then nevertheless explicitly qualified its
concerns with these failings "at least in the absence of specific congressional
authorization,"' 157 thereby leaving open the possibility of amendment.
Additionally, the Court noted its obligation to give "complete deference" to the
determinations of the President, alluding to the possibility that if the President
determined it "impracticable to apply the rule for courts-martial," the Court would
have to defer to the authority of the President. 158 Finally, the Court stated: "It
bears emphasizing that Hamdan does not challenge, and we do not today address,
the Government's power to detain him for the duration of active hostilities in order
to prevent such harm."' 159 In combination, due process advocates cannot yet
breathe easily.
Some solace may be found in the Court's finding that the process used to try
Hamdam not only violated the UMCJ, but also the Geneva Conventions. 6 ° Thus,
even if Congress or the executive were to preempt the Court's consideration of the
matter, if the terms still violate international law, there may be a colorable claim
and jurisdiction for the Court. The Court highlighted the necessity of complying
with Common Article 3 of the Conventions, namely the necessity of a regularly
constituted court "affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples."1' 61 Inextricably intertwined with Article 3 are
the procedures governing the trials commissioned by the government.' 62 The
Court noted that, at a bare minimum, those must include the protections embodied
may be international
by customary international law,' 63 noting that they
64
requirements, "[b]ut requirements they are nonetheless.1

Guantanamo detainees and other legal relief appears limited to non-existent if and when this occurs);
see also id at 624 (noting "[t]he military commission was not born of a desire to dispense a more
summary form of justice than is afforded by courts-martial; it developed, rather, as a tribunal of
necessity to be employed when courts-martial lacked jurisdiction over either the accused or the subject
matter.").
156. See, e.g., id at 611.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 623 (holding "[w]e assume that complete deference is owed that determination. The
President has not, however, made a similar official determination that it is impracticable to apply the
rules for courts-martial"); id. at 634-35 (holding "the Government has a compelling interest in denying
Hamdan access to certain sensitive information is not doubted
But, at least absent express
statutory provision to the contrary, information used to convict a person of a crime must be disclosed to
him.").
159. Id. at 635.
160. Id. at 625.
161. Id.at 630,632.
162. Id. at 633.
163. Id. at 635 (noting that "[m]any of these are described in Article 75 of Protocol I to the Geneva
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Like Hamdan, Boumediene v. Bush appears on its face to be another sizeable
victory for due process advocates in the "war on terror. 1 65 By reiterating the
Court's ability to hear habeas claims, the Court retained the powers of judicial
review essential to ensuring the executive does not exceed the scope of its power.
However, the decision may also contain one of the biggest blows to the rights of
detainees - i.e. the suggestion by the Supreme Court that Congress could suspend
habeas altogether if certain factors are present involving aliens detained outside the
United States.' 66 As shown above, the limits placed upon detainees who wish to
challenge their detentions are already arduous. Such an extension could make their
plight futile.
Boumediene presented consolidated cases, addressing the detention of
prisoners designated "enemy combatants" at Guantanamo Bay who petitioned for
writ of habeas corpus. 167 The petitioners were sent to Guantanamo after being
captured in Afghanistan (and elsewhere abroad) and subsequently designated
"enemy combatants" by Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs). 168 Each of
the detainees denied membership in Al Qaeda or the Taliban regime, which was
alleged to support the terrorist network, and thus sought a writ of habeas corpus in
the District Court, which dismissed the cases for lack of jurisdiction
because
169
Guantanamo is "outside the sovereign territory of the United States.,
The privilege of habeas corpus, fundamental to the U.S. Constitution and
American system of justice, entitles any detainee or prisoner to a meaningful
opportunity "to demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to 'the erroneous
application or interpretation' of relevant law."1 70 The Suspension Clause, which
provides that habeas may be suspended only when public safety requires it in times
1 72
171
of rebellion or invasion, is the only limiting factor to a writ of habeas corpus.

Conventions of 1949, adopted in 1977 (Protocol I)
[including] the "right to be tried in [one's]
presence.").
164. Id.
165. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (suggesting, without deciding, that Congress can
suspend habeas altogether if certain factors are present involving aliens detained outside the U.S.).
166. It must be noted that the current authors take some comfort in the recognition by the Court that
Congress has taken care to avoid suspending the writ of habeas corpus, and that we have confidence
that the mishandling of the Guantanamo detainees up to date will strengthen this prudence in the future.
See, e.g., id at 2263-66. In addition, the Court's focus on adequate alternatives to habeas corpus, if
Congress is to litigate to that effect, provides some confidence that the Court is concerned with
detainees' rights, even if suspected of crimes as heinous as terrorism. Id. at 2240, 2269.
167. Id. at 2241.
168. Id. at 2240-41.
169. Id. at2241.
170. Id. at 2266 (citing LN.S.v. St. Cy, 533 U.S. 289, 302 (2001)).
171. Id. at 2246; see also id. at 2247 (holding "In our own system the Suspension Clause is
designed to protect against these cyclical abuses. The Clause protects the rights of the detained by a
means consistent with the essential design of the Constitution. It ensures that, except during periods of
formal suspension, the Judiciary will have a time-tested device, the writ, to maintain the 'delicate
balance of governance' that is itself the surest safeguard of liberty.").
172. Id. at 2246 (citing U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl.
2).
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In the wake of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, Congress amended the Military
Commissions Act of 2006 to more clearly deny jurisdiction with respect to habeas
actions by detained aliens determined to be enemy combatants. 173 Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court held that the petitioners had a constitutional privilege of habeas
corpus, which was not precluded by either their designation as enemy combatant,
or their presence at Guantanamo (a quasi-sovereign U.S. territory). 174 The Court
rejected the Government's contention that dejure sovereignty is the "touchstone of
habeas jurisdiction," finding it to be "contrary to fundamental separation-ofpowers principles. 175 The Court found that the government presented "no
credible arguments that the military mission at Guantanamo would be
compromised if habeas courts had jurisdiction." 176 The Court averred:
[T]here is considerable risk of error in the tribunal's findings of fact...
And given that the consequence of error may be detention for the
duration of hostilities that may last a generation or more, the risk is too
significant to ignore . . for the writ of habeas corpus, or its substitute,
to function as an effective and proper remedy in this context, the court
that conducts the habeas proceeding must have the means to correct
errors .
to assess the sufficiency of the Government's evidence
and to admit and consider relevant exculpatory evidence that was not
77
introduced during the earlier proceeding. 1
Again, despite the apparent due process victory, the Court's holding has
limitations. First, the Court stated that its holding should not imply that a habeas
court should intervene, except in situations of undue delay and after the CSRT has
had opportunity to review the "enemy combatant" status determination.1 78 More
privilege if
importantly, the Court suggested that Congress could deny the habeas
79
it acted in accordance with the Suspension Clause's requirements.1

173. Id.at 2234.
174. Id. at 2262, 2270, 2274.
175. Boumediene, 128 S.Ct. at 2253. The Syllabus in (iii) states: The Government's sovereigntybased test raises troubling separation-of-powers concerns, which are illustrated by Guantanamo's
political history. Although the United States has maintained complete and uninterrupted control of
Guantanamo for over 100 years, the Government's view is that the Constitution has no effect there, at
least as to noncitizens, because the United States disclaimed formal sovereignty in its 1903 lease with
Cuba. The Nation's basic charter cannot be contracted away like this. The Constitution grants Congress
and the President the power to acquire, dispose of, and govern territory, not the power to decide when
and where its terms apply. To hold that the political branches may switch the Constitution on or off at
will would lead to a regime in which they, not this Court, say "what the law is." Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. 137, 177 (1803). These concerns have particular bearing upon the Suspension Clause question
here, for the habeas writ is itself an indispensable mechanism for monitoring the separation of powers."
Boumediene, 128 S.Ct. at 2236.
176. Id.at 2261.
177. Id.at 2270.
178. See id at 2275-76.
179. See id. at 2261-62 (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager,339 U.S. 763 (1950)). The Court articulated
three relevant factors in determining the reach of the Suspension Clause: "(1) the citizenship and status
of the detainee and the adequacy of the process through which that status determination was made; (2)
the nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) the practical obstacles
inherent in resolving the prisoner's entitlement to the writ." Id. at 2259.
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The present authors wish to highlight the potential risk of Congress
sidestepping due process guarantees under habeas corpus, but must also
acknowledge the Court's focus on "adequate and effective substitute[s]" for the
habeas writ. 180 The Court found that MCA § 7 failed to meet the prerequisites for
constitutionality, based on its due process deficiencies' 81 Hopefully this also gives
reason to have faith in such a future determination being made, if and when
necessary. In this light, the Court's rhetoric in Boumediene is worth repeating:
Security subsists, too, in fidelity to freedom's first principles

freedom from arbitrary and unlawful restraint and the personal
liberty
82
that is secured by adherence to the separation of powers.'
As seen throughout this section, these words appear to be more rhetoric than
reality. Nevertheless, this rhetoric will hopefully guide the policies of the U.S.
government, as well as the judiciary, moving forward. If this does not happen, the
consequences will continue to sap U.S. rule of law commitments and ultimately,
the credibility of the U.S. judiciary itself.
III. LEGAL POLICY PROBLEMS WITH U.S. LITIGATION RESULTS
The Bush administration's "war on terror" has evoked scathing criticism from
the international community, including states, international jurists, human rights
monitoring bodies and special rapporteurs,journalists, the world's citizenry, and
more. 83 Many of the programs implemented in the wake of September 11 have
proven not only to be illegal, but to violate some of international law's (and U.S.
constitutional law's) most fundamental tenets, including violations ofjus cogens
norms such as the prohibition on torture. Of further concern to the present authors,
however, is the apparent complicity in the illegal actions by American courts.
Despite good reason to find fault in the illegal extraordinary renditions,
warrantless-wiretapping, and unlawful detentions, and thus good reason to give
redress to the injured plaintiffs, the courts have refused to implement the laws
meant to protect those most vulnerable to the abuses of illegal government tactics the people. This section highlights some of the fundamental legal policy problems
with the U.S. litigation results.

180. See, e.g., id. at 2275.
181. Seeid. at 2266-71.
182. Id at 2277 (holding "[i]t is from these principles that the judicial authority to consider
petitions for habeas corpus relief derives.").
183. E.g., Jordan J. Paust, The Changing Laws of War: Do We Need A New Legal Regime After
September 11?, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1335, 1340-42 (2004) (criticizing the Bush Administration's
legal responses to, and characterization of, the new paradigm as a literal "War on Terror"); Jeffrey F.
Addicott, Into the Star Chamber: Does the United States Engage in the Use of Torture or Similar
Illegal Practicesin the War on Terror?, 92 KY. L.J. 849, 853 (2004) (highlighting the concerns arising
from the use of "stress and duress" interrogation styles); see generally DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL,
LESS SAFE, LESS FREE: WHY AMERICA IS LOSING THE WAR ON TERROR (2007); DAVID COLE, ENEMY
ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2003);
JOE CONASON, IT CAN HAPPEN HERE: AUTHORITARIAN PERIL IN THE AGE OF BUSH (2007); THE WAR
ON OUR FREEDOMS: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM

eds., 2003).

(Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr.,
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A. Inconsistent With Human Rights & Sound NationalSecurity Law Principles
Human rights and security go hand in hand. The primary purpose of human
rights law is to promote and protect human dignity, 184 as well as "life, liberty and
security of person."' 85 Likewise, good national security policies are meant to
protect not only the physical integrity of the state, but also the core values around
which a nation is built. In the United States, these core values purportedly include
186
"justice," "domestic tranquility," "common defense," and the "general welfare."'
Any one of these values should not come at the expense of the others. In other
words, "justice" and the "general welfare" of U.S. citizens should not be sacrificed
at the expense of searching for a "common defense" against international
terrorism. Likewise, fundamental human rights for all, which the U.S. has
committed itself to upholding, 187 should also not be forgotten while searching for
ways to increase domestic tranquility. If they are, then the "war" on terror is
already lost because we have, by our own accord, transgressed our own national
values - the very thing we are fighting so hard to preserve.
Although illustrated in the context of U.S. national values, this rationale
transfers throughout the international community, which has also ostensibly
committed itself to the preservation of human rights and the maintenance of
international peace and security. 188 In the words of Gabor Rona, "[t]he
governments, including the United States, that laboriously negotiated the details,
including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the
International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights (ICCPR), surely understood
that they were enhancing human security
by establishing principles and rules to
189
liberty.'
and
dignity
human
protect
Common sense dictates that in the modem world, sound national security
policy is underscored by a nation's relationship with the international community
as a whole. The more nations that are willing to come to a country's aid, the more
secure that country will be. This is especially true when fighting a battle in which
the web of the enemy weaves itself throughout the entire globe. By flouting the
rule of law, especially by transgressing upon the sovereignty of its allies, the U.S.
has not increased its security. 190 In fact, there is no evidence that we are any safer
from terrorism today then we were on September 12, 2001. However, to the
contrary, many security experts believe that the U.S. has actually weakened its

184. Gabor Rona, Legal Issues in the "'War on Terrorism" - Reflections on the Conversation
Between Silia N.U. Voneky and John Bellinger, 9 GERMAN L. J. 711, 713 (2008); see also International
Convenant on Civil and Political Rights, pmbl., Dec. 19, 1966, S. TREATY Doc No. 95-20 (1978),
999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at
pmbl., U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N.Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
185. UDHR, supra note 184, art. 3.
186. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
187. lCCPR, supra note 184, at pmbl.
188. U.N. Charter, pmbl., art. 1.
189. Rona, supra note 184, at 713.
190. Louis Fisher, ExtraordinaryRendition: The Price of Secrecy, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1405, 1446
(2008) (stating "[t]o allow the Executive Branch to engage in extraordinary rendition and torture serves
to recruit terrorists and spread hate against the United States.").
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security by compromising its moral high ground and international respect.1 91 By
foreclosing the possibility of judicial review and redress to those whom are entitled
to state protection of their basic human rights, U.S. courts have plainly contributed
to this quagmire.
B. Mistaken View Of Human Rights Law Applicability To U.S. Anti-Terrorism
192
Activities
One of the most controversial aspects of the U.S. approach to terrorism is the
mystifying classification system employed to both those captured on the
"battlefield" and those captured outside of armed conflict. Most captured on the
battlefield in Afghanistan have been denied POW status, 193 as required by the
Third Geneva Convention. 194 At the same time, those captured outside armed
conflict have often been dubbed "enemy combatants,"' 95 given neither the
protections due to citizens or soldiers under international law. The Bush
administration seemed to believe that only international laws of war govern
overseas anti-terrorism activity, to the exclusion of international human rights laws
and organizations that apply them.1 96 In some instances, the Bush administration
went so far as to purport that neither humanitarian law nor human rights laws apply
to the war on terrorism, thereby creating a "legal accountability vacuum." 19 7 How
far these beliefs pervade the current administration is yet to be seen. However, no
legal authority appears to support such mutual exclusivity, while much authority
appears to support the contrary position. 198

191. See, e.g., id.at 1417 (stating "The existence of torture creates a climate of fear and
international insecurity that affects all people," citing the Torture Victims Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 105320, 112 Stat. 3016 (1998) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2152)).
192. Philip Alston, Jason Morgan-Foster & William Abresch, The Competence of the UN Human
Rights Council and Its Special Proceduresin Relation to Armed Conflicts: ExtrajudicialExecutions in
the "War on Terror," 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 183 (2008) [hereinafter Alston].
193. One argument posed is that terrorists do not follow the laws of war, and therefore they are not
entitled to POW protection. However, the violations by some soldiers cannot serve to disqualify all
members of the fighting forces. "Were that the case, no U.S. military personnel would ever qualify for
POW status, so long as some 'special forces' operated out of uniform or some soldiers abused
detainees, especially if done systematically, i.e., pursuant to policy." Rona, supra note 184, at 717.
194. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, arts. 4, 5, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereineafter Geneva Convention III].
195. Rona, supra note 184, at 723 (asserting that "[t]he term "enemy combatant" appears nowhere
in U.S. criminal law or international law, including the law of war.").
196. Alston, supra note 192, at 191.
197. Id. at 207, (citing Margaret Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition
and the Rule of Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1333 (2007)).
198. Id. at 195-96 (citing the International Court of Justice Palestinian Wall opinion; the European
Court of Human Rights Chechnya decision applying the European Convention to that conflict; the UN
Human Rights Committee and the Commission on Human Rights interpretations of jurisdiction; the
African Commission on Human Rights application of the African Charter to the Chad conflict; the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights American Convention application to the El Salvador
conflict; and International Committee of the Red Cross citations to UN Security Council and General
Assembly condemnations of human rights abuses in various conflicts).
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Even accepting the controversial proposition that international humanitarian
law should primarily govern the "war" on terror, 199 in order to carry on its refusal
to apply human rights protections, the U.S. has ignored the findings of numerous
authoritative international bodies.2 °0 In Nuclear Weapons, Armed Activities, and
the Wall Opinion, for example, the International Court of Justice explicitly
observed that the protections of the ICCPR do not cease in times of war or armed
conflict. 20 1 Far from standing alone, these findings have been echoed by the
international community through bodies such as the UN Security Council, the UN
General Assembly, the UN Human Rights Committee, the UN Commission on
Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, the African Commission on Human and Peoples'
Rights, the International Law Commission, and the International Committee of the
Red Cross,20 2 "all of which have found that humanitarian law and human rights
law are complementary.
International human rights law may have been seen as an inconvenience to the
Bush administration. However, as reiterated in Hamdan, these are "binding
requirements" upon the United States. 20 4 The willingness to abandon these values
and laws has been very disturbing, especially because for so long the United States
has viewed itself as setting the bar for how human rights should be protected .for
all people. In fact, the U.S. has played an integral part in catalyzing the human
rights regime as it now stands.205 Perhaps this is also why the Bush tactics were so
disconcerting for the rest of the world - indeed, if the United States, which is
overtly committed to these international ideals, can flout them so easily, what is in
store for the rest of the world?
The primary question presented by this section is one of accountability. If the
U.S. government is to flout its international obligations and even the will of its
people, what is the recourse?
The U.S. has strategically constructed its
geopolitical positioning as to be minimally accountable before international bodies.
The election process (arguably a process of accountability) hardly seems sufficient
for serious crimes such as torture, especially when implemented as a policy. Thus,
it appears the sole remaining recourse is the U.S. court system. Yet if U.S. courts
will not maintain the balance of power outlined in the Constitution and solidified

199. Undoubtedly, some of the "'war on terror" involves true armed conflict, as envisioned by the
Geneva Conventions and other war law regimes. However, to conclude that all aspects invoke
humanitarian law, especially to the exclusion of human rights law, is simply erroneous.
200. Alston, supra note 192, at 192.
201. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 240 (July
8); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9); Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. (Dec. 19) available at http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/1 16/ 10455.pdf.
202. Alston, supra note 192, at 194.
203. Id. at 192.
204. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 635 (2006).
205. Rona, supranote 184, at 713.

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 37:4

in Marbury v. Madison,20 6 it appears that little recourse will be had for the victims
of illegal acts inflicted upon them from the war on terror.
20 7
C. Undermining Of FamilyLaw Rights & Values Through Alien Detentions
The abusive human rights practices underlying the war on terror have not only
adversely affected those suspected of being terrorists or having connections with
terrorists, but have also significantly impacted the population most vulnerable
within U.S. borders - immigrants. Once viewed as the land of opportunity, the
U.S. has increasingly clamped the funnel of immigration, with its practices posing
an ever-increasing threat to the respect for and promotion of human dignity of
those seeking new life and opportunity in America. The manner in which the
"problem" of illegal immigration has been focused has led to prejudice, hatred, and
blatant racial discrimination. Moreover, behind-the-scenes images of how the
government is dealing with aliens paint a picture of arbitrary detention, cruel
208
treatment, and injustice.
Coinciding with the inception of the war on terror has been a marked increase
in immigrant detention. In just one decade, the number of detainees has more than
tripled, with evidence pointing to increasing numbers in the future. 20 9 Included
among these numbers are increased detentions of entire families, including
children,21 ° as well as refugees and asylum seekers.211 What is most disquieting
about this trend is the accompanying poor treatment of those detained.
First, detainees are afforded insufficient procedural rights, leading to an
inability to defend their cases successfully.212 These deficiencies include a lack of
access to witnesses and documentary evidence, decreased legal orientations, lack
of access to counsel, and insufficient contact with friends and family members on
the outside who may be able to assist in the process.213 All of this led the Human
Rights Committee to express its concern that aliens in the U.S. receive lower
standard of due process than in other developed countries.214 The lack of process
poses a particular problem for asylum seekers, who now not only face serious

206. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
207. Michelle Brane & Christiana Lundholm, Human Rights Behind Bars: Advancing the Rights of
Immigration Detainees in the United States Through the Human Rights Framework, 22 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 147, 154-55 (2008) (citing UDHR, ICCPR, American Declaration and UN Rights of the Child
Convention violations).
208. See generally Human Rights First, US. Detention of Asylum Seekers: Seeking Protection,
Finding Prison, April 9, 2009, available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/pdf/090429-RP-hrfasylum-detention-report.pdf.
209. Bran6 & Lundholm, supra note 207, at 147.
210. Id. at 148.
211. Id. at 150 (noting "[t]he practice of detaining refugees is not confined to the United States; it
has become a global phenomenon, particularly in recent years.").
212. Id. at 158.
213. Id. at 159-60.
214. U.N. Human Rights Committee, Consideration of reports submitted by states parties under
article 40 of the covenant, Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee,
18,
CCPR/C/USA/CO/3 (Sept. 16,2006) [hereinafter 2006 Human Rights Committee Report on U.S.].
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mistreatment if returned to their native country, but also here in the United
States.215

Beyond due process deficiencies, the conditions of alien detention themselves
appear to often infringe upon both U.S. and international human rights
guarantees. 216 Detentions are often arbitrary and/or unnecessary, as exemplified
above in the case of Sissoko. They also frequently include inadequate facilities and
treatment for those detained, as well as seclusion from the outside world, including
family. Moreover, there is inadequate cultural training for detention staff, and
little focus on meeting international human rights standards. At the extreme, some
detentions may violate prohibitions on torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment, as embodied in the U.S. Constitution 21721and international law.218
International law requires that "all persons deprived of their liberty shall be
treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity for the human
person." 219 It also gives "special protection" to families and children, 220 through,
for example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,22' International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights,222 the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties
of Man, 223 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 224 Similarly, the family

unit is often touted as a core value in the United States.
Nevertheless, even though ICE has specific Detention Standards in place,
evidence points to the undermining of these international protections and family
values. 225 There is inadequate training of detention center staff, limited resources,

215. Bran6 & Lundholm, supra note 207, at 160.
216. Id.
217. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
218. See, e.g., Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, [hereinafter CAT];
ICCPR, supra note 184, art. 7.
219. Bran6 & Lundholm, supra note 207, at 161 (citing ICCPR, supra note 184, art. 10).
220. Id. (citing GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE ININTERNATIONAL LAW 249 (2d ed. 1996)).
22 1. "The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection
by society and the State." UDHR, supra note 184, 16.
222. Article 23 of the ICCPR states, "[t]he family is the natural and fundamental group unit of
society and is entitled to protection by society and the State." ICCPR, supra note 184, art. 23. Article
17 states, "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family,
home, or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right
to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks." Id. art. 17.
223. American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, reprinted in Basic
V-VII, OAS/Ser.L/V/I.4 Rev.
Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System,
9 (2003); 43 AJIL Supp. 133 (1949), availableat
American
http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/English/Basic2.American /%20Declaration.htm [hereinafter
Declaration].
224. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, 28 L.L.M. 1456
(1989) [hereinafter CRC]. Article 10 states, "[a]pplications by a child or his or her parents to enter or
leave a State Party for the purpose of family unification shall be dealt with by States Parties in a
positive, humane and expeditious manner. States parties shall further ensure that the submission of
such a request shall entail no adverse consequences for the applicants and for the members of their
family.'" Id. art. 10.
225. Bran6 & Lundholm, supra note 207, at 161-62.
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and a simple lack of willingness to afford "aliens" with the human dignity and
respect that all people deserve.226 The undermining of family values, supposedly
at the core of American values, is unacceptable. With the recent change in the
presidential administration, the new policies may afford more protection for these
exposed populations. However, until this proves true, the courts again remain the
sole recourse for maltreated detainees. To date, the legal process has proven
inadequate, and if the U.S. courts continue along their current path, there is little
hope for the full protection of human dignity.
Legal Basis For Rendition In The Face Of Strong Contrary
D. No Apparent
22 7
Authority

The most criticized policy of the Bush administration is likely that of
"extraordinary rendition." "Extraordinary rendition" refers to the transfer of a
detainee from one state to another for the purpose of interrogation, detention,
mistreatment, and more likely than not torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment.22 8 This differs from ordinary rendition, which involves the handing over
of a prisoner to another country for the purpose of prosecution or other legitimate
judicial purposes. 229 Although the latter has been accepted by the international
community, and was employed often by the Clinton administration, extraordinary
rendition "has been vociferously criticized in the United States and abroad as both
unlawful and ill-conceived., 230 As already alluded to above, the policy of
extraordinary rendition was explicitly put in place by the Bush administration, 3 1
and has led to widespread and methodical abuses of human rights.232
The illegality of such a policy is clear under international law. In fact,
international jurists have been able to point to numerous sources of law to support
this reality. 233 These include, among others, the Convention Against Torture, the

Geneva Conventions, including Common Article III, the ICCPR,2 34 the UDHR,

226. See, e.g., id.at 161-64.
227. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 190, (discussing legal prohibitions against torture applicable tothe
U.S., as well as various treaty violations); Leila Sadat, Extraordinary Rendition, Torture, and Other
Nightmares from the War on Terror, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1200 (2007) (discussing extraordinary
rendition as a violation of fundamental human rights law norms dating all the way back to Nuremberg).
228. COMM. ON INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. & CTR. FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS & GLOBAL JUSTICE, N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, TORTURE BY PROXY: INTERNATIONAL
AND DOMESTIC LAW APPLICABLE TO "EXTRAORDINARY RENDITIONS" 4 (2004), available at

http://www.nyuhr.org/docs/TortureByProxy.pdf [hereinafter Torture by Proxy].
229. See Fisher, supra note 190, at 1406-07.
230. Sadat, supra note 227, at 1201.
231. Id. at 1204; see also Fisher, supra note 190, at 1420 (citing 151 Cong. Rec. E282 (daily ed.
Feb. 18, 2005) (statement by Rep. Edward J. Markey)).
232. Sadat, supra note 227, at 1220 (saying "[i]nformation obtained by human rights groups and
news sources on the practice of extraordinary rendition indicate that the countries to which individuals
have been transferred include Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan, each of which has
been cited by the State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices as engaging in
torture.") (citations omitted).
233. See generally id.
234. Id.at 1223.
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and the findings of the Courts and Committees entrusted with the responsibility of
interpreting these documents (e.g., the Inter-American Court and Human Rights
Committee).23 5
Accordingly, the European Union Parliamentary Committee has called the
rendition program "criminal" and "illegal,, 236 and "the Human Rights Committee
issued a report in 2006 stating that the "[United States] should immediately cease
' 237
its practice of secret detention and close all secret detention facilities."
Moreover, and perhaps more importantly (for international diplomacy at least),
European leaders were offended by the tactics of the U.S., as well as its response
when Europe addressed concerns about the policy and use of European territory to
facilitate the renditions.238 According to one British member of the European
Parliament, Bush "has now left the Europeans high and dry.239
On the other side of the equation, U.S. government lawyers who have tried to
justify the actions of Bush's "war on terror" have been unable to point to any
substantial legal authority that would even cause hesitation in declaring the
program unlawful. 240 The thrust of the arguments consists of narrowing the
applicable legal restraints on U.S. actions, and in arguing that the President is
virtually unconstrained when acting as "Commander in Chief during a war., 241 As
Professor Sadat points out, "[w]here international sources are cited, their use has
been highly selective and often misleading."' 242 As a result, it is commonly
accepted that the policy of extraordinary rendition is unlawful. As seen above in
Section I, by looking at the outcome of U.S. litigation, one reasonably questions
whether the U.S. Government believes this.

235. See generally id.
236. Id. at 1204. Eur. Parl. Ass., Comm. on Legal Aff. and Hum. Rts., Alleged secret detentions
and unlawful inter-state transfers involving Council of Europe member states, Doc. No. ajdoc 16 Part II,
at
6,
34
(2006),
available
at
http://assembly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/2006/20060606_Ejdoc I 62006Partll-FJNAL.pdf.
237. Sadat, supra note 227, at 1224 (citing 2006 Human Rights Committee Report on U.S., supra
note 214, 12).
238. See Fisher, supra note 190, at 1429-3 1.
239. Id.at 1433 (citing Kevin Sullivan, Detainee Decision Greeted Skeptically, WASH. POST, Sept.
7, 2006, at A17 (quoting Sarah Ludford)).
240. See, e.g., Sadat, supra note 227, at 1210.
241. Id.(citing John Yoo, Transferring Terrorists,79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1183, 1221-22 (2004).
242. Id. (noting "a recent article by John Yoo purporting to elucidate the meaning of the Geneva
and Torture Conventions contains no references to the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights on the question of rendition, the opinions of the International Criminal Tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (which have extensively interpreted the Geneva and Torture
Conventions), the case law of the International Court of Justice, or even the practice of the United
Nations.").
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E. Increasing U.S. Public Objections To Clandestine
U.S. Human Rights Abuses,
2 43
Oversight
Congressional
More
In
Resulting
The clandestine element of the "war on terror," which has led to the human
rights abuses discussed throughout this study, has increasingly met with public
objection and indignation. The election of Barack Obama, upon his platform for
"change," speaks most loudly to the discontent of the American people with the
previous Bush policies.
Because the policies of torture and "extraordinary
rendition" proved unacceptable to the majority of the U.S. population, in addition
to the international community, Congress began imposing more 244
oversight on
system.
transparent
more
a
for
fought
arguably
and
actions,
executive
Transparency is commonly accepted as central to true democratic legitimacy,
which incorporates dedication to the rule of law. Accordingly, to supplement the
Constitution, the U.S. Congress enacted legislation such as the Freedom of
Information Act and the Official Secrets Act.245 These safeguards were prompted
in large part because of the repercussions of Watergate,246 which included
diminished respect for and faith in both the presidential office as well as
government as a whole. In similar fashion, both the American public and
Congress 247 have called for more accountability for the clandestine abuses that
shamed the U.S. in Abu Ghraib and continue in Guantanamo.
According to Professor Kreimer, "[t]ransparency can potentially discipline an
overreaching Executive before, during, or after the fact. 248 However, in 2001, the
Bush administration stopped reporting on those individuals that it detained and
interrogated.249 Consequently, the American public had no way to evaluate the
legitimacy of its "representative's" actions. It was left in the dark in a manner not
dissimilar to the victims of the illegal detentions. Although Congressional
representatives, lawyers, and a handful of judges tried to fight the secrecy of the
executive, it took years for the Bush administration to let up on its blanket policy
of secrecy and non-disclosure.
To date, the true extent of the Bush

243. See generally Seth Kreimer, Rays ofSunlight in a Shadow "War": FO1A, The Abuses ofAntiTerrorism, and the Strategy of Transparency, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1141 (2007) (sharply
criticizing U.S. executive branch secret human rights abuses conducted in the name of the war on
terror).
244. See generally id.
245. Id. at 1145 (citing Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 636 (1975) ("The
public's interest in knowing about its government is protected by the guarantee of a Free Press, but the
protection is indirect ....The Constitution, in other words, establishes the contest, not its resolution.").
246. Id.at 1146.
247. Sadat, supra note 227, at 1243 (discussing the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005). However,
the Military Commissions Act of 2006 codified many of the Bush administration's policies into federal
law. Id.).
248. Kreimer, supra note 243, at 1147.
249. Id. at 1149.
250. Id. at 1157.
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administration's policies have not been disclosed, and the American public is still
fighting for the truth. 1
"Democracies die behind closed doors." 252 These prophetic words written by
Judge Keith of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals should remind us that the U.S.
was built on a fundamental belief that the people should be free from the tyranny
of abusive government. In examining the plight of non-citizens labeled "suspect
class," which gave the government the power to secretly deport persons
unilaterally, Judge Keith noted that "[t]he Executive Branch seeks to uproot
people's lives, outside the public eye, and behind a closed door., 253 The same can
be said of many of the policies of the "war on terror." Although claiming that the
war is being conducted on behalf of the people, the Bush administration gave little
thought to the effects of its policies on the very people it claimed to protect. Judge
Keith called the government to account, but the court decisions described herein
paint a different picture - one in which the courts are effectively complicit in
shielding information from the public. This is patently contradictory to democratic
principles.
F. Inconsistency With U.S. Allies 'Approaches To War On TerrorBased On
254
InternationalLaw Norms Applications
The United States is not the only nation engaged in the "war on terror."
However, the U.S. has received the largest amount of criticism. This could be
because the U.S. initiated the war, or perhaps because the U.S. displays the greatest
characteristics of a hegemonic power. The more likely explanation, however, is
that the U.S. has failed in ways other countries have not, including its closest allies.
Although the Bush administration considered international human rights norms
and due process requirements as merely a hindrance to the fight against
terrorism, 255 U.S. allies were searching for ways to balance the two, not
considering them as mutually independent. The present authors do not want to
overstate other countries' commitment to human rights preservation throughout the
"war on terror," as these countries have likewise failed at times to keep this
commitment. However, the U.S. proved all too willing throughout the Bush
administration to acknowledge or heed criticism and change course when its tactics
began to appear counterproductive, whereas even the U.K., the U.S.'s closest ally,
altered its course. 6 Important in the process, at least in Europe, was that the
courts intervened when human rights were abused and 257due process procedures
circumvented (discussed more fully below in Section IV).

251. Editorial, A Truth Commissionfor the Bush Era?, N.Y. TIMES, March 2, 2009.
252. DetroitFree Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir. 2002).
253. Id.
254. See generally Shane Darcy, Human Rights Protection During the "War on Terror": Two
Steps Back, One Step Forward, 16 MINN. J. INT'L L. 353 (2007) (discussing the ICCPR, the European
Convention on Human Rights, and the application of human rights laws to anti-terrorism activity).
255. Id. at 353.
256. Id. at 358.
257. See, e.g., A1-Skeini v. Sec'y of State for Def., [2005] W.L.R. 1401, 1406 (Q.B.D.).
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Litigation taking place within Europe, which has been based in large part
upon the U.K. Human Rights Act of 1998 and the European Convention on Human
Rights, has shown the "resilience" of the human rights framework laid down in the
UDHR and ICCPR.25 8 Not only have European courts held Europe's nations
responsible for the protection of human rights within sovereign borders, but they
have also required countries to uphold their treaty and customary law obligations
beyond reified borders when those countries maintain "effective control" over the
conduct.25 9 The Bush Department of Defense declared its view that the ICCPR
"does not apply outside the United States or its special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction, and that it does not apply to operations of the military during an
international armed conflict., 260 This claim is clearly wrong and unlawful.
However, unlike European courts, U.S. courts have been loathe to grant redress to
those subject to abuse as a result of this misconceived policy - a policy that not
only distorts fundamentals of justice and human rights, but that also seems unwise
for the furtherance of promoting national security.
IV. THE EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW APPROACH: A BETTER WAY?
The authors strongly urge readers to consider how European courts have
proven to be up to the challenge of applying basic rule of law principles to war on
terror cases similar to those seen in the U.S. court cases discussed above. From a
rule of law perspective, the U.S. judicial system can see much across the Atlantic
to guide their handling of these cases here.
A. Neither Rendition Nor Other Removal Of Suspected TerroristsAre Allowed
26 1
Absent GuaranteedProtections Of Their Human Rights
Saadi v. Italy presented the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) with
the question of whether states can refoule (return) a person to another state where
there is a substantial likelihood of torture and other ill treatment. Saadi, a Tunisian

national who was lawfully residing in Italy, was tried on terrorism-related grounds
and convicted of criminal conspiracy (in lieu of "international terrorism"). 262 The
Assize Court of Italy found that although there was reason to believe that Saadi
had fundamentalist ties and objectives, there was insufficient evidence to prove
that he would turn those objectives into violent action "covered by the definition of
a terrorist act., 263 In due course, Saadi was sentenced to four years in prison and
subsequent deportation in 2002.264 Simultaneously, while Saadi was in jail, a
Tunisian military court sentenced him in absentia to twenty year's imprisonment

258. See Darcy, supra note 254, at 368-69.
259. See generally id. "The United Kingdom courts have recently joined the ranks of those
upholding the application of human rights obligations overseas during conflict." Id.at 358.
260. Id. at 356 (citing Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on
Terrorism; Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational Considerations (Mar. 6, 2003),
availableat http:/ www.globalpolicy.org/empire/un/2004/mar03torturememotext.htm.
261. E.g., Saadi v. Italy, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 37201/06 (2008).
262. Id. 14.
263. Id. 21.
264. Id.
14-15.
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for membership in a terrorist organization.265 In 2006, upon Saadi's release, he
was ordered deported to Tunisia.266
As a result, Saadi requested political asylum,267 and ultimately alleged that
enforcement of the deportation decision would expose him to the serious risk of
being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Convention). 268 The
Article, which prohibits exposure to torture and other inhuman and degrading
treatment, emulates Article 7 of the ICCPR and Article 3 of the Torture
Saadi relied upon country reports issued by Amnesty
Convention.269
International, 270 Human Rights Watch, 271 and the U.S. State Department 272 to

support the contention that there was serious risk that he would be subjected to
torture and incommunicado detention, as well as unfair trial procedures, including
falsified police reports, lack of legal counsel, and forced confessions.
The ECHR ultimately found in Saadi's favor, relying on the sources described
above. In doing so, the Court first found that "substantial grounds" of a "real risk"
of being subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment is
sufficient to invoke Article 3.273 Most notably, the Court concluded that there is no
place for balancing the risks presented to the extraditing community against the
absolute nature of the prohibitions against torture and CIDT.274 The Court patently
recognized the "immense difficulties in modem times [for countries] in protecting
their communities from terrorist violence." 275 However, the Court noted:
The concepts of "risk" and "dangerousness" in this context do not lend
themselves to a balancing test because they are notions that can only be
assessed independently of each other. Either the evidence adduced
before the Court reveals that there is a substantial risk if the person is
sent back or it does not. The prospect that he may pose a serious threat

to the community if not returned does not reduce in any way the degree
of risk of ill treatment [emphasis added] .... 276
Ultimately, the Court held that absent sufficient assurances by the receiving
country, deportation or extradition to such a country would invoke the
responsibility of the sending state. 277 The Court went further in pointing out that
even with assurances, a sending country must be certain that the detainee would be
265. Id 29.
266. Id. 32.
267. Id.1 35.
268. Id. 13.
269. Id.
270. Id. 1 65-72.
271. Id. TT 73-79.
84-93.
272. Id
273. Id. 140.
274. Id. 139.
275. Id. 137.
276. Id. 139. The Court further found that "[tihe weight to be given to assurances from the
receiving State depends, in each case, on the circumstances obtaining at the material time." Id. 148.
277. Id. 147-49.
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Saadi was granted remuneration for

B. No Military
Judges Can Adjudicate Suspected TerroristsBecause Of FairTrial
28 0
Concerns
Kenar v. Turkey originated with an application against Turkey under the
Convention by Mr ibrahim Kenar, a Turkish national, on 18 September 2000.281
Kenar claimed that he had not received a fair hearing by an "independent and
impartial" judiciary, as is required by Article 6(1) of the Convention, because a
military judge was sitting during his trial before the Istanbul State Security
Court.2 82

Again, the terms of the Convention mimic safeguards incorporated in
ICCPR Article 14(1), Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, and
customary international law.
The Turkish government submitted that Kenar had been lawfully convicted by
the court because the military judge had been replaced during the proceedings, and
thus Kenar was convicted by three civilian judges.283 However, the court found
this argument unpersuasive and decided that military courts should have no role
over judicial determinations and that the presence of a military judge, even if

removed, makes the independence of the court questionable.284 As a consequence,
285
the court stated that the proper remedy was a retrial or reopening of the case.
Although the ECHR allows for pecuniary damages in such a situation,286the court
found a damages remedy inappropriate in this case for lack of evidence.
C. All Alleged GovernmentalAbuses Require "Effective Investigations

287

The European Human Rights Convention requires "effective investigations"
of all alleged abuses by government authorities (i.e. deaths, torture, and illegal
detentions). 88 In comparison, as a general rule we see no such investigation
priority in the United States. In fact, it has seemed fanciful even to imagine the
Justice Department investigating the Pentagon or Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) in rendition cases, whether there are serious allegations of illegal detention
278. Id. 148.
279. Id. 5 of holding.
280. E.g., Kenar v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 67215/01 (2007).
281. Id. 1.
282. Id. 31. Article 6(1) of the Convention reads as follows: "In the determination of..
any
criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair
. hearing within a reasonable time by an
independent and impartial tribunal established by law." European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 6(1), Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR].
283. Id. 135.
284. Id. T 37 ("The Court has consistently held that certain aspects of the status of military judges
sitting as members of the state security courts rendered their independence from the executive
questionable (see incal v. Turkey, judgment of 9 June 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions
1998-IV, § 68; and Ciraklarv. Turkey, judgment of 28 October 1998, Reports 1998-VII, § 39).").
285. Id. 1 50.
286. Id 148.
287. E.g., Askharova v Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 13566/02 (2008).
288. See, e.g., id. 76-89 (citing ECHR, supra note 282, art. 2).
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and torture or not. 28 9 The central issue, of course, is that if there are no
investigations, let alone "effective," "meaningful," or "full" investigations, there
are no means to protect individual and collective liberties owed to American
citizens and aliens under the Constitution and international law. Cases will never
proceed beyond complaint, let alone have a chance of seeing the courtroom.
Situations in which the ECHR has required "effective investigation" into the
actions of public officials are far-reaching and diverse, despite the same concerns
for national security seen within the United States. In Askharova v Russia, for
example, the applicant alleged that her husband had "disappeared after being
detained by servicemen in Chechnya., 290 The facts mimic those seen infra in
Takhayeva v. Russia, in which a group of armed men wearing masks invaded the
Askharov home early in the morning, forcefully removing the Mr. Sharani
Askharov by placing a bag over his head, and physically abusing him. 291 Several
others detained at the same time were found dead or badly beaten, but Mr.
Askharov was never to be heard from again.292
The Court reiterated that Article 2 of the Convention required the Court to
subject deprivations of life to "the most careful scrutiny," noting the particular
vulnerability of those detained at the hands of State agents.293 The Court also
focused on the combination of the obligation to protect life under Article 2 with the
State's duty under Article 1 to "secure to everyone within [its] jurisdiction the
rights and freedoms defined in [the] Convention," which lead the Court to
conclude that there must always be some form of "effective official
investigation." 294 According to the Court, the essential purpose of such
investigations is to 1) protect the right to life and security, and 2) ensure
295
accountability of public officials.

289. With the inauguration of the new Obama Administration, this appears to be changing. How
far it will go again remains to be seen.
290. Id. T13.
291. Id. 11 8-9.
292. Id. 11 7-18.
293. Id. T 61 (noting "[tihe Court reiterates that, in the light of the importance of the protection
afforded by Article 2, it must subject deprivations of life to the most careful scrutiny, taking into
consideration not only the actions of State agents but also all the surrounding circumstances. Detained
persons are in a vulnerable position and the obligation on the authorities to account for the treatment of
a detained individual is particularly stringent where that individual dies or disappears thereafter (see,
among other authorities, Orhan v. Turkey, no. 25656/94, § 326, 18 June 2002, and the authorities cited
therein)." Where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the
authorities, as in the case of persons within their control in detention, strong presumptions of fact will
arise in respect of injuries and death occurring during that detention. Indeed, the burden of proof may be
regarded as resting on the authorities to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation (see Salman
v. Turkey [GC], no. 21986/93, § 100, ECHR 2000-VII, and taklcz v. Turkey [GC], no. 23657/94, § 85,
ECHR 1999-IV).").
294. Id. 1 78.
295. Id. (holding "This investigation should be independent, accessible to the victim's family,
carried out with reasonable promptness and expedition, effective in the sense that it is capable of
leading to a determination of whether the force used in such cases was or was not justified in the
circumstances or otherwise unlawful, and afford a sufficient element of public scrutiny of the
investigation or its results (see Hugh Jordan v. the United Kingdom, no. 24746/94, §§ 105-109,
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In this case, the Court noted that the authorities were made aware of the crime
shortly after the events, but that the investigation was not opened until five months
297
later; 296 that there were significant delays in crucial steps of the investigation;
that essential steps, such as investigation of the crime scene to trace the vehicles
implicated, had never been taken; 298 that authorities did not uphold their obligation
to exercise "exemplary diligence and promptness in dealing with such a serious
crime"; 299 that the applicant was not informed of significant developments; that
investigators failed to ensure the investigation received the required level of public
300
scrutiny, and to "safeguard the interests of the next of kin in the proceedings";
that the investigation was adjourned and resumed several times; 30 1 and that, based
on the foregoing, the applicants could not have effectively challenged the
inadequate investigation before a court.30 2 Consequently, the Court found that the
investigation was ineffective 30 3 and that Ms. Askharova was to be given
304
reparations.
Similarly, in Mehmet Eren v. Turkey, where a reporter was detained and
subjected to ill treatment, including allegations of torture and threats of rape, 30 5 the
Court found that an investigation was not effective when the only step taken was to
obtain statements from Eren and his representative, and when the prosecutor
306
The
delayed even those minimum steps for 20 months after the complaint.
Court reaffirmed that "the rights enshrined in the Convention are practical and
effective, and not theoretical and illusory," and that, therefore, in cases of ill
treatment, an effective investigation must be conducted in such a manner as could
lead to "identification and punishment of those responsible. 307
Likewise, Jasar v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia illustrates
the Court's commitment to ensuring accountability of government officials by
308
insisting on effective investigations.
Again, the applicant was subject to
mistreatment at the hands of State officials, this time police, which allegedly left
him in a situation with "no effective remedy against the prosecutor's inactivity"
because of a lack of effective investigation. 30 9 The Court reiterated the importance
of effective investigations, which are capable of leading to the identification and
4 May 2001, and Douglas-Williams v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 56413/00, 8 January 2002)").
296. Id. 1 80.
297. Id. 11 81-82.
298. Id. 183.
299. Id. 1 84.
300. Id. 185.
301. Id. 186.
302. Id.188.
303. Id.1 87.
304. Id I II of holding.
305. Mehmet Eren v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 32347/02, IT 5, 8, 14 (2008).
306. Id. 1 53, 55-56.
307. Id.1 50 (citing Nevruz Kog v. Turkey, App. No. 18207/03, § 53, 12 (2007).
308. Jasar v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 69908/01
(2007).
309. Id.13.
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punishment of the perpetrators.
Importantly, the Court noted the essential link
between effective investigation and the prevention of torture, cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment, stating that without effective investigation "the general legal
prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment
would, despite its fundamental importance, be ineffective in practice and it would
be possible in some cases for agents of the State to abuse the rights of those within
their control with virtual impunity (emphasis added). 3 11
These cases are only a sampling of the demonstrated commitment to
"accountability" and the "effective" and "practical" application seen in Europe of
the prohibitions on torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. Europe
faces the same threats of terrorism that plague the U.S., perhaps even more so.
Nevertheless, the ECHR has applied these fundamental principles in all member
countries and in all circumstances.
312
D. All Detainees' Injuries & Other PhysicalAbuses RequireFull Investigations
Kocak v. Turkey also originated with alleged violations under the Convention,
particularly Articles 3, 6(1), and 6(3)(c). 313 Under allegations of terrorism, the
Istanbul Security Directorate detained Memet Ko9ak, a Turkish national, between
December 12 and 27, 1993.314 Ko9ak alleged that throughout detention he was
subject to gross mistreatment and torture. The complaint alleged:
[H]e was blindfolded and forced to listen to the cries of other detainees
being tortured. He was threatened with torture and forced to admit that
he was a member of the PKK. When he refused to do so, he was
stripped naked, immersed in cold water and beaten with a truncheon on

various parts of his body, including the soles of his feet. He was then
forced to walk on a salt-strewn floor. His hands were tied with a
blanket, he was strung up by his arms and subjected to a form of torture
known as "Palestinian hanging" In this position, electric shocks were
administered to his genitals, his fingers and feet. He was subsequently
coerced into signing a statement, of which he only signed the first two
pages. During his detention in police custody the applicant was kept in
315
a cell, deprived of food and water and prevented from sleeping.

310. Id.
55-56 (holding "[t]he investigation into serious allegations of ill-treatment must be
thorough. That means that the authorities must always make a serious attempt to find out what
happened and should not rely on hasty or ill-founded conclusions to close their investigation or as the
basis of their decisions. They must take all reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence
concerning the incident, including, inter alia, eyewitness testimony and forensic evidence. Any
deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of injuries or the
identity of the persons responsible will risk falling foul of this standard (citations omitted).").
311. Id. 55.
312. E.g., Kogak v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 32581/96 (2007).
313. Id. 1,3.
314. Id. 13.
315. Id.
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Subsequent to detainment, Kogak was examined by the Forensic Medicine
Institute, which found serious injuries all over Kogak's body.316
As a result, Kogak complained that he had been denied the right to legal
assistance during investigatory stages of the proceedings, pursuant to Article 6 of
the Convention, and subjected to torture, inhuman, and degrading treatment,
pursuant to Article 3 of the Convention.3 17 The first claim was dismissed.318
However, the Court found in Kogak's favor regarding the maltreatment. The
Turkish government claimed that Kogak's allegations were unsubstantiated and
meant to dishonor the fight against terrorism. 319 The Court determined, however,
that the government bore the burden of disproving mistreatment when a prisoner is
taken into custody in good health but is found injured at the time of release,
320
particularly when injuries are backed by medical reports.
The focus of the Court was the fact that the events at issue were wholly within
the exclusive control and knowledge of the authorities.321 In such a situation,
322
according to the Court, there is a strong presumption in favor of the plaintiff.
Based on the allegations described above, in combination with the strong
inferences that can be drawn from the evidence, the Court found that Kogak was

tortured. 323 Consequently, the Court awarded Kogak both non-pecuniary damages
and costs. 32 4 Thus, while U.S. courts deny standing and apply the state secrets
doctrine to preclude any possibility of discovery and/or trial for cases of serious
abuse, European courts are invoking accountability for the abuses perpetrated at

316. Id
17 (noting ".... presence of pain in the shoulders, the armpits and the neck, a yellow
ecchymosis on the right armpit, an ecchymosis of 3x2 cm on the upper part of the right arm, widespread
ecchymotic area and abrasions on both arms and wrists, hyperaemic lesions of 3x2 cm and 2x1 cm on
the upper part of the right hand and on the left hand, widespread pain in the hands, widespread
ecchymotic area of yellow colour on both gluteal regions on the back, ecchymotic area on the groin,
pain in the testicles, pain during defecation, swollen area on the right leg and foot, a yellow ecchymosis
and swollen area on the sole of the right foot, pain in the left leg, a yellow ecchymosis on the malleolar
region, a yellow ecchymosis and swollen area on the sole of the left foot, several old wounds on both
wrists and ankles .... ").
317. Id
32, 41.
318. Id. 40.
319. Id 43.
320. Id. 44 (holding that upon failure to produce evidence to the contrary, "a clear issue arises
under Article 3 of the Convention" (see t;olak and Filizer v. Turkey, nos. 32578/96 and 32579/96, § 30,
8 January 2004; Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803/94, § 87, ECHR 1999-V; Aksoy v. Turkey,
judgment of 18 December 1996, Reports 1996-VI, p. 2278, § 61; and Ribitsch v. Austria, judgment of
4 December 1995, Series A no. 336, p. 26, § 34)").
321. Id 45.
322. Id (holding "the burden of proof may be regarded as resting on the authorities to provide a
satisfactory and convincing explanation (see Salman v. Turkey [GC], no. 21986/93, § 100, ECHR 2000VII).").
323. Id 48.
324. Id. 56; Article 41 of the Convention provides: "If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting
Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just
satisfaction to the injured party.'" ECHR, supra note 282, art. 41.
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the hands of executive officials by putting the burden upon the government to
discredit credible claims of torture and gross abuse.
325
E. All Detainees 'Alleged Mistreatment Claims Require JudicialAdjudication
Atici v. Turkey also involved the case of a Turkish national detained by
Turkish government officials upon suspicion of terrorism. However, the facts of
this case are somewhat unusual. In 1992, Atici was arrested by the anti-terrorism
branch of the Istanbul Security Directorate on suspicion of his membership of the
Dev-Sol (the Revolutionary Left).326 He was detained, and along with sixteen coaccused, charged with membership in an illegal armed organization aimed and
undermining the constitutional order of the Turkish state.327 The prosecutor sought
the death penalty for all accused. 328 Despite being arrested in 1992, it was not until
2004 that the case was transferred to the Istanbul Assize Court, where Atici was
convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. 329 The Court of Cassation quashed
the judgment and remanded the case, where it was still pending at the time of this
2007 decision. 330 Thus, Atici was essentially in jail for over 14 years before
having his case fully adjudicated.
Consequently, Atici brought a claim under Article 6(1) of the Convention for
violation of the entitlement to "hearing within a reasonable time" requirement.331
The Court had reason to suspect the guilt of the accused in this case; however, the
ECHR upheld the rule of law and found that Atici was indeed deprived of his right
to a speedy trial. 332 Because the Turkish government did not offer any evidence
capable of discounting Atici's claim, the Court found the case justiciable and
found on behalf of Atici.333 Again, based on the finding of wrongdoing, the Court
awarded damages in the attempt to restore the wrong done. 334 In short, the Atici
decision stands for the proposition that both the government and the courts have a
responsibility to uphold the rights of its citizens, and when they do not, remedial
redress must be given.
F Evidence ObtainedBy Torture Is Inadmissible In Any UK Judicial
33 5
Proceeding
A and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department is a landmark
decision in the field of judicial oversight regarding torture.336 The question

325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.

Atici v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 31540/02 (2007).
Id. 15.
Id T 7.
Id.
Id. IT 8-9.
Id. 10.
Id. 11.
See id.117.
See id 17, 21, 24-25.
Id. 1 19-25.
E.g., A v. Sec'y of State for Home Dept. [2005] UKHL 71.

336. TOM FROST, LEGAL COMMENTARY ON THE USE OF TORTURE EVIDENCE,

Against the Criminalization of Communities (CAMPACC) (Jan. 2006),
http://www.campacc.org.uk/Library/legal commentary tortureevidence_220106.pdf.

15, Campaign

available

at
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addressed by the House of Lords was whether evidence that has been procured by
torture might be used in any judicial proceedings, even if the torture was not
inflicted at the hands of state officials.337 After giving thorough attention to the
English Common Law, the Convention Against Torture, the European Convention
on Human Rights, and general public international law, Lord Bingham came to the
well-accepted conclusion that the prohibition of torture is a norm of jus cogens,
from which no derogation is permitted, and imposes obligations erga omnes,
which entail obligations owed towards the international community as a whole. 338
In due course, Lord Bingham, along with the entirety of the Appeals Court, found
that evidence procured through torture is never admissible in any UK judicial
proceeding.339
Although the judgment has particular application in the case of suspected
terrorists in the UK, it has been acknowledged that its practical effects will extend
much further, such as deportation proceedings, issuance of control orders, and
depriving naturalized British persons of their UK citizenship. 340 The decision
affects all levels of government within the UK and likely Europe. But it could go
even further. The laws upon which the Lords rely are principles of general
international law applicable, at a minimum, to those state parties to the CAT,34 1
ECHR,342 and ICCPR,343 and arguably to all states by virtue of their customary
status.344 Therefore, the conclusions should logically transfer to the United States
as well.
The question becomes of particular importance when considered in the
context of the United States' "extraordinary rendition" program referred to herein.
In each of these scenarios, the U.S. Government could make a claim that the
torture and mistreatment has not been perpetrated by U.S. officials or on U.S.
territory, and therefore any resulting evidence should not be precluded. However,
applying the rationale of the Lords' decision, this argument should be rejected.
The Lords opined that a contrary conclusion would "bring British justice into
disrepute. 345 To note the same of the U.S. system is not much of a leap, as it has
already received voluminous criticism. The Lords also relied heavily on the
magnitude of international condemnation of torture and all its related evils.
Indeed, to accept the fruits of torture does in effect condone the torture itself.
Therefore, akin to the exclusionary principle applied by U.S. courts to Fourth

337. A v. Sec'y of State for Home Dept., supra note 335, 1.
338. Id.
151,153.
339. See id.
340. Frost, supra note 336, at I n. 1 (noting "[t]his point was made in the House of Lords by Lord
Brown, who accepted that this would be the most likely outcome of the judgment: [2005] UKHL 71, at
168.").
341. CAT, supra note 218, art 15.
342. ECHR, supra note 288, art. 3.
343. ICCPR, supra note 184, art. 7.
344. See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 184, art. 5.
345. A v. Sec'y of State for Home Dept. [2005] UKHL 71, 165.
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Amendment abuses, exclusion of all evidence accessed through torture, as well as
full investigation into such charges, would further the system of justice.
46
G. All Human Rights Law Violation Victims Must Have Meaningful Legal Reliej
Takhayeva v. Russia presents on its facts a scenario that seems almost
untouchable by the Courts - a situation of incommunicado detention in which the
government acknowledges absolutely no involvement. Nevertheless, the ECHR
did not shy away from the difficult questions presented. Instead, the Court
confronted the circumstantial situation head on, forcing the government to account
for its actions.
At approximately 3 a.m., November 13, 2002, five men in masks and armed
with machine guns and grenades broke into the applicants' home in the Chechen
village of Mesker-Yurt.347 They threatened the residents, locked some of them in
their rooms, beat the others, and ultimately kidnapped Ayub Takhayev,
disappearing into the night never to be seen or heard from again. 348 The next
morning, the applicants began inquiring to all possible official bodies in the
attempt to locate their son. 349 After much prodding, they eventually convinced the
prosecutor to open an investigation.3 5 °
Over the next nine months, despite continued pressure from the applicants,
official investigations went nowhere. On September 19, 2003, the military
prosecutor informed the applicants that there was no reason to believe that Russian
federal troops had anything to do with the kidnapping. 351 For two years, despite
inquiries, the applicants heard nothing, and on July 3, 2005, the investigation was
suspended.352 It was not resumed until May 8, 2007, and only then, for the first
time, did investigators visit the applicants' house to question them.3 53 Throughout
this entire time, "despite specific requests by the Court, the Government did not
disclose any documents from the investigation file. 354
Despite the lack of cooperation from the Russian government, the applicants
maintained that it was state agents that had kidnapped Ayub Takhayev. To support
this contention, they referred to the fact that the armed men had moved around
freely in APC vehicles, which were only in the possession of the military.355 The
abductors also spoke Russian without an accent, proving they were not of Chechen
origin.356 Finally, the applicants highlighted the government's unwillingness to
submit the investigation file because it contained "information of a military nature

346.
347.
348.
349.

350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.

E.g., Takhayeva v. Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 23286/04 (2008).
Id. 99.
Id. 9 9-16, 110.
Id. 99 20-21.

Id. 22.
Id. 935.
Id. 38.
Id. 39.
Id. 48.
Id. 9 63.
356. Id. .
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disclosing the location and nature of actions by military and special security
forces. 357
The Court responded in a way that is unfamiliar to litigants seeking redress
against the government in the United States - it gave the applicants the benefit of
the doubt. It stated:
When, as in the instant case, the respondent Government have exclusive
access to information able to corroborate or refute the applicants'
allegations, any lack of cooperation by the Government without a
of inferences as to
satisfactory explanation may give rise to the drawing
358
allegations.
applicant's
the
of
the well-foundedness
In short, the Court found that the evidence presented by the applicants
established a prima facie case, which, because the Russian Government did not
dispute the facts alleged, established that state servicemen kidnapped Ayub
Takhayev.359
Accordingly, the Court found that the government had violated several
fundamental human rights principles codified in the Convention, including Article
2, which states "[e]veryone's right to life shall be protected by law" 360 ; Article 3,
which protects persons from torture, inhuman, and degrading treatment 361; Article
5, which protects the right to liberty and security of person362; and Article 13,
which affords effective remedies in respect of Convention violations.363
In assessing redress for the victims of this atrocious situation, the Court
opined that "given the fundamental importance of the right to protection of life,"
not only is compensation appropriate, but so is a thorough and effective
364
In the
investigation capable of leading to criminal punishment of the offenders.
end, the Court awarded remedial relief in the form of damages, noting that it was
appropriate in certain circumstances to include compensation for loss of

357. Id..
358. Id. 165 (noting Tani and Others v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 65899/01, § 160 (2005).).
359. Id. 74-77.
360. Id.
86 (holding "The Court has already found it established that Ayub Takhayev must be
presumed dead following his unacknowledged detention by State servicemen and that his death can be
attributed to the State. In the absence of any justification in respect of the use of lethal force by State
agents, the Court finds that there has been a violation of Article 2 in respect of Ayub Takhayev."). The
Court also noted that "investigators failed to ensure that the investigation received the required level of
public scrutiny, or to safeguard the interests of the next of kin in the proceedings ... and that, therefore,
authorities failed to carry out an effective criminal investigation into the circumstances surrounding the
disappearance of Ayub Takhayev, in breach of art 2 in its procedural aspect." Id. 94, 96.
361. Id. 103 (holding "In view of the above, the Court finds that the applicants have suffered
distress and anguish as a result of the disappearance of their close relative and the inability to find out
what happened to him. The manner in which their complaints have been dealt with by the authorities
must be considered to constitute inhuman treatment contrary to art 3.").
362. Id. 105.
363. Id. 116, 121.
364. Id. 121 (citing Anguelova v. Bulgaria, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 38361/97, §§ 161-162 (2002)
and Sdheyla Aydin v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 25660/94, § 208 (2005)).
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earnings, 365 as well as for the suffering of the family members of the kidnapped
Takhayev.366 Ultimately, the holding of the Court stands for the proposition that
not only should victims of human rights abuses be granted relief, but that it should
be adequate and meaningful.
367
H. Judicially UnsupervisedElectronic Surveillance Is Strictly Prohibited
The final case study in this section, Liberty v. U.K., builds upon the premise
of meaningful relief, and presents a useful comparison to ACLU v. NSA, and AlHamadain (discussed above in Section II). Aptly named, Liberty ultimately stands
for the principle that electronic surveillance that is not supervised by the courts is
strictly prohibited. Prior to this action, several Acts existed in the UK regarding
the use of electronic information and surveillance, with the most recent Act
coming into force at the end of 2000.368 The Court noted that according to the
legislature, the main purpose of the Act was "to ensure that
the relevant
369
investigatory powers were used in accordance with human rights."
The applicants, Liberty, British Irish Rights Watch, and the Irish Council for
Civil Liberties, brought a claim, alleging that the interception of their
communications 370 was contrary to Article 8 of the Convention, which provides
that "[e]veryone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home
and his correspondence." 37 The applicants argued that because the procedures
permitted the interception of virtually all communications, with little protection
afforded, namely that the nature of the program was not available to the public, it
was unlawful.372 Moreover, they claimed that the interferences into their private
affairs pursued no legitimate aim, or in the alternative, 373
that they were not
interceptions.
the
of
over-breadth
the
of
because
proportionate
The government neither confirmed nor denied the allegations set forth by the
applicants, claiming "security reasons. 374 However, it accepted for the purposes
of the application that the Court proceed on the "hypothetical basis that the
applicants could rightly claim that communications
sent to or from their offices
375
were intercepted ...during the relevant period.,

365. Id. 135.
366. Id. 138.
367. Liberty v. U.K., Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 58243/00 (2008).
368. Id. 34.
369. Id.
370. Id. 42 ("The applicants complained that, between 1990 and 1997, telephone, facsimile, email and data communications between them were intercepted by the Capenhurst facility, including

legally privileged and confidential material.").
371. Id. 41. Section 2 states: "There shall be no interference by a public authority with the
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others." Id., citing ECHR, supra note 282, art. 8(2).
372. See id. 44.
373. Id. 46.
374. Id. 47.

375. Id.
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In short, the Court affirmed its previous cases, stating that legislation that
allows for the secret monitoring of communications "strikes at freedom of
communication" and thereby "amounts in itself to an interference with the exercise
of the applicants' rights under Article 8. , , 376 Contrary to the U.S. decisions, Liberty
found that there was a violation of the applicants' rights "irrespective of any
measures actually taken against them. 377 It attacked the illegal legislation itself,
concluding that its mere presence causes harm (or "injury in fact" in American
standing terms). 378 Thereby, it found a lack of necessity in proving how and when
the communications were actually intercepted - a burden that may have been
impossible given the lack of public disclosure underlying the program. 379 What
appears to ultimately lead the Court to its decision is the "protection against abuse
of power. 380 Thus, it seems that while U.S. courts have been more concerned
with the "separation of powers," the European courts have focused more on the
"balance of power."
V. CONCLUDING COMMENT

The U.S. would do well to look at how Europe wages the "war on terror"
without violating fundamental legal rights. Or at least when violations occur,
European courts give proper redress to the victims of illegal treatment at the hands
of the government. The courts do not balance torture against security, but uphold
the international law principle that torture is never acceptable. They refuse to
extradite without adequate assurances against torture. They do not allow the
executive branch, through military courts, to violate the independence and
impartiality of the civilian courts. They force the government to answer to serious
charges of abuse and torture. They ensure timely trials. They refuse to reward
torture by excluding the fruits of its application. They refuse to ignore blatantly
illegal legislation because those subject to warrantless surveillance cannot prove
actual injury when government secret evidence is needed to do so. And, finally,
they require that each of these situations be given adequate and meaningful
remedy and redress.
With the end of the Bush administration, the era of extraordinary rendition
and torture at the hands of U.S. officials likewise appears to be coming to an end.
As stated by Professor Kreimer, "the [American] public is increasingly cognizant
of the outrages committed in its name, and the legislative branches, freed from
one-party control by the election of 2006, are beginning to reassert their
constitutional oversight authority, backed by the subpoena power."38 Whether
this will be enough to return the United States to its tradition of respect for and
promotion of human rights is not yet determined.3 82 However, by looking outside
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.

Id. 1 56.
Id.
Id. 1 57.
See id 11 44, 57.
Id. 169.
Kreimer, supranote 243, at 1220.
Id.
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its own borders, and by examining the actions of a community that began dealing
with the threat and consequences of terrorism long before September 11, the U.S.
has a good opportunity to start over and reintegrate the respect for human rights
that has been so sorely missed in the past eight years.

PRESIDENT OBAMA AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
OF SUCCESSOR LIABILITY
DAVID AKERSON* AND NATALIE KNOWLTON**

I. INTRODUCTION

The last fifteen years have seen the dramatic expansion of international
criminal law and the use of international criminal tribunals to prosecute senior
leaders for their role in war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide
(international criminal law or ICL). An important development at the tribunals has
been the law of command responsibility.' While its history can be traced as far
back as 500 B.C., the modern doctrine draws from the jurisprudence that emerged
from the military tribunals established after World War II - the International
Military Tribunal (IMT) that tried Nazi Germany's war criminals and the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) that prosecuted Japanese
officials.
Decades later, in the early 1990s, scenes of concentration camps eerily
reminiscent of the Nazi Holocaust began to come out of the former Yugoslavia.
The outrage over those images spurred the United Nations Security Council in
1993 to utilize its broad Chapter VII powers 2 in a novel way - with the creation of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Within a
year, that decision spawned the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR). Thus began the inexorable trend toward the deployment of
tribunals as a tool in post-conflict resolution. By 2008, there were seven
international or quasi-international tribunals, including the ICTY and ICTR, The
Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts
of Cambodia (ECCC), The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (Lebanon Tribunal), The
Ad-Hoc Court for East Timor (East Timor Tribunal) and the International Criminal
Court (ICC). These institutions (collectively The Tribunals) are focused on and
mandated to indict high-level political and military leaders who orchestrate

*
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1. Command responsibility is also referred to as "superior responsibility," a term that denotes the
application of command responsibility to a broader civilian context. For the purposes of this article it
will be referred to as command responsibility.
2. See U.N. Charter ch. 7 (addressing Action with Respect to the Threats of Peace, Breaches of
Peace, and Acts of Aggression).
3. Julia Preston, U.N. Moves to Create Balkan War Crimes Panel, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 1993, at
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atrocities. To date, the Tribunals' indictments include Yugoslavian President
Slobodan Milogevi6, Rwandan Prime Minister Jean Kambanda, two Presidents of
the self-declared Republic of Srpska Radovan Karadzic and Biljana Plavsic,
Liberian President Charles Taylor and Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir.
The Tribunals exercise jurisdiction over three categories of core international
4
The direct
crimes: war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.
perpetrators of these crimes are typically lower-ranking subordinated field soldiers,
militia or paramilitary members. One of the significant challenges of the tribunals
is to link crimes committed by subordinates to the military or political superiors.
To this end, the tribunals have two alternatives. The first alternative is to charge
commanders with "individual criminal liability" for their direct involvement in the
crimes, such as ordering, instigating or planning. 5 The second alternative,
command or superior responsibility, is an indirect form of responsibility based on
an omission: the commander's failure to fulfill a duty with regard to subordinates
to prevent crimes where possible, or to punish the commission of offenses after the
fact.6
While the doctrine of command responsibility is firmly entrenched in ICL,
new issues have arisen in the doctrine's application. In 2001, the ICTY indicted
Bosnian military officers Enver Had~ihasanovid, Mehmed Alagic and Amir
Kabura (the Accused) on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity based
on a command responsibility theory for failing to punish his subordinates who had
committed those crimes. 7 These charges were contentious because for certain acts
Kabura was not the subordinates' commander at the time of the commission of the
crime, rather he had assumed command after the fact. For the purposes of this
article, we refer to this form of command responsibility as successor liability.
Before trial, the Accused moved to strike successor liability in the indictment. 8
The Trial Chamber rejected their argument, but on interlocutory appeal the9
Appeals Chamber reversed the lower court and invalidated successor liability.

4. In the case of the quasi-international tribunals, such as the SCSL and the ECCC, they include
domestic crimes as well. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 5, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178
U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Statute of the SCSL]; Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers
in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic
Kampuchea art. 3, NS/RKM/1004/006, Oct. 27, 2004 [hereinafter ECCC Statute].
5. See, e.g., The Secretary-General, Report on Aspects of Establishing an International Tribunal
for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, Annex 1, art. 7(1), U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3,
1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; S.C. Res. 955, Annex 1, art. 6(1), U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (July 1,
1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
6. See, e.g., ICTY Statute, supra note 5, at art. 7(3); ICTR Statute, supra note 5, at art. 6(3).
7. Prosecutor v. Had~ihasanovi6, Alagi6 & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47, Indictment, 18 (July
13, 2001). The ICTY amended this initial indictment two times. See also discussion infra Part I1.B. 1.
8. Prosecutor v. Had~ihasanovik, Alagid & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-PT, Decision on Joint
Challenge to Jurisdiction, 1 (Nov. 12, 2002).
9. Prosecutor v. Hadihasanovi6, Alagi6 & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Decision on
3(2), 57 (July
Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility,
16, 2003).
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The Appeal Chamber decision issued its decision in the form of a three-two
10
majority opinion with two strong dissents.
At the time the ICTY was litigating successor liability in Hadiihasanovi6,
President George W. Bush, was commander-in-chief of U.S. armed forces, and had
implemented controversial policies of water-boarding, harsh interrogation and
indefinite detention at Guantanamo Bay. These policies were widely-publicized
and openly acknowledged by the Bush administration.11 The implementation of
these policies involved the issuing of orders at a command level and the execution
of orders by subordinates. On January 20, 2009, President Barack Obama
succeeded President Bush as commander-in-chief and inherited authority over
many subordinates who are alleged to have participated in the execution of these
policies. Successor liability would mandate that Obama has a duty to punish
known subordinate offenders, and a failure to do so would subject him to liability.
As international law becomes more comfortable holding senior leaders liable
for mass crimes, it will be confronted on reoccurring basis with the criminal
subordinates who remain in their positions in successive regimes. Do the new
regime leaders, such as Obama and Prime Minister Gordon Brown of the United
Kingdom, each of who may have had no involvement in the crimes or opposed the
criminal policies of their predecessors (hereinafter referred to as successor
regimes), have a duty to root out and punish subordinate offenders to the extent
that a failure to discharge that duty subjects them to criminal liability for acts they
may have opposed?
This article examines the law and policies of successor liability in light of
President Obama and clamor for him to appoint a special prosecutor to investigate
possible war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the Bush
administration. Section II will analyze the branch of successor liability as it
currently stands in international law. Section III will then view successor liability
with respect to President Obama and his role as a commander of subordinates in
the armed forces who may have committed crimes. The section will first set forth
the alleged crimes committed under the prior Presidential administration and then
discusses President Obama's duty to respond to those crimes. Various policy
arguments militating for and against establishing successor liability are explored in
Section IV.
II.

COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY AND THE SUCCESSOR LIABILITY BRANCH

A. Codification
The body of case law that came out of the World War II tribunals established
and developed command responsibility as a form of individual criminal
responsibility; however, the operating statutes of the IMT and IMTFE did not
expressly provide for command responsibility.
Likewise, the four Geneva
Conventions are largely silent on the issue. 12 The first codification of the doctrine

10. Id. 57.
11. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
12. See Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 39, Aug. 12, 1949, 75
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in international humanitarian law is in Articles 86 and 87 of Additional Protocol I
to the Geneva Convention of 1977 - applicable to international armed conflicts which establishes superior liability for failures to act and places a duty on
13
commanders to prevent, suppress or punish breaches of the Geneva Conventions.
Since then, the doctrine of command responsibility as a form of individual
criminal liability has been expressly recognized by all of the international
tribunals. It is set forth in Articles 6(3) and 7(3) of the Statute of the ICTR and
ICTY, respectively, Article 6 of the Statute of the SCSL, Section 16 of the
constitutive document of the Special Panels for Serious Crimes, and in Article 29
of the ECCC. 14 All of these tribunals generally reference command responsibility
15
as follows:
The fact that any of the acts referred to in
the present Statute was
committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal
responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was
about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take
the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish
the perpetrators thereof. 16

While the expression of the command responsibility doctrine may vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the ad hoc jurisdictions, beginning with the Celebii
Trial Chamber, have generally recognized three elements necessary to a finding of
superior liability: the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship; the
commander's knowledge of the subordinate's crime; and the commander's failure
to act either in the form of preventing the criminal acts or if learned of after the
fact, punishing the offenders.1 7 Successor liability is concerned with this latter
duty to punish, in the case of a new commander who inherits subordinates who
have previously committed criminal acts under a previous commander.
B. SuccessorLiability
1. Current State of the Law
The successor liability branch of command responsibility has to date been
litigated only at the ICTY. It was first discussed in the case of Prosecutor v.
Kordi6 and Cerkez.1 8 Dario Kordi6 was a high-ranking political figure in the
Bosnian Croat separatist movement who exercised substantial influence over its
U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention lI].
13. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.a.
14. ICTR Statute, supra note 5, at art. 6(3); ICTY Statute, supra note 5, at art. 7(3); Statute of the
SCSL, supra note 4, at art. 6; U.N. Transitional Admin. in East Timor, Regulation on the Establishment
of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Offences, § 16, U.N. Doc.
UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (June 6, 2000) [hereinafter Statute of East Timor Tribunal]; ECCC Statute,
supra note 4, at art. 29.
15. With slight variations.
16. ICTY Statute, supra note 5, at art. 7(3).
17. Prosecutor v. Delalik, Muci6, Deli6 & Landfo, Case No. IT-96-21, Judgment, [ 346 (Nov. 16,
1998). The three elements of command responsibility are discussed in more detail in Section III (B),
infra.

18. Prosecutor v. Kordi6 & C(erkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment (Feb. 26, 2001).
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military and paramilitary operations. 19 Mario Cerkez was the commander of a
Bosnian Croat Brigade.2 ° While the issue of successor liability was not
specifically challenged at the pre-trial stage, the Trial Chamber in convicting the
two Accused did address the issue. In obiter dicta, the Trial Chamber affirmed
that
The duty to punish naturally arises after a crime has been committed.
Persons who assume command after the commission are under the same
duty to punish. This duty includes at least an obligation to investigate
the crimes to establish the facts and to report them to the competent

authorities, if the superior does not have the power to21sanction himself.
Civilian superiors would be under similar obligations.
The issue of successor liability next came up in the ICTY case of Prosecutor
v. Hadiihasanovi6and Kabura.22 Enver Had~ihasanovi6 and Amir Kabura were
professional military officers in the Yugoslavian army of the SFRY prior to its
dissolution.
When Bosnia-Herzegovina
declared its independence,
Had~ihasanovi6 and Kabura migrated from the Yugoslavian Army to the newlyformed Army of the Republic of Bosian-Herzegovina (ABiH). Both served as
high-ranking officers in the Army of Bosnian-Herzegovina during the ensuing
armed conflicts. 23 In several indictments, the ICTY alleged that the ABiH
committed a range of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Hadhihasanovi6
was initially a Commander of the ABiH 3 rd Corps, then later promoted to the Chief
of the Supreme Command.24 Kabura was initially commissioned as the Deputy
Commander of a detachment in the Bosnian city of Kakanj2 He rose steadily
through the ranks of the ABiH, becoming the 3 rd Corps 7 th Muslim Mountain
Brigade Chief of Staff on January 1, 1993.26 Between April and July of that year,
Kabura effectively served as Commander of the Mountain Brigade, as its de jure
Commander Asim Koricic was absent. The ICTY indicted Hadhihasanovi6 and
Kabura in a joint amended indictment on September 26, 2003.27 The indictment
alleged that 3 rd Corps committed a range of war crimes, including attacking
civilians causing death and serious injury, unlawful imprisonment of Croatian and
19. See Prosecutor v. Kordi6 & Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2, Amended Indictment, 9-10 (Sept.
30, 1998).
20. See id 12.
21. Prosecutor v. Kordi6 & (erkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, 1 446 (Feb. 26, 2001)

(citation omitted).
22. Prosecutor v. Had~ihasanovi6, Alagi & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47, Indictment (July 13,
2001). Alagi6 died before trial commenced and the action against him was terminated by the Trial
Chamber on March 21, 2003. An amended indictment without Alagi6 was issued on September 26,
2003. Prosecutor v. Had~ihasanovi6 & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-PT, Third Amended Indictment
(Sept. 26, 2003).
23. Prosecutor v. Hadihasanovi6, Alagid & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-PT, Amended
Indictment, 2-6 (Jan. 11, 2002).
24. Id. 2-3.
25. Id. 9.
26. Id.
27. Prosecutor v. Hadihasanovi6 & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-PT, Third Amended Indictment
(Sept. 26, 2003).
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Serbians who were subjected to physical and psychological abuse, inhumane
treatment, and deprivations of basic necessities. 28 The indictment charged Kabura
with criminal responsibility for acts committed by his subordinates, the 3 rd Corps,
based on the command responsibility provision of the ICTY statute. 29 The
indictment indicated that liability would attach to Kabura if the superior knew or
had reason to know" of acts his subordinates were about to commit "or had done
so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to ...
punish the perpetrators thereof., 30 The indictment charged that Kabura had
assumed command over the Mountain Brigade in the midst of a military campaign
in which war crimes and crimes against humanity were alleged to have already
been committed. 31 The indictment included the allegation that Kabura was
responsible for subordinates who had committed crimes two months before his
assumption of command.32 Thus, for the first time in international criminal law an
indictment had explicitly charged an accused with successor liability.
The Accused challenged the successor liability aspects of the indictment in a
pre-trial motion.33

The Accused argued that "Article 7(3) may apply when the

superior learns after the event of the offence, but that the superior-subordinate
relationship must [also have existed] at the time of the offence., 34 The Defense
argument was comprised of both legal and policy components. The legal argument
turned on the notion that command responsibility required a commander to have
effective control of his subordinates at the time of the commission of the acts and
thus be in a position to prevent the breach. 3 Kabura argued that he did not have
effective control of subordinates during their commission because he was not yet
their commander, and thus he was not liable under command responsibility. In
support of this position, the Accused relied on language from the ICTY case of
Prosecutor v. Delali and Deli.

The Delali6 and Deli6 case (sometimes referred

to as the Celebi&i case) trial judgment stated in a general discussion of command
responsibility that a commander must have effective control over subordinates for
command responsibility to attach.36 The Defense extracted this argument and put
it forward as support for their position. They then buttressed that assertion with
the policy argument that the "aim of command responsibility [is] to ensure that
commanders will guarantee that troops over whom they have effective control will

28. Prosecutor v. Had~ihasanovik, Alagi6 & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-PT, Amended
Indictment, 41-42 (Jan. 11, 2002).
29. Id. 13 (citing ICTY Statute Article 7(3)).
30. Id. (emphasis added).
31. See id. 58.
32. Id.; see also Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovi6, Alagi6 & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-PT,
Decision on Joint Challenge to Jurisdiction, 180 (Nov. 12, 2002).
33. Prosecutor v. Had~ihasanovid, Alagi6 & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-PT, Decision on Joint
Challenge to Jurisdiction (Nov. 12, 2002).
34. Id. 185 (citing the written submissions of Hadzihasanovi).
35. See id.
36. Prosecutor v. Delali6, Mucid, Delic & Land~o, Case No. IT-96-21, Judgment, 378 (Nov. 16,
1998) (citing the International Law Commission Draft Code).
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conduct operations 7 in accordance with the law, thereby preventing crimes from
3
being committed.
The Prosecution responded that the operative fact is who the commander was
with effective control over subordinates when knowledge of the past commissions
of criminal acts is attained. 38 The Prosecution also asserted that the Accused's
position would create a lacuna in the law, effectively allowing militaries to swap
commanders when breaches were committed thus eliminating the new
commander's duty to punish.3 9
The three-judge Trial Chamber sided with the Prosecution and denied the
Defense's motion. The Chamber found that "in principle a commander could be
liable under the doctrine of command responsibility for crimes committed prior to
40
the moment that the commander assumed command.,
They reasoned that the purpose of the doctrine of command responsibility was
"to require commanders to fulfill their duty to ensure that their subordinates
comply with the principles of international humanitarian law ' 41 and successor
liability helped satisfy that purpose of command responsibility by pressuring
subsequent commanders to investigate allegations.42
The Defense filed an interlocutory appeal on November 27, 2002 challenging
the Trial Chamber's decision.4 3 On appeal the Accused again argued that "the
express terms" of Article 7(3) of the [ICTY] Statute precluded successor liability
in that it required a superior-subordinate relationship at the time of the commission
of the offense. 44 "The proper person," the Defense offered, "to be prosecuted is the
commander who had effective control . . . at the time the offences were
committed., 45 The Accused also asserted that there was no basis in conventional
or customary law for successor liability. 46 And finally, the Accused argued that by
affirming successor liability, the Appeals Chamber would undesirably extend
liability for years after the offenses were committed.4 7
The Prosecution relied on the obiter in the Kordi6 Trial Judgment, discussed
supra. But it also conceded the paucity of precedent, arguing that "the lack of a
known precedent for a finding of guilt for failing to punish subordinates for
37. Prosecutor v. Had~ihasanovi6, Alagi6 & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-PT, Decision on Joint
Challenge to Jurisdiction, 185 (Nov. 12, 2002) (emphasis omitted).
38. Id. 191.
39. See id 192-94.
40. Prosecutor v. Had~ihasanovik, Alagi6 & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-PT, Decision on Joint
Challenge to Jurisdiction, 7 202 (Nov. 12, 2002).
41. Id. 197.
42. Id. 200.
43. Prosecutor v. Had~ihasanovi6, Alagi6 & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-PT, Interlocutory Appeal
on Decision on Joint Challenge to Jurisdiction, 77 12, 120-23 (Nov. 27, 2002).
44. Prosecutor v. Had~ihasanovi6, Alagid & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Decision on
Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility, T 41 (July 16,
2003).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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offences committed before assuming command cannot prevent charging an
accused in this manner. "48 In effect, the prosecution was arguing that the issue of a
successor commander was not new law but rather an unforeseen factual
circumstance that the Appeals Chamber could decide fell within the scopes of
command responsibility.
The five-judge Appeals Chamber issued its three-two decision on the appeal
on July 16, 2003.49 The three judge majority overruled the Trial Chamber's50
judgments)
decision (as well as the obiter in the earlier Kordi6 and Cerkez trial
while Judges Hunt and Shahabadeen dissented.
The majority opinion offered that
[i]n considering the issue of whether command responsibility exists in
relation to crimes committed by a subordinate prior to an accused's
assumption of command over that subordinate, the Appeals Chamber
observes that it has always been the approach of this Tribunal not to
rely merely on a construction of the Statute to establish the applicable
law on criminal responsibility, but to ascertain the state of customary
law in force at the time the crimes were committed.51

In analyzing customary international law as it stood at the time of the
commission of the crimes, the majority found that
[i]n this particular case, no practice can be found, nor is there any
evidence of opinio juris that would sustain the proposition that a
commander can be held responsible for crimes committed by a
subordinate prior to the commander's assumption of command over that
subordinate.52
The majority did conclude that what precedent existed militated against
successor liability. Two primary sources that it relied on were a definition of

command responsibility as set forth in the Rome Statute's Article 28, and Article
86 of the 1977 Additional Protocols I, both of which will be discussed infra.
While a three-two Appeal Chamber decision is binding authority on the Trial
Chambers at the Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals, even Judge Meron (one of the
majority judges) acknowledged that the narrowness of a three-two majority "and
the cogency of [the] dissent may suggest that the jury is still out on this
question. 53

48. Id. 43.
49. Id. 57.
50. Gideon Boas et al., Forms of Responsibility in International Criminal Law 233 (2007).
51. Prosecutor v. Had~ihasanovi6, Alagi & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Decision on
Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility, 44 (July 16,
2003).

52. Id. 45.
53. THEODOR MERON, WAR CRIMES LAW COMES OF AGE 89 (1998) (referring to the Erdemovic

Appeals Chamber Judgment, ruling "that duress does not afford a complete defense to a solider charged
killing of innocent human beings.").
with a crime against humanity and/or ...
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Both dissenting judges seized on the argument of the majority that it was
required that successor liability be part of customary international law in order.
Judge Shahabuddeen in his dissent acknowledged that there were no clear
authorities one way or the other on the successor liability issue. 54 But in such a
circumstance, he offered, the Tribunal has the competence to interpret established
principles of law (such as superior responsibility) and to determine whether a
particular situation falls within the principle.55 He argued that this wasn't creating
and applying one of its existing principles; a proper
law, but rather interpreting
56
function of Judges.
In his dissent, Judge Hunt similarly submitted that the proper analysis of
successor liability is not whether it "clearly" existed as custom at the time of the
commission of the crimes, but whether successor liability is a new situation that
reasonably falls within the principle of command responsibility. 7 Judge Hunt
pointed out the paradox of the majority's position, that
[s]urely it is the purpose of the relevant principle of customary
international law which dictates the scope of its application, not the
facts of the situation to which the principle is sought to be applied.
And, if that scope or purpose is not sufficiently rigorous or precise, it
may be defined by reference to the 'principles of humanity' and
'dictates of the public conscience' as provided for in the Martens
Clause. If the view of the majority is correct, no principle of customary
international law could ever be applied to a new situation, simply
58
because it is a new situation.
Judge Hunt also pointed out the irony in the reasoning of the majority itself on
a different issue in the appeal. Here, the majority found that where it can be shown
a principle exists "it is not an objection to the application of the principle to a
particular situation to say that ... it reasonably falls within the application of the
59
principle.,
Other tribunal decisions have examined "new" situations and validated them
as situations reasonably falling within the established custom. In Prosecutor v.
Karamera, an ICTR Appeals Chambers held that the imposition of liability for
participation in enterprises that are not limited in size or scope is a new situation
that reasonably fell within the broader parameters of Joint Criminal Enterprise - a
principle with a clear basis in customary international law. 60 The Brdanin Trial
Chamber approved an unprecedented aspect of superior responsibility when it

54. See Prosecutor v. Had~ihasanovik, Alagi & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Decision on
Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility, 8 (July 16,
2003) (Shahabuddeen, J., dissenting) (partial dissenting opinion).
55. Id. 9.
56. See id. 9-10.
57. See id. 38 (Hunt, J. dissenting) (separate and partially dissenting opinion).
58. Id. 40 (emphasis omitted).
59. Id. 37 (citing the majority opinion) (emphasis omitted).
60. Karamera et al, Joint Criminal Enterprise Appeal Decision, (ICTR) paras. 15-16.

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 37:4

the application of the
satisfied itself that the principle reasonably fell 6 within
1
responsibility.
criminal
superior
of
general doctrine
The Hadihasanovi6majority position was criticized in subsequent judgments
although followed on the grounds of stare decisis. The Trial Chamber in
Hadiihasanovi6,after the case had been remanded to them after the interlocutory
appeal, lamented in its judgment that the Appeals Chambers had in fact created gap
in the law:
Since the commanders of troops change on a regular basis in times of
war, there is a serious risk that a gap in the line of responsibilities will
be created as the changes occur. . . [1]f the superior in command at the
time a crime is committed is replaced very soon after its commission, it
is very likely that the perpetrators of that crime will go unpunished and
that no commander will be held criminally responsible under the
principles of command responsibly. It must be recognised that in such
case military practice, whose purpose is to establish the internal order
and discipline necessary to run the armed forces, and from62 which the
power to punish flows, falls short of achieving its objective.
The issue reached the Appeals Chamber again in the Prosecutorv. Oric case,
a panel that again included Judge Shahabuddeen. The Oric Trial Chamber had
offered that while it too disagreed with the position taken by the Hadlihasanovi5
majority, it was legally bound to follow it.63 Since the duty to punish only
becomes relevant when the crime is discovered, not when it is committed, often a
superior would be obligated to take punitive measures even when he or she had no
ability to prevent the crimes due to his lack of awareness. Therefore, the Trial
Chamber suggested that "it seems only logical that such an obligation [to punish]
a change of command
would also extend to the situation wherein there has been
64
following the commission of a crime by a subordinate."
The issue was raised on appeal. This time, a three-two majority, including
Judge Shahabuddeen, was positioned to reverse Hadihasanovic.65 But curiously,
Judge Shahahabuddeen declined the opportunity to do so. He acknowledged
justifications for the reversal. He explained that one Appeals Chamber could, even
in a three-two decision, reverse the previous Appeal Chamber position. 66 He
referenced the support that a reversal would have, mentioning that fourteen ICTY
judges had expressed opposition to the HadlihasanoviW decision in subsequent
cases. 67 But notwithstanding this, he deferred to a cryptic judicial code wherein a
dissenting judge should not form part of a subsequent overturning three-two

61. Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, 715 (Sept. 1, 2004).
199 (Mar. 15,
62. Prosecutor v. Had~ihasanovi6 & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-T, Judgment,
2006).
63. Prosecutor v. Ori6, Case No. IT-03,68-T, Judgment, 335 (June 30, 2006).
64. Id.
65. See Prosecutor v. Orik, Case No. IT-03-68A, Judgment, 3 (July 3, 2008) (Shahabuddeen, J.,
declaration).
8, 11-13.
66. Id.
67. Id. 12.
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majority, or at least he should do so with economy. 68 In Shahabuddeen's view,
decorum commended that an incorrect expression of law shall remain in place until
"such time when a more solid majority shares the views of those two judges.69
The irony of this puzzling stand is highlighted by the dissents by Judges Liu
and Schomberg, both of which now take up the position so persuasively argued by
Shahabuddeen himself in his Hadiihasanovi6 dissent. 70 Judge Liu issues a
particularly spirited dissent. He submits that the Appeals Chamber should have
reversed the Hadihasanovi decision for many reasons. First, its failure to do
"gives the impression .. .that [it] considers such [a] challenge unfounded" or
"disagrees with the challenge.'
Its refusal to reverse avoids its responsibility to
address legal challenges to its own decisions, he submits. To Judge Liu, the issue
is an important one. "The exceptional nature and general significance of the
question whether a commander can be held responsible under Article 7(3) of the
Statute for failing to punish the crimes of which he had knowledge, but were
perpetrated before he assumed command" Judge Liu offers, "is undoubtedly of
fundamental importance to our jurisprudence., 72 He explains that the failure to
correct such an erroneous decision will only serve to generate uncertainty, and
cause confusion in the determination of the law by parties to cases before the
International Tribunal.
Thus, the Haddihasanovi6decision continues to represent the law of the ICTY
and ICTR despite the tenuous grounds on which it currently rests. It is therefore
worthwhile to amplify two of the bases of the HadiihasanoviW majority that
continue the successor liability debate: Article 86 of Additional Protocol I and
Article 28 of the Rome Statute.
2. Appeals Chamber's flawed reliance on Articles 86 of Additional Protocol I
and Article 28 of the Rome Statute as evidence of custom
a. Article 86 of Protocol I
The source of the debate over successor liability can be traced to the modem
codification of command responsibility in the 1970s that is, in part, represented by
Article 86 of the 1977 Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.7 3 This Protocol and
Protocol II came about after increasing dissatisfaction among nations throughout
the 1950s and 1960s with the definitional rigidity of the original Geneva
Conventions passed in 1949. Nations convened the Diplomatic Conference of
Geneva in 1974 with the aim of issuing an amending treaty to modernize the 1949
Convention's strict view of armed conflict that was oriented to conflicts between

68. Id. 14.
69. Id. 115.
70. See id. 1-2 (Liu, J., dissenting) (partially dissenting opinion and declaration); see, e.g., id.
12-13 (Schomburg, J., dissenting) (separate and partially dissenting opinion).
71. Id. 3 (Liu, J., dissenting) (partially dissenting opinion and declaration).
72. Id. 5.
73. See Prosecutor v. Had~ihasanovi6, Alagi6 & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Decision on
Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility, 22 (July 16,
2003) (Shahabuddeen, J., dissenting) (partial dissenting opinion).
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states deploying uniformed armed forces. 74 These definitions increasingly did not
adequately reflect modem armed conflicts that emerged after World War II. The
post WWII-era conflicts often had less to do with territorial conquest and more to
do with political issues such as the liberation of colonies in Africa and Asia, the
foreign occupation of states in the cold war, and racist regimes such apartheid in
South Africa. The Geneva conference sought to broaden the 1949 definitions to
extend protections to these new kinds of conflicts. In addition, the conference
sought to more adequately protect the victims in such conflicts. With these broad
aspirations in mind, in 1977 the conference issued its results after three years of
75
labor with a new convention that became known as Additional Protocol 1.
While the Hadlihasanovi majority focused exclusively on Article 86, two
provisions of Additional Protocol I codified the responsibility of commanders:
Articles 86 and 87. Article 86 provides:
Failure to act

1. The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall
repress grave breaches, and take measures necessary to suppress all
other breaches, of the Conventions or of this Protocol which result from
a failure to act when under a duty to do so.
2. The fact that a breach of the Conventions or
committed by a subordinate does not absolve his
or disciplinary responsibility, as the case may be,
information which should have enabled them

of this Protocol was
superiors from penal
if they knew, or had
to conclude in the

circumstances at the time, that he was committing or was going to

commit such a breach and if they did not take all feasible measures
within their power to prevent or repress the breach.76
Article 87 set forth the duty of commanders. It provides
Duty of commanders
1. The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall
require military commanders, with respect to members of the armed
forces under their command and other persons under their control, to
prevent and, where necessary, to suppress and to report to competent
authorities breaches of the Conventions and of this Protocol.
2. In order to prevent and suppress breaches, High Contracting Parties
and Parties to the conflict shall require that, commensurate with their
level of responsibility, commanders ensure that members of the armed
forces under their command are aware of their obligations under the
Conventions and this Protocol.

74. See generally George H. Aldrich, New Lifefor the Laws of War, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 764 (1981)
(detailing the major changes made by the Protocols based on the changing nature of modern warfare).
75. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1391 [hereinafter
Protocol 1].
76. Id. at art. 86 (emphasis added).
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3. The High Contracting Parties and Parties to the conflict shall require
any commander who is aware that subordinates or other persons under
his control are going to commit or have committed a breach of the
Conventions or of this Protocol, to initiate such steps as are necessary to
prevent such violations of the Conventions or this Protocol, and, where
appropriate, to initiate disciplinary or penal action against violators
thereof 7
The crux of the problem, of course, lies in inconsistency in the tenses in
Articles 86 and 87. Article 86 uses the present tense, referring to a commander's
liability where a subordinate was committing or about to commit a breach whereas
Article 87 uses the past tense, requiring a commander to act where subordinates
have committed breaches. Article 86 seemingly precludes successor liability,
Article 87 supports it.
Whether or not this discrepancy between Articles 86 and 87 was intentional is
dubious. It would seem doubtful that the drafters of the Articles would have
preferred the present inconsistent language and the inevitable ensuing ambiguities.
Moreover, the official commentaries on the articles do not seem to grasp the
significance of the language. In its explanation of Article 86, the commentary uses
the past tense (i.e. the language of Article 87) stating that a commander "is to be
responsible for an omission relating to an offence committed or about to be
committed by a subordinate. 78 If the tense had been a critical issue in the drafting
of the article, one would presume that the commentary would have been more
sensitive to the nuances of the language and the commentators would have been
more precise.
How does one reconcile Articles 86 and 87? When attempting to clarify an
inherent ambiguity in a statute, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
provides that "[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose. ",79
The plain language of Article 86 suggests that its principal purpose was to
criminalize the superior's omission, an idea that the original Geneva Conventions
did not adequately address. The commentary on the provision confirms its purpose
was to close this loophole. 80 The commentary does not discuss the relevance of the
use of the present tense only. Article 87, aptly entitled "Duty of Commanders,"
elaborates on those duties of omission and enjoins states to enact enabling
legislation. 81 A good faith interpretation of the two Articles would be that the two
c majority's
Articles should be read together. In that vein, the Hadiihasanovi
selective reliance only on Article 86 is unfounded.

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at

art. 87 (emphasis added).

Protocol I, supra note 75, at art. 86 cmt. 3543 (emphasis added).
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
Protocol I, supra note 75, at 86 cmt. 3525-26.
See id. 3549-51.
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The Article 86 and 87 commentaries support this view. Paragraph 3541 of the
Commentaries explicitly states that Article 86 "should be read in conjunction with
82
the duties of commanders."
paragraph 1 and Article 87 . . . which lays down

This is supported by a later provision that explains that
[t]his rule [Article 86] concerns both the immediate commander and his
superiors. However, the specific duties of commanders are further dealt
with in the detailed provisions which will be examined under Article 87
'(Duties of commanders).' The present provision merely poses the
principle of the indictment of superiors who have tolerated breaches of
the law of armed conflict. 83
Therefore, if the two Articles were meant to be read together, a collective
interpretation must be deduced. Moreover, it is clear from the commentaries that
the envisioned scope of the duty was expansive and should include past breaches.
An insightful passage can be found in paragraph 3555 which says
[T]he text [of Article 87] does not limit the obligation of commanders to
apply only with respect to members of the armed forces under their
command; it is further extended to apply with respect to 'other persons
under their control.' It is particularly, though not exclusively, (9) in
occupied territory that this concept of indirect subordination may arise,
in contrast with the link of direct subordination which relates the
tactical commander to his troops. Territory is considered occupied when
it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army, and the
occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been
established and can be exercised. (10) Consequently the commander on
the spot must consider that the local population entrusted to him is
subject to his authority in the sense of Article 87, for example, in the
case where some of the inhabitants were to undertake some sort of
pogrom (11) against minority groups. He is responsible for restoring
and ensuring public order and safety as far as possible, (12) and shall
take all measures in his power to achieve this, (13) even with regard to
troops which are not directly subordinate to him, if these are operating
in his sector. (14) A fortiori he must consider them to be under his
authority if they commit, or threaten to commit, any breaches of the
rules of the Conventions against persons for whom he is responsible. As
regards the commander who, without being invested with responsibility
in the sector concerned, discovers that breaches have been committed or

are about to be committed, he is obliged to do everything in his power
to deal with this, particularly by informing the responsible commander.
84

The relevance of paragraph 3555 is that it takes a liberal view of a
In the example cited in the
commander's responsibility toward breaches.

82. Id. 13541.
83. Id. 3547.
84. Id. 3555 (emphasis added).
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paragraph, the commentator suggests that commanders have a responsibility to not
only their subordinates but a range of other persons who fall under the control. It
goes on to argue that a commander's reporting responsibility even extends to
situations where he learns of breaches outside his geographic area of
responsibility. The operative issue for the commentator is not whether or not the
commander had the ability to control subordinates and an ability to prevent the
breaches, but only whether he learned of their commission at some point.
Under this view, a good faith interpretation of the two Articles read together
would be that they intended to create a broad obligation for commanders to pursue
known breaches including those that would constitute successor liability.
The Hadihasanovi5majority relies on two supplemental resources to support
its parochial interpretation: the Report of the International Law Commission and
Article 6 of the Draft Code of Crimes against Peace and Security of Mankind.
Judge Liu in his dissent takes issue with this reliance, deftly pointing out the
imprecision of language that was pervasive.85
As Judge Liu surmises, the Hadihasanovi6 majority's "error in the
86 and 87 of Additional Protocol I... represents a cogent
interpretation of Articles
86
reverse.
to
reason"
b. Article 28 of the Rome Statute
The HadiihasanoviW majority also relied upon the command responsibility
provision contained in Article 28 of the Rome Statute8 7 which mirrors the language
of Article 86 and by its terms seemingly excludes successor liability. The majority
argued that this was evidence of an international custom that weighed against
88
successor liability.
The Rome Treaty's version of command responsibility provides that
(a) A military commander or person effectively acting as a military
commander shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court committed by forces under his or her
effective command and control, or effective authority and control as
the case may be, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control
properly over such forces, where:
(i) That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the
circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces
were committing or about to commit such crimes; and

13, 18-24 (July 3, 2008) (Liu, J.,
85. Prosecutor v. Ori6, Case No. IT-03-68A, Judgment,
dissenting) (partially dissenting opinion and declaration).
86. Id. 28.
87. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 28, July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 999
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
88. See Prosecutor v. Had~ihasanovi6, Alagi6 & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Decision on
Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility, 46 (July 16,

2003).
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(ii) That military commander or person failed to take all necessary
and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or
repress their commission or to submit the matter89 to the
competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.

On its face, Article 28 seems to preclude successor liability when it followed

the Article 86 language but this interpretation is problematic. Paragraphs (i) and
(ii) are not easily reconcilable. On the one hand, paragraph (i) limits a
commander's criminal responsibility to situations where forces were committing or
about to commit crimes. On the other hand, paragraph (ii) obligates a commander
to submit these situations to competent authorities for, investigation and
prosecution. Because neither war crimes nor crimes against humanity include
inchoate crimes, the underlying act needs to be completed in order for a war crime
or crime against humanity to exist. Logically, it is inconsistent for a commander to
submit a war crime or crime against humanity that was about to be committed for

investigation, when legally they would not exist in that inchoate state. It would not
make much sense in the Rome Statute, principally concerned with war crimes and
crimes against humanity, to have included Article 28 a provision with such
obvious importance that would not pertain to a significant number of its
provisions. 9°
Notwithstanding that, the reliance on Article 28 as evidence of custom is a
poor argument. The drafting of the Rome Statute can easily be seen as an exercise
in compromise rather than an attempt to articulate custom. More importantly, as
discussed supra, every other tribunal enacted - before and after the Rome Statute has a statute with command responsibility provisions that reflect Article 87. 9 1
Because these statutes use the Article 87 language, if one were to attempt to derive
a custom based on the statutes of all of the tribunals, even including the ICC, the
evidence would support a custom of command responsibility based on Article 87.
Judge Liu in his dissent also points out an obvious flaw in Article 28, that
under its clear terms, Article 28 wouldn't cover past crimes, even for a superior
who had effective control over subordinates at the time of commission. 92 Ample
jurisprudence from the tribunals establishes that a duty to punish arises after the
superior acquires knowledge of the commission, contrary to Article 28. 9'

89. Rome Statute, supra note 87, at art. 28(a) (emphasis added). Note that Article 28(b)
pertaining to civilian commanders has a different mens rea, but the operative language for the purposes
of this discussion is the same.
90. The only inchoate offense recognized by the Rome Statute as a general principle is the offense
of criminal attempt. With regard to Genocide only, the Rome Statute includes the inchoate offense of
direct and public indictment to commit genocide. Id. at art. 25(3)(e)-(f).
91. The ICTY codified commander responsibility in 1993 using the Article 87 terminology. The
ICTR followed suit with identical language to that of ICTY in 1994. The SCSL adopted its statute in
2000, also with Article 87 language. In 2004, the ECCC enacted its command responsibility statute that
also followed the Article 87 language. See infra note 14 and accompanying text.
92. See Prosecutor v. Ori6, Case No. IT-03-68A, Judgment,
25 (July 3, 2008) (Liu, J.,
dissenting) (partially dissenting opinion and declaration).
93. See Prosecutor v. Had~ihasanovi6, Alagi6 & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Decision on
Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility, 19-21 (July
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Even though the Hadihasanovie decision remains the law, it rests on
perilously tenuous grounds and there is reason to believe that a future Appeals
Chamber will give due consideration to overturning Hadihasanovi6. Despite the
fact that it is unlikely to be litigated at the ICC because of Article 28,94 command
responsibility is now being litigated in more numerous and diverse fora, including
domestic prosecutions invoking universal jurisdiction 95 and civil suits in the United
96
States applying the alien tort claims statute and the torture victims protection act
that present more opportunity for legal challenges.
That successor liability sits on the precipice begs the question as to whether
successor liability is a desirable development or not. The election of Barack
Obama presents just such an opportunity to examine successor liability as a
principle of customary international law in application. 97 And the Obama scenario
presents an interesting juxtaposition to Had~ihasanovi6: Kabura was a successor
commander who shared the intent of his predecessor and perpetuated his criminal
policies and practices. On the one hand, the application of successor liability in the
case of Kabura poses no significant moral issue since Kabura participated in the
criminal enterprise to some extent. On the other hand, President Obama is a
successor commander who vigorously opposed his predecessor's policies and to
potentially incur criminal liability for their commission presents a moral dilemma.
III.

SUCCESSOR LIABILITY & CLEAN-HANDS REGIMES: THE OBAMA
ADMINISTRATION

Before delving into an analysis of successor liability as applied to successor
regimes using President Obama as the example, it is helpful to discuss briefly some
of the alleged commission of crimes committed by subordinates that he has
inherited. 98 It is important to preface this discussion with the observation that
Obama's duty under command responsibility is triggered upon a showing that he
had some general information in his possession which would put him on notice of
possible unlawful acts by his subordinates. 99 It is not necessary that the

16, 2003) (Shahabuddeen, J., dissenting) (partial dissenting opinion).
94. Because the Rome Treaty has, at the moment, 131 signatories and so changing the language of
Article 28 would require the require a vote of two-thirds of the States Parties per Article 121of the
Rome Statute. The Rome Statute has a provision for "elements of crimes" supplemental definitions that
help interpret the Statute. Member States can propose elements that require a two-thirds majority of
the Assembly of States Parties to be adopted, but this applies only to the core crimes and not modes of
liability. Rome Statute, supra note 87, at art. 9.
95. Marlise Simons, Mother Superior'sRole in Rwanda Horror is Weighed, N.Y. TIMES, June 6,
2001, at A3; Spain to Investigate GuatemalanAbuses, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2000, at A4.
96. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2009); Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 106
Stat. 73 (1992).
97. It is important to note that we could have easily based this section of the article on President
Sir-Leaf Johnson, Prime Minister Gordon or another recently elected leader who opposed the impugned
policies of his predecessor and assumed command over common subordinates.
98. This is by no means an assertion of the legal or substantive merit of these claims and the
authors do not take a position one way or the other on their validity, but rather view them in light only
of their relevance as triggering mechanisms of a duty to punish.
99. Prosecutor v. Delali6, Muci6, Deli6 & Land.o, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment,
222-41
(Feb. 20, 2001).
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information available to Obama amounts to proof sufficient for a criminal
conviction. The triggering information need not be about specific acts, but can be
of a general criminal character. 100 And although the allegations below have been
subject of vigorous public debate including numerous comments by President
Obama himself during his presidential campaign that clearly show knowledge, 0 1 it
is theoretically not necessary to show that Obama acquainted himself with the
available information for the triggering to occur, but merely that it had been
provided to him, made available to him or was in his possession.
A. Allegations of Crimes Committed the Bush Administration
1. Torture
The most high-profile allegation leveled against the Bush administration since
the beginning of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has been the torture of al Qaeda
and Taliban detainees. In late 2002, the first reports began to surface of the alleged
1 2
torture of suspected al Qaeda detainees at the Bagram air base in Afghanistan.
Interviews with unnamed intelligence officials revealed the use of stress
techniques, water-boarding and extraordinary rendition of terrorist suspects to
foreign countries whose use of torture was well-known, e.g., Jordan, Saudi Arabia
and Egypt. In 2004, pictures surfaced showing U.S. Army officials engaged in
torture and abuse of detainees at the Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad. While several
military personnel were court-martialed for their involvement in the scandal, the
use of tortuous interrogation techniques did not end there. On October 24, 2008,
Vice President Cheney issued the administration's first public endorsement of
water-boarding; a position that ran contrary to that of the U.S. Pentagon which,
two years prior, had issued a Field 3 Manual on Intelligence Interrogation that
10
explicitly prohibited water-boarding.
Torture committed during an international armed conflict is a violation of the
law of war. Under the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War (Third Geneva Convention), torture of prisoners of war (POWs) during
questioning is specifically prohibited'0 4 and "[a]ny unlawful act or omission by the
Detaining Power causing death or seriously endangering the health of a prisoner of
war in its custody is prohibited, and will be regarded as a serious breach" of the
Convention. 10 5 Furthermore, Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions
prohibits "[v]iolence to life and person, in particular . . . cruel treatment and
torture" against a number of persons, including those taking no part in the

100. Id. 238.
101. See The Associated Press, Obama: U.S. Will Not Torture, MSNBC.com (Jan. 9, 2009),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28574408; Leonard Doyle, Obama Would 'Immediately Review'
Torture Crimes, THE INDEPENDENT, Apr. 16, 2008, available at http://blogs.independent.co.
uk/the campaign_trailers/2008/04/obama-would-imm.html.
102. Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations,WASH. POST,
Dec. 26, 2002, at Al.
103. U.S.: Vice President Endorses Torture, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Oct. 25, 2006, available at
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2006/10/ 2 5 /us-vice-president-endorses-torture.
104. Geneva Convention III, supra note 12, at arts. 17, 87.
105. Id. at art. 13.
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been taken out of the theatre of
hostilities and members of armed forces who 10have
6
war as a result of detention or any other cause.
The generally accepted definition of torture is that which is set forth in the
United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Torture Convention). According to this
definition, torture is any
act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from
him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an
act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any
reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering
is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
7
capacity.

10

Under international law, torture is proscribed as a crime against humanity and
a war crime. 1°8 Neither proscription follows the Torture Convention in 0requiring
9
that the torture be carried out by public official, or with his acquiescence.'
With respect to the prohibition against torture in the Third Geneva
Convention, the initial argument of the Bush administration was not that the
techniques used by U.S. interrogators were not torture but rather that the
individuals supposedly subjected to these techniques were not protected by the
Geneva Convention.110 A prisoner of war is defined as a member of armed forces
or member of other militia or volunteer corps that fulfill a number of conditions:
they are commanded by a person responsible for subordinates; they have a
distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; they carry arms openly; and they
conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs or war."'
Because Taliban and al Qaeda fighters, and terrorists in general, do not wage war
in accordance with the recognized laws and customs of war - e.g. they do not
identify themselves or carry arms openly - the Bush administration deemed them
.'enemy combatants" - an undefined and distinct third category of individuals who
112
were not entitled to the protections under the Geneva Conventions.
In the alternative, the Bush administration also argued that the techniques
used in the interrogation of detainees - water-boarding in particular - did not fall
within the definition of torture; despite an extensive historical treatment of water106.
107.
art. 1(1),
108.
109.
2002).
1 10.

Id. at art. 3(1)(a).
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Torture Convention].
See Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Judgment, 147 (Sept. 17, 2003).
Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, 148 (June 12,
E.g., Lionel Beehner, Backgrounder: Torture, the United States, and Laws of War, COUNCIL

ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Nov. 11, 2005.

111. Geneva Convention 1II, supra note 12, at art. 4(2).
112. Beehner, supra note 110.
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boarding directly contradicting this assertion.113 In a 2002 memo written by Jay
Bybee, then-Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel to Alberto
Gonzales, Counsel to the President, the administration redefined torture as
[p]hysical pain . equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying
serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily
function, or even death. For purely mental pain or suffering to amount
harm of
to torture . . . it must result in significant psychological
14
years.'
even
or
months
for
lasting
e.g.,
duration,
significant

Under this definition, the administration argued that the pain caused by waterboarding did not rise to a level of intensity that would constitute torture. In a
second memo - also authored by Bybee but that remains classified - a list of
techniques were analyzed and approved - including waterinterrogation
15
boarding. 1

Related to the issue of torture is the Bush administration's use of
"extraordinary rendition" - the practice whereby detainees and suspected terrorists
are transferred to other countries where they are usually detained indefinitely with
a high possibility that they will be tortured.' 16 This practice violates Article 3 of
the Torture Convention which prohibits the expulsion, return or extradition of an
individual "to another State where there are substantial
grounds for believing that
'
he would be in danger of being subjected to torture." 17
2. Unlawful Detainment

In addition to the crimes of torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment perpetrated against detainees, the very circumstances under which many
of these individuals have been detained - indefinitely and without due process arguably violates the Geneva Conventions. Under the Third Geneva Convention,
an individual falls into one of two legal classifications - combatants or civilians

113. The United States has historically treated water-boarding as torture. In 1901, Major Edwin
Glenn was convicted for subjecting a suspected Philippine insurgent to the technique and in 1968 a U.S.
army officer was court-martialed for his assistance in water-boarding a Vietnamese prisoner of war.
The International Military Tribunal for the Far East found several Japanese soldiers guilty of war crimes
for water-boarding U.S. prisoners. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 103.
114. Memorandum from the Office of the Assistant Attorney General to Alberto R. Gonzales,
Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/
documents/cheney/torture memo aug2002.pdf.
115. The approval of water-boarding in the memo was garnered from a publicly released CIA
document. The full list remains classified. U.S. SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMM., INQUIRY INTO THE

TREATMENT OF DETAINEES IN U.S. CUSTODY xvi (Nov. 20, 2008), available at http://graphics8.
nytimes.com/packages/images/nytint/docs/report-by-the-senate-armed-services-committee-on-detaineetreatment/original.pdf.
116. As a legal term, extraordinary rendition does not exist. The practice of rendition generally
describes the practice of forcibly abducting individuals from a state unwilling to prosecute them in
order to bring them to trial in a state willing to prosecute. The term "'extraordinary rendition" has since
evolved to reflect the extraordinary nature of the process "in the sense that it has bypassed all judicial
processes." J. Troy Lavers, ExtraordinaiyRendition and the Self-Defense Justification: Time to Face
the Music, 16 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 385, 386-87 (2007).
117. Torture Convention, supra note 107, at art. 3(1).
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(non-combatants) - and each group is afforded protections based upon their
classification. With respect to detainment, once captured, combatants become
prisoners of war. The Convention authorizes a Party to detain prisoners of war
until the cessation of active hostilities,11 8at which point prisoners of war must be
released and repatriated, without delay.
If the detainee does not qualify under the Third Geneva Convention as a
prisoner of war, the ICTY has held that the person qualifies as a civilian under the
Fourth Geneva Convention. Under international law, there is no intermediate
status.1 19 This is supported by The Commentary to the Fourth Geneva Convention
which asserts that:
[e]very person in enemy hands must have some status under
international law: he is either a prisoner of war and, as such, covered by
the Third Convention, a civilian covered by the Fourth Convention, or
again, a member of the medical personnel of the armed forces who is
covered by the First Convention. There is no intermediate status;
nobody in enemy hands can be outside the law. We feel that this is a
satisfactory solution - not only satisfying to the mind, but also, and
above all, satisfactory from the humanitarian point of view. 120
Where there is doubt as to whether an individual meets the legal classification
as a prisoner of war, the detainee's status must be determined by a competent
tribunal and until this determination they are afforded the protections of the
Convention.
B. Obama's Liability as Bush's Successor
On January 20, 2009, Barack Obama was sworn into office as the 4 5 th
president of the United States. Concurrently with the inauguration, the former
president of Liberia Charles Taylor was on trial for war crimes and crimes against
humanity, and the ICC had indicted the president of Sudan Omar al-Bashir. With
sovereign immunity in retreat, President Obama assumed his role as Commanderin-Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces with its many military subordinates, many of
whom also served under President Bush. Under successor liability, Obama would
be liable for those subordinates' crimes - discussed above - if three elements are
satisfied: a superior-subordinate relationship exists between Obama and the
subordinates, Obama has an awareness of the subordinates' alleged criminal acts,
and Obama subsequently fails to punish those subordinates.

118. Geneva Convention III, supra note 12, at art. 118.
119. Prosecutor v. Delali6, Muci6, Deli6 & Land~o, Case No. IT-96-21, Judgment, 271 (Nov. 16,
1998) (noting there "is no gap between the Third and the Fourth Geneva Conventions. If an individual
is not entitled to the protections of the Third Convention as a prisoner of war (or of the First or Second
Conventions) he or she necessarily falls within the ambit of Convention IV, provided that its article 4
requirements are satisfied.")
120. Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 4 cmt. 4,
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV].
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1. Existence of a Superior-Subordinate Relationship
The superior-subordinate relationship exists where a commander has effective
control over the subordinates, which in turn is said to exist when the superior has
the material ability to prevent subordinates from committing breaches or the
material ability to punish them. 21 The superior-subordinate relationship can occur
in either de jure or de facto circumstances and it is also well-established that a
civilian head of state who wields the requisite effective control over military
subordinates qualifies as a requisite superior - subordinate relationship. 22 For
both types of commanders, the ad hoc tribunals have recognized a number of
situations that would support a finding of effective control, including: de jure
authority to issue binding orders; dejure or defacto authority to order disciplinary
measures against subordinates and to detain alleged subordinates; de jure or de
facto authority to remove subordinate commanders from duty; and where the
accused commander held himself out as commander in title and behavior and the
subordinate respected and acted in accordance with such a superior-subordinate
relationship. 123 With respect to a civilian superior, a finding of effective control
would be supported where the civilian exercised control in a military fashion or
similar form. 124 Further, two or more superiors may be held responsible for the
same crime perpetrated by the same individual if it is established that the principal
5
offender was under the command of both superiors at the relevant time. 12
The constitution of the United States establishes the President's de jure
command over the armed forces, providing that the President "shall be
Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the
Militia of the several states.' 26 The National Security Act of 1947 extended this
authority over the Air Force. 127 The President's authority over all U.S. armed
forces was consolidated even further with the Goldwater-Nichols Department of
Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.128 This act streamlined the military chain-ofcommand so that commanders of the armed forces responded directly to the
President and the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 29 In
addition, Title 10 of the United States Code provides the legal basis for the
President's role as dejure commander in chief' 30

121. Prosecutor v. Delalid, Muci6, Deli6 & Land2o, Case No. IT-96-21, Judgment, 378 (Nov. 16,
1998).
122. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-A, Judgment, 87 (May 23, 2005).
123. Boas et al., supra note 50, at 199.
124. Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-A, Judgment, 87 (May 23, 2005).
125. Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25, Judgment, 93 (Mar. 15, 2002).
126. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
127. National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C.S. § 401 (2008).
128. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, 10 U.S.C.S. § 11
(2008).
129. National Defense University Library, Goldwater Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986, http://www.ndu.edu/library/goldnich/goldnich.html (last visited Apr. 15,
2009).
130. See 1OU.S.C.S. §111.
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However, the de jure position is only the starting point of the analysis; actual
authority is not decided by the existence of a formal position.13 1 Whether or 132
not
Obama is a superior must be determined based upon the reality of his authority.
This authority of U.S. Presidents over the military is not ceremonial. U.S.
Presidents have traditionally exercised a direct, involved and public role as the
Commander-in-Chief, deciding when and where to engage in armed conflict,
setting budgets and policy, and generally signing off on all key issues regarding the
war. As a matter of course, U.S. Presidents get daily intelligence briefings on
military matters.133 In the case of the Iraq war, President Bush met personally with
General Tommy Ray Franks to plan the invasion of Iraq shortly after the
September 11 attacks on the World Trade Towers 134 - General Franks was
Commander of the United States Central Command, overseeing U.S. Armed
Forces operations in a twenty five-country region including the Middle East - and
Bush was integrally involved in the decision to invade Iraq.' 35 Bush also
personally made key tactical decisions that resulted in the implementation of the
136
policies of torture and indefinite detention.
On January 20, 2009, all of the armed forces previously subordinated to Bush
became subordinated to Obama. In his first two months, Obama was no less
involved in exercising effective control over the armed forces than Bush had been.
In fact, he was aggressive in implementing key military decisions, including a
decision setting a date to withdraw combat forces from Iraq, 37 a decision to close
the detention facility at Guantanamo
Bay 138 and the decision to cease the use of the
139
term of "enemy combatants."'
The clear leadership in the form of policy decisions and orders issued by both
Presidents Bush and Obama to the armed forces, as well as the subordinate's
compliance with those orders, is a strong indication of a superior - subordinate
relationship. 140 The key factor is the commander's material ability to prevent or
punish acts. 141 Being able to implement quick decisions to conclude detention at

131. Prosecutor v. Kordi6 & Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, 418 (Feb. 26, 2001).
132. See id.
133. See Walter Pincus, Under Bush, the Briefing Gets Briefer, WASH. POST, May 24, 2002, at
A33.
134. William Hamilton, Bush Began to Plan War Three Months after 9/11, WASH. POST, Apr. 17,
2004, at AOl.
135. Sarah Baxter, Powell Tried to Talk Bush out of War, SUNDAY TIMES, July 8, 2007, available
at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us and americas/article2042072.ece.
136. Interview by Brit Hume with President George W. Bush, President, United States (Jan. 11,
2009), availableat http://thinkprogress.org/2009/01/1 I/bush-authorized-torture.
137. Peter Baker & Elisabeth Bumiller, Obama Favoring Mid-2010 Pullout in Iraq, Aides Say,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2009, at Al.
138. Peter Finn, Guantanamo Closure Called Obama Priority, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 2008, at
A01.
139. Obama to End Use of Term 'Enemy Combatant',ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 12, 2009.
140. See Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Judgment, 397 (Feb.
22, 2001).
141. Prosecutor v. Blagki6, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, 302 (Mar. 3, 2000).
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Guantanamo is but one example of President Obama's material ability to prevent
commissions and consequently evidence of his effective control.
President Obama cannot claim attenuation from the subordinates as a defense.
Under international law, the superior-subordinate relationship is based upon the
notion of control within a hierarchy, not necessary control based on the personal
relationship. 142 The hierarchy can be quite broad. The ICTY indicted President
Slobodan Milogevi6 of Serbia under a command responsibility for crimes
committed by Bosnian-Serb forces - a different country's armed forces committed in the neighboring country of Bosnian.1 43 The ICC similarly indicted
Omar al-Bashir for crimes committed byjanjaweed militia forces. The operative
fact is the commander's effective control over his subordinates reflected in his
ability to exert control. In a professional military such as the U.S. armed forces,
with clear hierarchies, with Obama sitting at the apex as Commander-in-Chief, his
effective control over all of the impugned subordinates is clear.
Effective control is the key determination in command responsibility, but
when that effective control exists is crucial to successor liability. Under the
current law, it is necessary that the effective control existed at the time of the
commission of the offenses. Under successor liability, effective control must exist
when the knowledge of the offenses is obtained.
2. Knowledge
While some tribunals have considered the argument that command
responsibility should be a strict liability offense, 144 such a reading has been
rejected and, in order for a superior to incur liability for the crimes committed by a
45
subordinate, he must have known about the crimes. 1
Two types of knowledge are recognized in this context: actual and
constructive. Actual knowledge is, as its name suggests, actual knowledge established through either direct or circumstantial evidence -the superior has of the
crimes committed by the subordinate or actual knowledge of the crimes that the
subordinate plans to commit. Actual knowledge may also be inferred through
circumstantial evidence, for example, by a commander's superior position and the
existence of an organized military structure with established and functioning
reporting systems. 46 The Blaskic Appeals Chamber considered the superior's
147
physical proximity to the subordinate when the latter committed the crimes.
Constructive knowledge, on the other hand, applies to situations where a
superior does not have actual knowledge but knowledge should nevertheless be

142. Prosecutor v. Delali, Muci6, Deli & Land~o Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment, 248-54 (Feb.
20, 2001).
143. Prosecutor v. Miloievi6, Case No. IT-01-51-1, Initial Indictment "Bosnia and Herzegovina,"
Indictment, 127-31 (Nov. 22, 2001).
144. See, e.g., Prosecutor v.Delalid, Muci6, Deli & Land~o, Case No. IT-96-21, Judgment, 1 353
(Nov. 16, 1998).
145. Prosecutor v. Blagojevik & Joki6, Case No. IT-02-60, Judgment, 686 (Jan. 17, 2005).
146. Prosecutor v. Had~ihasanovi6 & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47, Judgment, 1 94 (Mar. 15, 2006).
147. See id.
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imputed to the superior because the circumstances of the situation are such that the
superior should have known. Knowledge may be imputed where the superior turns
a blind eye to the crimes that were about to be, or had been, committed or where
the superior's negligence in performing his duties precluded him from learning of
the crimes.148
Knowledge may also be imputed where information was available that the
crimes were either about to be committed or had been committed, and that the
information was sufficiently available and credible so that the superior was put on
notice of the need for further investigation. 149 A number of cases have cited the
following factors as examples of the type of information that is sufficient to trigger
a duty to investigate: reports addressed to the commander that draw his attention to
1) the behavior of the subordinates alleged to have committed the crimes; 2) the
tactical situation; 3) the level and training and instruction of
the subordinates; and
15 0
.
subordinates
the
of
traits
behavioral
and
4) known character
In the case of Obama, his knowledge of offenses potentially committed by the
Bush administration is irrefutable. The Bush policies, discussed supra, were
public, front-page news and widely-debated. Knowledge would certainly be
imputed to a presidential candidate presumed to have been briefed on relevant
campaign issues. Regardless, in this instance Obama made the aforementioned
crimes key issues in his campaign platform, clearly establishing his actual
knowledge. In numerous Senate and presidential campaign statements, Obama
publically challenged, in detail, the Bush administration on its military policies
including torture and indefinite detention. 51 In one example, Obama reacted to
newspaper stories about the Bush administration's authorization of brutal
interrogation techniques by issuing the following statement:
The secret authorization of brutal interrogations is an outrageous
betrayal of our core values, and a grave danger to our security. We must
do whatever it takes to track down and capture or kill terrorists, but
torture is not a part of the answer it is a fundamental part of the
problem with this administration's approach. Torture is how you create
enemies, not how you defeat them. Torture is how you get bad
information, not good intelligence. Torture is how you set back
America's standing in the world, not how you strengthen it. It's time to
tell the world that America rejects torture without exception or
equivocation. It's time to stop telling the American people one thing in
public while doing something else in the shadows. No more secret
authorization of methods like simulated drowning. When I am president
America will once again be the country that stands up to these

148. Prosecutor v. Blagki6, Case No. IT-95-14, Judgment, 332 (Mar. 3, 2000).
149. Prosecutor v. Delali6, Muci6, Deli6 & Land~o, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment, 383 (Nov.
16, 1998).
150. Prosecutor v. Had2ihasanovi6 & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-T, Judgment,
99 (Mar. 15,
2006).
151. Senator Barack Obama, Statement on the Military Commissions Legislation (Sept. 28, 2006),
availableat http://obamaspeeches.com092-Military-Commission-Legislation-Obama-Speech.htm.
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deplorable tactics. When I am president we won't work in secret to
avoid honoring our laws and Constitution, we will be straight with the
1 52

American people and true to our values.

In another official statement, Obama decried the "low road" taken by the
Bush administration, mentioning the Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo detention
facilities as deviations from international norms:
This brings me to the fourth step in my strategy: I will make clear
that the days of compromising our values are over.

When I am President, America will reject torture without

exception. America is the country that stood against that kind of
behavior, and we will do so again.
I also will reject a legal framework that does not work.

.

. As

President, I will close Guantanamo, reject the Military Commissions
Act, and adhere to the Geneva Conventions. Our Constitution and our
Uniform Code of Military Justice provide a framework for dealing with
53
the terrorists.'
Again, the key consideration here is not whether President Obama has
knowledge that crimes were potentially committed in the Bush regime, but that he
has information that his current subordinates have committed crimes. It is the
latter information that invokes his responsibility to punish as their superior. And
while many of the high-level operatives in the Bush administration responsible for
drafting and implementing the policies of torture and detention did not carry over
into Obama's administration, many lower-level subordinates did.' 5 4 And given the
extent of the crimes across several agencies, involving hundreds if not thousands
of personnel, committed in several regions of the world, Obama would have reason
to know that some of these subordinates remain in the military.

3. Failure to Punish
The third and final element of the successor liability analysis is the failure to
punish subordinates, a two-prong analysis centering on whether a commander took
those measures "necessary and reasonable" to punish crimes. Successor liability,
therefore, would dictate that President Obama take all necessary and reasonable
measures to punish his current subordinates who he knows, or has information that
suggests, may have committed crimes.

152. Obama News

and

Speeches,

Torture and Secrecy Betray Core American Values,

http://www.barackobama.com/2007/10/04/obama torture andsecrecy betr.php.
153. Senator Barack Obama, Speech at the Woodrow Wilson International Center (Aug. 1, 2007)
(transcript available through the Council on Foreign Relations).
154. The most interesting subordinate may be Secretary of Defense Robert Gates who continued in
that position after having succeeded Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in the same position in the Bush
Administration. See Peter Banker & Thom Shanker, Obama Planning to Retain Gates as Defense
Chief N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2008, at A23.
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A commander's duty to prevent is triggered when he either learns of the
subordinate's plans to commit the crimes or when he has reason to know, based on
information available to him. Similarly, the duty to punish arises when the
commander learns - after the fact - that the crimes had been committed by the
subordinate or when he has reason to know of their commission.
With respect to whether the punishment is sufficient to satisfy the duty, a
commander must take "necessary and reasonable" measures to prevent or
punish. 155 "Necessary" has been defined as those measures required to discharge
the obligation to punish in the circumstances prevailing at the time 156 and those
measures which the commander was in a position to take in the circumstances. 157
What constitutes a reasonable measure depends on the relationship between the
superior and the subordinate. 158 Thus, in the theatre of war, a battlefield
commander who is a direct superior to a soldier (such as Had~ihasanovid) would
have different obligations than one farther up the command chain, residing far
from any theatre of conflict, and having a very indirect relationship with most
subordinates. One consideration regarding reasonable measures is effective
control:
[I]t is a commander's degree of effective control, his material ability,
which will guide the Trial Chamber in determining whether he
reasonably took the measures required either to prevent the crime or to
punish the perpetrator
. .
[T]his implies that, under some
circumstances, a commander may discharge his obligation to prevent or
59
punish by reporting the matter to the competent authorities.'

Thus, unlike a heat of battle situation where a commander may be the person
obligated to dispense immediate punishment, in other circumstances the obligation
could be discharged simply by referring the matter to competent authorities for
investigation.
A commander is not obligated to perform the impossible, but they
must use every means in their power.' 61 What is clear is that whatever steps62 are
1
taken, a commander needs to be an important step in the disciplinary process.
What constitutes a reasonable measure depends on the relationship between
the superior and subordinate. While a battlefield commander may have limited
disciplinary options, President Obama has few restrictions in this regard. He sets
the policy, budgets and strategy for the armed forces. 163 He has ample resources at

155. Prosecutor v. Delalid, Muci6, Delid & Land~o, Case No. IT-96-21, Judgment,
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160.
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Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T, Judgment, 47 (June 7, 2001).
Id.
See Prosecutor v. Kordi6 & Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment,
441-45 (Feb. 26,
Prosecutor v. Blagki6, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, 335 (Mar. 3, 2000).
See Prosecutor v. Kvocka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgment, 316 (Nov. 2, 2001).
Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T, Judgment, 95 (Mar. 15, 2002).
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his disposal.164 He meets regularly with his Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of
Staff and other high-ranking military leaders who could and would give effect to
his orders regarding discipline. And he has a high degree of effective control over
the military and all those who are subordinated to him. Among these options,
President Obama has the power to create independent commissions or he can refer
the matter to his Secretary of Defense for investigation by the Judge Advocates
General Corp or to his Attorney General for investigation by the Department of
Justice. Therefore, while Obama is only obligated to do what is feasible, there are
virtually no measures outside his logistical realm of feasibility.
On the other hand, President Obama's obligations could arguably be limited
by the "necessary" prong, a subjective assessment. Many view an investigation as
necessary. The call for a truth commission - i.e. an investigation - into the use of
torture and other abuses of power by the Bush administration is the subject of a
growing national debate.1 65 Others argue that the United States military is
competent to conduct its own internal investigations.1 66 However, President
Obama is obligated to make his determination not on political considerations
alone, but also on his treaty obligation under the Geneva Conventions and the
Additional Protocols of 1977.167
To discharge these obligations, President Obama is required to act and this
action needs to be an "important step." 168 Obama could arguably discharge his
duty within the minimal act of referring the matter in good faith to the relevant
authorities directing that any criminal acts be investigated. 169 But in the initial
days of his administration, the clamor for Obama to take action was loud and
strong. 170 On one occasion soon after taking office, the issue of investigating
crimes was put directly to President Obama: "Will you appoint a Special
Prosecutor (ideally Patrick Fitzgerald) to independently investigate the gravest
crimes of the Bush Administration, including torture .
?,,171 Obama responded
that, "My view is also that nobody is above the law, and if there are clear instances
of wrongdoing, that people should be prosecuted just like any ordinary citizen; but

164. See Thom Shanker, ProposedMilitary Spending is Highest Since WWII, N.Y. TIMES, February
4, 2008.
165. See Nicholas D. Kristof, The Truth Commission, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2008, at 12.
166. See inter alia, Seymour M. Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib,NEW YORKER, May 10, 2004.
167. Under Article VI of the U.S. Constitution "all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land." Because of the U.S. has
signed and ratified the Geneva Conventions, the U.S. is bound by their provisions. U.S. CONST. art. VI,
§2.
168. See Prosecutor v. Kvo~ka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgment, 316 (Nov. 2, 2001).
169. However, given the fact that Bush administration military policies emanated from Bush
himself in consultation with his key advisers, it may be that a referral to the military to investigate may
present a conflict of interest particularly since Minister Gates could himself be scrutinized as a
commander with command responsibility liability. In that view, the situation may require a referral to
an impartial investigation body outside of the entity to be scrutinized.
170. See Glenn Greenwald, The Effects of Obama's Refusal to Investigate Bush Crimes, Salon.com
(Jan. 20, 2007), http://www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/2009/01/20/turley/index.html.
171. Scott Horton, Investigating Bush's Crimes, THE NATION, Mar. 9, 2009, available at
http://www.thenation.com/doe/20090309/horton.
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that generally speaking, I'm more interested in looking forward than I am in
1 72
looking backwards."
Appointing a Special Prosecutor would almost certainly qualify as a
reasonable and necessary measure thus discharging his successor liability duty to
punish. But the "looking forward" phrase has been a familiar Obama refrain, and
some commentators have taken this to mean that accountability is not part of
Obama's agenda, or it is at least not a priority given the economic crisis with
which he is confronted. 173 Time will tell whether the "looking forward" policy is
an indication of Obama's unwillingness to address the crimes, or it is simply a
public relations tactic that doesn't reflect actual, behind-the-scenes policy.
Ultimately, his actions - not just his words - would be measured against the
reasonable and necessary standard. And the vagueness of this guideline makes it
difficult to assess when he would be reasonably expected to act given his other
pressing demands. What is clear is that to discharge the duty, successor liability
would dictate that Obama, at some point, take an important step in the disciplinary
process; at a minimum delegating the matter to competent authorities. This would
be true even if that step occurred several years hence.
Obama would involve the novel circumstance of examining the duty to punish
contemporaneously with that duty. The Had4ihasanovi6 case litigated the issue
nearly ten years after the fact. Perhaps the failure to punish can ultimately only be
fully assessed in a retroactive examination. But the polemic raises an important
policy debate about the whether human rights and humanitarian law schemes
benefit from the pressure successor liability would apply to Obama and other
successor regimes to look backward.
IV.

POLICY ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF SUCCESSOR LIABILITY

A. Successor liability serves the goal of ending impunity
After the atrocities committed during World War II, the international
community set out to develop international legal obligations, designed to ensure
the world would never see such horrors repeated. The victors of World War II
brought German and Japanese war criminals to justice, building important
jurisprudence in international criminal law, the Fourth Geneva Convention was
drafted to protect civilians in times of armed conflict, the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was developed and the
Torture Convention was enacted. 174 Each development represented an important
step forward in the international community's resolve to prevent and punish
international crimes. Despite these advances, however, there was a disconnect in
the development of international legal obligations and the willingness of the
international community to enforce them. In the decades that followed the
judgments of the Tokyo and Nuremberg Tribunals, very few of the legal

172. Id.
173. See id.
174. See Mark S. Ellis, Combating Impunity and Enforcing Accountability as a Way to Promote
Peace and Stability: The Role of InternationalWar Crimes Tribunals, 2 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y
111, 114-15 (2006).

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 37:4

obligations that the international community zealously crafted were enforced. The
absence of enforcement was not due to an absence of crimes warranting
punishment, but rather the international community had fallen into a culture of
impunity, in which war crimes, genocide,
torture, and grave breaches of the
175
Geneva Convention went unpunished.
The longest civil war in the region's history began in 1960 in Guatemala after
a military revolt that lead to a long-standing conflict between the government and
the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity; an organization composed of a
number of leftist guerrilla groups. 176 It is estimated that approximately 200,000
people were killed or disappeared between 1960 and the conflict's end in 1996.177
A Commission was established to document the human rights violations and war
crimes committed during the conflict; however, of the more than 600 massacres
identified by the Commission, the perpetrators of all but one have yet to be held
178
accountable.
Shortly after the Guatemalan civil war broke out in the mid- 1960s, Colombia
became embroiled in a long-standing armed conflict between the government
United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) and the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrilla group, later becoming the National
Liberation Army (ELN). The conflict lasted for almost half a century (there is
debate whether it is even over), during which time both the government and
guerrilla organizations committed massive atrocities against civilian
populations. 179 These atrocities went largely unpunished and the 2005 Justice and
Peace Law essentially guaranteed crimes committed by government forces will
continue to go unpunished. 80
On the other side of the world from the conflicts raging in the Americas, the
Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia killed one-third of the Cambodian population approximately two million people - between 1975 and 1979.181 Rather than
prosecute those in the regime responsible for genocide, war crimes and crimes
against humanity, many were granted amnesty by the Cambodian government and
182
attempts to bring these individuals to justice were repeated thwarted.
Numerous other examples exist of this culture of impunity that stunted the
enforcement of international humanitarian and criminal law; however, in the last
few decades there has been a noticeable shift away from this attitude. Such a shift
is evident in the increasing number of international tribunals charged with holding
accountable those charged with serious crimes in addition to the increasingly

175. See generally id. (detailing the experiences in East Timor, Cambodia, Colombia, Guatemala,
Liberia, and Afghanistan).
176. Id. at 133-34.
177. Id.

178. Id. at 134-36.
179. See id. at 129, 130-32.

180. See id. at 129-31.
181. Id. at 125.
182. Id. at 126-28.
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willingness of governments, such as the Cambodian government, to bring
perpetrators of crimes to justice; after decades of delay.
Therefore, after decades of impunity, governments individually - and the
international community as a whole - have begun to finally implement the goals of
the Geneva Conventions and the other international agreements designed to ensure
enforcement; if not prevention as well. To this end, command responsibility is an
important tool in ending the attitude of impunity; the importance of which is
evidence in the codification of the theory and development of command liability
jurisprudence in the tribunals. Given the overarching purpose of the Geneva
Conventions, requiring Parties to "undertake to respect and to ensure respect for
the present Convention in all circumstances," 183 successor liability is arguably an
equally important component in ending impunity. As one commentator offered:
Clearly there is
an ethical imperative [to intervene to prevent war
crimes], and it is recognized by many commentators, both military and
legal. That principle supports enforcement of successor commanders'
duty to punish; the international humanitarian law community should
therefore take steps to close the current loophole through which
individuals who should be held responsible can now escape that
184
enforcement.
The absence of successor liability creates a gap that allows "wrongdoers to
escape reproach by the immediate superiors whenever the person in charge at the
time of the misconduct has been replaced by someone else.' 8 5 Commentators (and
Judge Shahabuddeen in the Hadihasanovie dissent) argue that by rejecting
responsibility - an
successor liability, a successor commander is able to evade
1 86
outcome tantamount to condoning or concealing the crimes.
Some commentators fear that the Hadgihasanovi successor "gap" could
prove to be massive. The HadlihasanoviW majority inferred that the Article 87 past
tense language "have committed" was not customary law.18 7 By logical extension,
that would mean that command responsibility did not impose a duty to punish
crimes that "had been committed" even by the commander who had command at
the time of commission. s8 In other words, should that interpretation prevail a
no duty to punish acts of subordinates that were
commander may be under
189
previously committed.

183. Geneva Convention III, supra note 12, at art. 1.
184. Carol T. Fox, Closing a Loophole in Accountability for War Crimes: Successor Commanders'
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185. Boas et al., supra note 50, at 235.
186. See Fox, supra note 184, at 457-59.
187. See Prosecutor v. Had~ihasanovik, Alagi6 & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Decision on
Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility, 44-47 (July
16, 2003).
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B. Successor liability reflects the natureof combat
There are a number of circumstances unique to situations of war and military
structure that make a shift from command responsibility to successor liability a
rational step. First, given the inherently chaotic nature of warfare, there is no
guarantee that one's commander at the beginning of a conflict will be his
commander in the middle or at the end of the conflict. Commanders can be killed
or reassigned - after which the dynamics of the superior-subordinate relationship
and the previous commander's ability to prevent or punish have been altered.
Furthermore, unique to the U.S. military structure is a civilian commander whose
authority is inherently limited and expires within four to eight years after assuming
the position. It is characteristic with the U.S. system that when the Presidency
changes, so too do the political appointments in the administration, including
military commanders. Because command changes repeatedly in times of war,
there would be a serious gap in the system of protection if command responsibility
only applied to the person in command at the time at which the offence was
committed. 90 Judge Schomberg in his dissent echoes this, stating that "given the
rapid succession of military commanders in armed conflicts, the result of such an
interpretation would be to grant impunity to those who committed war crimes
under a predecessor."' 91 Commentators further point out that it is often difficult to
discipline contemporaneously in the theatre of war, so more often than not a
1 92
successor commander will be in place when an investigation is possible.
C. Successor liabilitywould have a positive effect on sovereignty
A benefit of successor liability is to encourage a policy and practice that
promotes domestic accountability and militates against the imposition of
international jurisdiction. As set forth above, historically there has been little
incentive for successor regimes to look backward. They risk incurring the wrath
within tenuous political coalitions and weakening their own constituencies. The
political capital expended by initiating legitimate punitive processes may be
considered to be too costly for little domestic return. And many of the political
operatives in a former regime remain in politics and continue to wield substantial
influence.
With the advent of the ICC, however, that paradigm may change. The ICC
has jurisdiction over war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity 193 for acts
occurring on or after July, 2002, committed by nationals from state parties or
occurring in their territory. 94 It was conceived to assert itself where states are

190. See Prosecutor v. Had2ihasanovi6, Alagi & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Decision on
Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility,
14 (July 16,
2003) (Shahabuddeen, J., dissenting) (partial dissenting opinion).
191. Prosecutor v. Ori6, Case No. IT-03-68A, Judgment, 17 (July 3, 2008 (Schomburg, J.,
dissenting) (separate and partially dissenting opinion).
192. Fox, supranote 184, at 457.
193. Rome Statute, supra note 87, at art. 5.
194. Id. at art. 12.
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unwilling or unable to proceed with their own domestic proceedings. However,
per the Rome Statute the ICC must yield its jurisdiction to states who conduct their
own investigations and/or prosecutions. This principle, known as complimentarity,
is set forth in Article 17 which provides that a case is inadmissible before the ICC
where
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has
jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to
carry out the investigation or prosecution;
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction
over it and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned,
unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the
State genuinely to prosecute;
(c) The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is
the subject of the complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted
under article 20, paragraph 3 195
Sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) both recognize the primacy of local, legitimate
state investigations. Sub-paragraph (c) codifies the doctrine of double-jeopardy.
Complimentarity aims to spur domestic justice 96 and recognizes the integrity of
sovereignty. However, in a more practical sense, complimentarity was a political
compromise during the Rome Treaty convention sought and obtained by state
parties who were concerned about undue encroachment of the sovereignty from an
overly-aggressive ICC. 197 This concern is a persistent criticism by opponents of
the ICC.1 98
The concern about sovereignty, raised in particular by opponents of the ICC,
whether warranted or not, is bound to be amplified by the recent trend of the use of
universal jurisdiction. Increasingly, domestic courts pursue criminal charges
199
against perpetrators of crimes occurring in foreign territories under the principal.
Belgium, France, and Spain have all actively pursued criminal prosecutions based
on universal jurisdiction. 20 0 In these venues as well a customary law version of
complimentarity is emerging. In 2003, a case against President Alberto Fujimori
and other high-ranking Peruvian officials was initiated in the Spanish Supreme
195. Id. at art. 17(1).
196. Dickinson, Laura, Complementarity in Practice: InteractionsAmong Domestic, International,
and TransnationalHuman Rights Prosecutions,Paper presented at the annual meeting of the The Law
and Society Association, Renaissance Hotel, Chicago, Illinois, May 27, 2004, http://www.allacademic.
com/metalpl 17112_index.html
197. See Federica Gioia, State Sovereignty, Jurisdiction, and 'Modern' International Law: The
Principlesof Complementarity in the InternationalCriminal Court, 19 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 1095, 1101
(2006).
198. See Henry Kissinger, The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction: Risking Judicial Tyranny,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July/August 2001.
199. Kenneth Roth, The Casefor Universal Jurisdiction,FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept./Oct. 2001.
200. See, e.g., Naomi Roht-Arriaza, UniversalJurisdiction:Steps Forward,Steps Back, 17 LEIDEN
J. INT'L L. 375, 375-76 (2004). In December 1999, Rigoberta Menchu Turn and others initiated a
criminal case in Spain as parties civiles against Guatemalan government officials including Effrain Rios
Montt. Id. at 378.
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Court under universal jurisdiction. 20 1 The Supreme Court, however, invoked a
version of complimentarity, termed the "effective jurisdiction test" in rejecting the
case on jurisdictional grounds.20 2 Under this test, Spain would defer to the
domestic court if the matter is the subject of kind domestic prosecution. 20' The
issue is currently relevant; a Spanish Court initiated proceedings against six former
high-level Bush administration officials for implementing the policy of torture.20 4
Under the Fujimori effective jurisdiction test, if the U.S. initiated an investigation
against these officials, Spain would defer to those proceedings.
To be sure, universal jurisdiction - not to mention the customary law version
of complimentarity - is in its infancy and remains a fluid concept. But it remains
nonetheless an issue that administrations like the Obama administration must
grapple with. Successor liability, by applying pressure on successor regimes to
look backward and initiate legitimate investigations, serves a useful role in
controlling jurisdiction domestically through complimentarity.
D. Successor liabilitywould promotefact-finding
The current scheme of international law is designed to have the international
tribunals and the ICC prosecute perpetrators only at the highest levels of
culpability. At the first two modem tribunals, the ICTY and ICTR, this was given
an expansive interpretation. The ICTY indicted nearly 165 suspects in its fifteen
years, 205 and the ICTR nearly eighty. 206 This tribunal model, indicting a range of
suspects including high-, mid- and even low-level accused, proved to be costly and
slow, and it opened the tribunals up to criticism. 207 As a result, the subsequent
trend has been to limit the scope of indictees at the international tribunals to a
handful of high-level targets. Accordingly, the SCSL indicted only thirteen
suspects and the ECCC only five.20 8 The ICC to date has been even more
201.

BETH VAN SCHAACK & RONALD C. SLYE, INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS

ENFORCEMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 131 (2007).

202. Id.
203. Id.
204. The complaint names former Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez, Justice Department lawyer
John C. Yoo, William J. Haynes II, former general counsel for the Department of Defense, Jay S. Bybee
- Mr. Yoo's former boss at the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel - and David S.
Addington, who was the chief of staff and legal adviser to Vice President Dick Cheney. Marlise
Simons, Spanish Court Weighs Criminal Inquiry on Torturefor 6 Bush-Era Officials, N.Y. TIMES,
March 28, 2009, at A6.
205. See U.N. ICTY Key Figures of ICTY Cases, http://www.icty.org/sections/TheCases/
KeyFigures (last visited Apr. 23, 2009).
206. See U.N. ICTR Detainees - Status on 22 April 2009, http://69.94.11.53/default.htm (last
visited Apr. 23, 2009).
207. See Virginia Law, Wald Sees International Tribunals Evolving Toward "Hybrid" Courts
(Apr. 15, 2005), http://www.law.virginia.edu/html/news/2005_spr/wald.htm (reporting Wald as having
stated that "[t]he hybrid court is the likely wave of the future ... "We'll not ever see another court
modeled after the ICTY and ITCR. They've proven just too expensive, slow and bureaucratic." The two
courts together cost $250 million annually and have more than 2,000 employees.") (last visited Apr. 23,
2009).
208. Although there was an internal dispute within the Office of the Co-Prosecutors about whether
to indict six additional suspects. See Seth Mydans, Efforts to Limit Khmer Rouge Trials Decried, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan 31, 2009, at A8.
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selective, indicting only three suspects in their Sudan (Darfur) case, four suspects
in the Congo case, five in the Uganda case, and one suspect in their Central
African Republic case.2 °9
Under this trend, the tribunals leave prosecutions of all of the other suspects
in these cases, often numbering in the hundreds, to domestic systems (or other
domestic jurisdictions exercising universal jurisdiction). Those systems are better
equipped to investigate low-level indictees, but there are practical impediments to
mid-level targets.
By way of example, during the Viet Nam conflict the U.S. Army 1st Battalion
committed the now infamous My Lai massacre on March 16, 1968.210 The army
disciplined two persons but both were of a low military rank (captain) despite
evidence that orders came from higher up.2 11 There was also evidence that
suggested a subsequent cover-up of the incident had occurred at much higher
levels. 212 In the Iraq war prison-abuse scandal at Abu Ghraib, the U.S. Army
court-martialed only one person, Lieutenant Colonel Steven Jordon, for a failure to
supervise subordinates and for his role in a subsequent cover-up.213 His lone
conviction - based only on the cover-up - was overturned by the commander of
the Military District of Washington.214
These cases illustrate that in practice, politics and power in the military and
political hierarchies often are inclined to punish comparatively low-level
perpetrators. Thus, there tends to be a gap between international tribunals and
domestic prosecutions. Kabura, for example, was first a Deputy Commander and
the Brigade Chief of Staff.215 His stature might well fall outside the scope of a new
tribunal as being not serious enough, and the connections of his rank may also
protect him from domestic accountability.
Successor liability applies pressure for every commander in the chain of
command to take legitimate measures to insure that every participant in criminal
acts is brought to justice. Moreover, to the extent that prosecutions have an
important fact-finding function, and successor liability facilitates prosecutions of
middle commanders, successor liability promotes a more comprehensive and
complete factual inquiry. The middle commanders often possess key information
about who plans and issues orders at the highest levels. Successor liability would

209. International Criminal Court, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC?lan=en-GB.
210. Public Broadcasting Service, Vietnam Online: The My Lai Massacre, http://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/amex/vietnam/trenches/mylai.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2009).
211. See My Lai: A Question of Orders, TIME MAGAZINE, Jan 25, 1971, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,904643-1,00.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2009).
212. University of Missouri at Kansas City, General William R. Peers Report on the My Lai
Incident: A Summary, http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mylai/summaryrpt.html (last
visited Apr. 23, 2009).
213. Ben Nuckols, Military Prosecution in Abu Ghraib Scandal Ends, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan 11,
2008.
214. Id.
215. See Prosecutor v. Had~ihasanovi6, Alagi6 & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-PT, Amended
Indictment, 2-6 (Jan. 11, 2002).
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help to flush out information holders in order to piece together often complicated
theories of liability both during the criminal acts and in subsequent cover-ups.
V.

POLICY ARGUMENTS AGAINST SUCCESSOR LIABILITY

A. The attribution of the subordinates' crimes to the successor, rather than a
dereliction ofduty offense, is a disproportionateresult in the case of successors
who did share in the predecessorpolicies
If a court or tribunal prosecuted Obama criminally under successor liability,
the indictment would indicate he was charged with the underlying subordinates'
crimes, under the theory of criminal responsibility. For example, a hypothetical
indictment would charge Obama with responsibility for torture as a crime against
humanity, for the act of a military subordinate committed during the Bush
administration that continued to serve in the Obama administration. It may be little
solace to either Obama (and his supporters) or international criminal law that the
for
charge of torture is misleading in that Obama in actuality is only responsible
216
his failure to carry out his duty as a superior to the torturer, not torture itself.
The problem illustrated in this example is the incongruity of the optics of the
law. Superior commander convictions at the tribunals do appear as though the
commander is convicted of the subordinates' crimes. 2 1 It is a subtle distinction
that may placate academics but few others. For Obama to be charged with alleged
Bush administration torture crimes would be unpalatable and would probably do
more harm than good. Successor liability applied to Gordon Brown would no
doubt occasion similar reactions. Of course, prosecutorial discretion could operate
to preclude instances of injustice that the valid application of laws may sometimes
produce. But successor liability does have the potential to produce this unpleasant
and arguably unjust result. As was said by the United States Military Commission
in Yamashita, "[i]t is absurd
to consider a commander a murderer or rapist
because one of his soldiers commits a murder or a rape., 21 8 But the Obama
hypothetical demonstrates that this absurdity would appear to have occurred.
B. Successor liability would have a chilling effect on the U.S. military's ability to
change commanders
If a high-level commander learned that a subordinate battalion had been
committing crimes, he not only has a duty to punish but to prevent future crimes.
One option available to that commander would be to replace the immediate officerin-charge of the units committing the crimes. So, a four-star general upon leaming
that crimes against humanity had been committed in the theatre of war by a
particular battalion, may issue an order detaining the battalion commander,
typically a lieutenant colonel, for investigation along with an order replacing him
with a new lieutenant colonel. The impugned lieutenant colonel may inherit three
captains subordinated to him and the military hierarchies beneath those captains.

216. Prosecutor v. Kmojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Judgment, 171 (Sept. 17, 2003).
217. Prosecutor v. Ori6, Case No. IT-03-68A, Judgment, 25 (July 3, 2008) (Shahabuddeen, J.,
declaration).
218. Id. 22.
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Successor liability would mandate that the new lieutenant colonel, once he
learns of the criminal allegations previously committed by his predecessor and
subordinates, would have the duty to investigate and punish the offenders lest he
be held responsible himself. This creates a difficult scenario for a new commander
particularly in difficult command situations such as the theatre of war where the
esprit de corps would already be at issue.
Successor liability, in such situations, may induce a nominated replacement
commander to decline the command to avoid the liability inherent in the situation.
In the case of a renegade unit, the inability of high-level command to quickly
emplace new commanders to restore order and lawfulness could arguably facilitate
the continuation of criminality.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Hadiihasanovi6and Oric decisions right now operate to keep successor
liability at bay. But those decisions rest on shaky ground and coupled with the
growing number of venues that are litigating superior responsibility, successor
liability could be revisited.
The call on President Obama to appoint a special prosecutor to investigate
alleged crimes committed during the Bush presidency, and the myriad pressures
incumbent on him not to heed those calls, spotlights the relevance of successor
liability.
Successor liability can lead to uncomfortable and perhaps damaging results in
the case of a superior who opposed the criminal behavior of his predecessor. What
if President Obama was held legally responsible for the policy of torture
effectuated by the Bush administration that he opposed? What if Nelson Mandela
had been charged with crimes of apartheid for failing to punish known offenders?
One can scarcely imagine the fallout from that.
But at the same time, history is replete with examples of mass crimes going
unpunished because there is no interest in the successor regimes dredging up the
past or because immunity has been implicitly or explicitly traded for political gain.
Moreover, there has been no mechanism by which political outsiders could bring
pressure to bear on the powerful.
In the end, the international community must wrestle with whether pressuring
successor regimes to address the crimes committed by their predecessors is a
fundamentally fair trade-off for ending impunity.

WAR ON TERROR OR TERROR WARS:
THE PROBLEM IN DEFINING TERRORISM
UPENDRA

D.

ACHARYA 1

I. INTRODUCTION

The definition of terrorism has emerged as a central focus of power politics
and propaganda. Differential and ideological posturing, the absence of boundaries
of conflict and fixed enemies, messages of fear, legal narratives, and creating,
remaking and reconfiguring judicial reality have a profound tendency to make
terrorism a never-ending battle. As Foucault suggests, ". . . knowledge, power,
oppression and resistance always circulate around one another, alternately feeding
off and nourishing one another."2 The ultimate goal of law is to maintain justice
by facilitating human dignity and worth, while defining substantive aspects of
rights and duties of individuals and nations in the international legal context. Law
then lays out procedural arrangements to realize those substantive rights and
duties. The ultimate goal of politics is to obtain or maintain power within the legal
and constitutional framework of a nation. When a group of people, a government,
or a nation instills terror to obtain or maintain power, terrorism exists; even though
such terror, particularly when used by governments, is molded within a framework
of legal or other justifications. Terrorism is a psychological phenomenon, with
criminal acts being used to fight for political power or to maintain a political status
quo. This particular characteristic of terrorism and the techniques employed to
eliminate it, create a narrative, on a normative scale, that threatens the potential for
global consensus in defining terrorism. At the same time, domestically,
governments willfully scare the populace into uncritical and unquestioning faith in
governmental actions.
Powerful countries replicate this approach on an
international level.

1. Assistant Professor of Law, Gonzaga University School of Law. I would like to express my
special thanks to Professor Mary Pat Treuthart, Professor George Critchlow, Attorney Jeannie Young
and Matthew McGaughey for their insightful suggestions. I also would like to express my appreciation
to Professor Ved Nanda and Professor James Nafzigar for their valuable input and for encouraging me
to write this article. I also am thankful to my student research assistant, Estee Lewis, for her hard work,
insight and support.
2. HELEN M. STACY, POSTMODERNISM AND LAW: JURISPRUDENCE IN A FRAGMENTING WORLD

61 (Tom Campbell ed., Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd.) (2001).
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TERRORISM: A NEBULOUS CONCEPT

The employment of terrorism is an age-old practice. 3 However, the term
terrorism was first used in English in 1528. 4 It was subsequently used in France to
describe the political violence of the Jacobian Party.5

After the Second World

War, peoples in the colonized countries initiated self-determination movements to
free their nations from state occupation and terrorism. 6 This struggle focused in
particular on the state terrorism of colonial powers.' Similarly, the advent of the
Cold War initiated ideological confrontations and tensions in which ideologybased terror was employed by both sides, simultaneously creating or provoking
rebels and supplying money, training and weapons for use against the opposing
ideology-based government. 8
At present, the violence that uses terrorism as a tactic includes not only statesponsored regimes of fear, but also a religious ideology-based terrorism that calls
for securing and protecting sacred lands and sacred religious and cultural
practices. 9 The fatwa declared by the 1998 World Islamic Council, of which Bin
Laden was a co-author, can be considered an ideology-based statement of terrorism

3. Whether in the building of ancient Rome, Greece and Egypt or in maintaining the JulioClaudian Dynasty or in the targeting of Romans by the Zealots of Judea or in the actions of the unified
South Asian kingdoms led by Acharya Chanakya against the Roman empire, state and non-state actors
have employed terrorism to obtain or maintain power. See LAURA K. DONOHUE, TERRORISM AND
COUNTER-TERRORISM DISCOURSE, IN GLOBAL ANTI-TERRORISM LAW AND POLICY, 15-17 (Victor V.
Ramraj, Michael Hor & Kent Roach eds., 2005).
4. ALEX P. SCHMID, THE PROBLEMS OF DEFINING TERRORISM, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD
TERRORISM, 12 (Martha Crenshaw & John Pimlott eds., 1997).
5. Maximilien Robespierre's Jacobian Party in France imposed its "regime de la Terreur", in
which mass executions and extensive use of the guillotine paralyzed the population -- 17,000 people
were publicly executed --in response to the aristocratic threat to the revolutionary government. See id.
at 12-13; see also PETER J. VAN KRIEKEN, TERRORISM AND THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE UN, THE EU AND CROSS-BORDER ASPECTS, 12 (2002).
6. "The earliest states to gain independence were Libya, from Italy, in 1951 and Egypt, from
Britain, in 1952... The vast majority of African nations became independent in the 1960s." Scott Flatto,
Too Much of a Good Thing?. Reassessing the Proliferationof African Regional Trade Agreements, 30
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 407, 411 n.27, (citing BASIL DAVIDSON, MODERN AFRICA: A SOCIAL
AND POLITICAL HISTORY 283 (3d ed., Longman 1994).
7. Id.
8. Among a few examples are the United States' financing, equipping, and training of Contra
rebels to overthrow the Sandanista government in Nicaragua. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in
and Against Nicaragua, (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
242, (June 27, 1986); the United States'
training of Cuban exiles in efforts to overthrow Fidel Castro's government in Cuba. See Michelle
Arendt, The Cuban Liberty And DemocraticSolidarity (Libertad)Act Of 1996: Isolationist Obstacle To
Policy Of Engagement, 30 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 251, 256 n.30 (1998) (citing MAX AZICRI, CUBA:
POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIETY 31 (1988)); and the Soviet subsidy to the Zimbabwe African
Peoples' Union in its efforts against the Zimbabwe African National Union, supported by China. See
Ian Martinez, Rhodesian Anthrax: The Use Of Bacteriological & Chemical Agents During The
Liberation War Of 1965-80, 13 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 447, 452 (2003).
9. See Stephanie R. Nicolas, Negotiating In The Shadow Of Outlaws: A Problem-Solving
ParadigmFor UnconventionalOpponents, 9 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POLY 385, 400 (2000) (citing Bashir
Maan, Missiles Will Only Make Matters Worse, THE HERALD (Glasgow), Aug. 24, 1998, at 13).
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translated into action on September 11, 2001.10 This fatwa calls for "kill[ing]
Americans and their allies - civilians and military. . in order to liberate the AlAqsa [Jerusalem] Mosque and the Holy Mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in
order for their armies to move out all of the lands of Islam... and plunder their
money wherever and whenever. . and launch the raid in satan's U.S. troops and
Devil's supporters allying with them. . .",1 The 9/11 event, a recent example of
ideology-based terrorism, established state and non-state terrorist activities and
forced the world to ponder once again the nature, meaning and understanding of
terrorism. With 9/11 came fluctuations in the political agenda of powerful nations
and oppressed groups, 12 artificially manufactured, ideologically motivated or
naturally evolving to address internal or external political situations.
Terrorism remains a nebulous concept for the international legal system
mainly because it has no acceptable definition. 13 In the absence of a definition,
there is a free and open tendency for the persons using the term, whether states,
organized groups or scholars, to define it as suits their purposes at the moment,
14
leading to uncertainty as to how to fashion a legal structure to address terrorism.
III. THE PROBLEM

IN DEFINING TERRORISM

For some, terrorism is an offense, and for others, it is an activity assigned by
God; for some, it is a distinctive act of maintaining power pride, and for others, it
is a justified action against oppression; for some, it is an attack on the peace and
security and for others, it is a quest for identity. 15 It follows that it has been
difficult to reach a definition of terrorism that is acceptable to the international
community. It is worth noting the statement made by Robespierre in 1794 in the
context of the complexity of the distinction between terrorist and freedom fighter:
"Terror is nothing but justice, prompt, severe, inflexible; it is therefore an
emanation of virtue; it is not so much a special principle as it is a consequence of

10.

See YOSSEF BODANSKY, BIN LADEN: THE MAN WHO DECLARED WAR ON AMERICA, 226-27

(2001.

11. See id.; see also Bernard K. Freamon, Martyrdom, Suicide, and the Islamic Law of War: A
Short Legal History, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 299 (2003).
12. Suppressed groups have been identified with devaluation and ideology, poverty, relative
deprivation, sense of injustice, difficult life conditions, repressive societies, and us-them differentiation.
These suppressed groups are a potential root cause of non-state terrorism. See Ervin Staub, Notes on
Terrorism: Origin and Prevention, 8 PEACE & CONFLICT: J. PEACE PSYCHOL. 207, 209-12 (2002).
13. See Sami Zeidan, Agreeing to Disagree: CulturalRelativism and the Difficulty of Defining
Terrorism in a Post-9/11 World, 29 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 215 (2006); FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
DEFENSE, AND TRADE DIVISION, ISSUE BRIEF FOR CONGRESS: TERRORISM, THE FUTURE, AND US

FOREIGN POLICY 13 (2003), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/IB95112.pdf.
14. See, Amnesty International, Iraq in Cold Blood: Abuses by Armed Groups, 2 (2005) (Al
Index: MDE 14/009/2005) (Noting that "[t]here is no internationally agreed definition of what
constitutes "terrorism" and in practice the term is used to describe different forms of conduct); see also
Zeidan, supra note 13, at 227-28 (recognizing the adage that one man's terrorist is another's freedom
fighter).
15. See Daniel Lazare, We are all Terrorists, 29 RADICAL SOC'Y: REV. CULTURE & POL. 13
(2002). See also Zeidan, supra note 13, at 216-19.

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 37:4

16
the general principle of democracy applied to our country's most urgent needs."'
Such divisive views have created a pendulum approach, in which the definition of
terrorism oscillates from favorable to unfavorable.

The problem of defining terrorism is further complicated in modern days by
one party's tactical use of characterizing another party as a terrorist.17 Generally,
weak, less militarily equipped and marginalized people are identified as terrorists.
Their quest for self-governance or self-determination is generally undermined by
powerful actors either in the national or international arena. When their legitimate
demands are unmet, they react-sometimes with and sometimes without violence.
In this situation, each side labels the other a terrorist, each seeking to justify its
own violence while condemning the other's violence.
The question is where to draw the line between the quest for nationalist
identity and an act of terrorism, between legitimate political demands within a
country and suppression of those who make demands. Once a terrorist, always a
terrorist? Are Palestinians 1 terrorists? Are Irish 19 terrorists? Are Maoists 2° in
22
21
Nepal terrorists? Are the LTTE in Sri Lanka terrorists? Are Hezbollah
terrorists? Are the Taliban 23 terrorists? The focus is not or should not be whether
a group is a terrorist group, but rather what activities or actions constitute
terrorism. A group labeled as terrorist at one time may eventually become a viable
partner in international peace and security. Unfortunately, our focus is now more
on rushing to identify (with political motives) groups as terrorists rather than on
identifying terrorist activities. This (de)focus on terrorism is caused by the
16. Lois T. Flaherthy, Youth, Ideology, and Terrorism, 27 ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 29, 33-34
(2003).
17. See Zeidan, supra note 13, at 227-28.
18. See United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 106 n.41, 107 n.42, (2d Cir. 2003).
19. Id. See also Mark Pieth, Criminalizing the Financing of Terrorism, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST.
1074, 1076 (2006) (addressing the difficulty of drawing a clear line between "freedom fighters" and
"terrorists" especially when dealing with money collectors.
20. See Keshav Bhattarai, Gunanidhi Nyaupane, Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Civil
Liberties: A Review From Global and Regional Perspectives, 2003 J. INST. JUST. INT'L STUD. 116, 126
(2003) ("There are good reasons for blaming political parties because they seldom have had fixed
opinions about the Maoists' approach. Some political parties have romanticized Maoist violence as an
expression of the real aspirations of the people and called the Maoist movement a 'people's war.' These
political parties as soon as they were out of power combined their political strategies with the Maoists,
while the same parties called the Maoists terrorists once they are put in power.").
21. Id. at 121-22. See also Professor Beverly Allen, Talking "Terrorism": Ideologies and
Paradigmsin a Postmodern World, 22 SYRACUSE J. INT'L. L. & COM. 7, 8 (1996) ("[T]he Tamil Tigers
in Sri Lanka, who were rehabilitated by The New York Times in the space literally of about a week
back in 1988 from "terrorists" to "guerrillas" to "freedom fighters" as the priorities of U.S. foreign
policy shifted. These are some of the more blatant examples in recent times of the manipulation of the
term according to ideology.").
22. See Yosouf, supra note 18, at 107 n.42; see also Pieth, supra note 19, at 1076.
23. See Sami Zeidan, Desperately Seeking Definition: The International Community's Quest For
Identifying The Specter Of Terrorism, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 491, 492 (2004) ("The Taliban and
Osama bin Laden were once called freedom fighters (mujahideen) and backed by the CIA when they
were resisting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Now they are on top of the international terrorist
lists.").
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absence of a definition of the term. In this modem age of globalization of
terrorism, it is important that we conduct a historical evaluation and determine, not
who is a terrorist, but what is a terrorist act. This will help us understand what we
are fighting against and how to bring the world together while excluding terrorist
acts, but not excluding people. Such a historical evaluation and analysis of the
present legitimate demands and conditions2 4 of different non-state groups and
underdeveloped (oppressed) societies is necessary to arrive at a comprehensive and
inclusive approach to defining terrorism.
IV.

ANTI-TERRORISM CONVENTIONS

To date there is no universally accepted definition of terrorism in the context
of international law. 25 International terrorism has been labeled, at least by Western
leaders, as a threat to Western democracy and civilization, and this label has been
consistent during the pre-26 and post-9/1 1 eras.27 This label alone is problematic in
tackling international terrorism for two reasons. First, while democracy is a
universal value, its modus operandi and implementation may differ from society to
society and nation to nation. It is not accurate to claim that Western democracy
and its modus operandi reflect the only permissible (inevitable) universal practice
and that other societies and nations should adapt to it. Second, it dictates that only
the civilization of the (self-styled) civilized nations is important to the extent that it
should be promoted at any cost, which, in turn, may undermine civilizations of
other regions and societies. Let us at least assume (if not believe) that whether a
people belong to a historically recorded civilization or to a historically nonrecorded civilization, they may be proud of their group's structure and culture.
Notwithstanding this labelingproblematique,the international community has
made efforts to address and outline the definition of international terrorism. In
1930, during the League of Nation period, a definition of the term was proposed at
the Third Conference for the Unification of Penal Law at Brussels. 28 This
proposed definition 29 is important for one reason: it addressed both state and nonstate terrorism. In its 1937 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of
Terrorism, 30 the League of Nations defined acts of terrorism as "criminal acts
24. For conditions of the suppressed groups and those conditions being the root causes of
terrorism, see generally Arendt, supra note 8, and accompanying text.
25. See Zeidan, supra note 13, at 215.
26. See Guy B. Roberts, Self-Help in Combating State-Sponsored Terrorism: Self-Defense and
Peace Time Reprisals, 19 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 243, 247 (1987).
27. Jim Garamone, Iraq a Grave and Gathering Danger, Bush Tells U.N., AM. FORCES PRESS
SERV., Sept. 12, 2002, availableat http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=43466.
28. See M.K. Nawaz and Gurdip Singh, Legal Control of International Terrorism, 17 INDIAN J.
INT'L L. 66, 66 (1977).
29. Id. "The intentional use of means capable of producing a common danger that represents an
act of terrorism on the part of anyone making use of crimes against life, liberty or physical integrity of
persons or directed against private or state property with the purpose of expressing or executing
political or social ideas...."Id.
30. The League of Nations Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, League
of Nations Doc. C.546M(I).M.383(I).1937.V (1937) [hereinafter LoN Convention of Terrorism]. This
followed the 1934 assassination by Croation separatists of the French Foreign Minister and King
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directed against a state and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the
minds of particular persons, or a group of persons or the general public., 31 This is
perceived to be the first international effort to define terrorism. 32 The 1937
Convention, which avoided the issue of terrorism by state actors, 33 was ratified by
only one country 34 and signed by another 25 countries. 35 So this Convention never
came into force, and was soon voided by World War 11.36 Under the 1937
Convention, countries were required to enact legislation criminalizing terrorism
and certain other acts.37 While its definition of terrorism was not limited by an
express reference to political objective, its failure to address state actors led Hitler
to justify his "Proclamation on the German occupation of Bohemia and Moravia..
[in] March 1939. In this [Hitler] referred to 'assaults on the life and liberty of
minorities, and the purpose of disarming
Czech troops and terrorist bands
38
threatening the lives of minorities."
After the Second World War, as was the case during the League of Nations
era, efforts to address the definition of international terrorism were scattered and in
reaction to particular events.39 Prior to 9/11, there were a total of thirteen
international conventions related to terrorism in particular contexts 40-safety of
civil aviation,4 1 maritime issues, 42 internationally protected persons, 43 plastic
Alexander I of Yugoslavia while on a state visit to France. The suspects fled to Italy, and France
requested their extradition under a treaty of 1870, which excluded political crimes from extradition. The
Court of Appeal of Turin (Italy) refused to surrender the accused because regicide and related offences
were politically motivated and thus non-extraditable. The League of Nations faced political pressure,
which contributed to the drafting of this Convention. Ben Saul, The Legal response of the League of
Nations to Terrorism, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 78, 81 (2006). The draft of the Convention was prepared
upon French request, by a panel known as the Committee for the International Repression of Terrorism
(CIRT), which represented Belgium, Chile, France, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania, Spain,
Switzerland, U.K. and U.S.S.R. The conference of this Convention had considered a complementary
convention creating an international criminal court. See Proceedings of the InternationalConference on
the Repression of Terrorism, League of Nations Doc. C.94.M47.1938 V (1938) at 49.
31. LoN Convention of Terrorism, supra note 30, art. 1, 2.
32. Id.; see also Saul, supra note 30, at 79-82.
33. See LoN Convention of Terrorism, supra note 30, art. 2.
34. India was the only country to ratify this Convention. See Saul, supra note 30, at 82.
35. See LoN Convention of Terrorism, supra note 30; see also Saul, supra note 30, at 81-82. The
countries that signed were: Albania, Argentina, Belgium, Great Britain, Bulgaria, Cuba, Dominican
Republic, Egypt, Ecuador, Spain, Estonia, France, Greece, Haiti, Monaco, India, Norway, the
Netherlands, Peru, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Turkey, U.S.S.R., Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. Id.
36. See Thomas M. Franck & Bert B. Lockwood Jr., Preliminary Thoughts Towards an
InternationalConvention on Terrorism, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 69, 70 (1974).
37. See LoN Convention of Terrorism, supra note 30, art. 1(2) and 2(1)-(5).
38. Cf IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 340 (Clarendon

Press 1963).
39. See Saul, supra note 30, at 82.
40. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI,

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS

1937-2001 (Hotei Publishing 2001) (1937); see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, Legal Control Of
InternationalTerrorism:A Policy-OrientedAssessment, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 83, 91 (2002).
41. See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation,
Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 546565, 974 U.N.T.S. 177 [hereinafter Montreal Convention].
42. See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
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46
45
suppression of the financing of terrorism,
explosives,44 nuclear material,
suppression of terrorist bombings,47 continental shelf safety,4 8 taking of hostages,4 9
suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft,5 ° offenses committed on board
aircraft, 51 and unlawful acts of violence at airports. 52 These Conventions do not
adopt a generic means of arriving at an understanding of terrorist acts, but rather
reflect a case-by-case approach addressing particular events.53 Most of these
treaties were adopted in order to alleviate the fears of the West. For example, the
1963 Tokyo Convention 54 and the 1970 Hague Convention 55 were a direct
response to air piracy by the Palestinians.56
Similarly, the 1979 Hostages
Convention 57 was adopted in response to the 1976 Entebbe case, in which a group
of Palestinians hijacked an Air France Airbus and forced it to land in Entebbe
(Uganda), demanding the release of 53 accused terrorists detained in Israel in

Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, S. TREATY Doc. NO. 101-1, 27 I.L.M. 668 [hereinafter Maritime
Convention].
43. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167
[hereinafter Internationally Protected Persons Convention]; see also Convention on the Safety of
United Nations and Associated Personnel, Dec. 9, 1994, G.A. Res. 49/59, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess.,
Supp. No. 49, at 299, U.N. Doc. A/49/49 (1994).
44. See Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, Mar. 1,
1991, S. TREATY DOc. No. 103-8, 2122 U.N.T.S. 359 [hereinafter PlasticExplosives Convention].
45. See Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, opened for signature Mar. 3,
1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11080, 1456 U.N.T.S. 101 [hereinafter Nuclear Materials Convention].
46. See International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999,
S. TREATY DOc. No. 106-49, G.A. Res. 54/109, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc.
A/54/49 [hereinafter Financing Convention].
47. See International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Dec. 15, 1997, S.
TREATY DOc. NO. 106-6, 37 I.L.M. 249 [hereinafter Bombings Convention].
48. See Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms
Located on the Continental Shelf, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 304 [hereinafter Fixed Platforms
Convention].
49. See International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, T.I.A.S. No.
11081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Hostages Convention].
50. See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T.
1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105 [hereinafter Hague Convention].
51. See Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14,
1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219 [hereinafter Tokyo Convention].
52. See Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving
International Civil Aviation, Supplementary to the [Montreal Convention], Feb. 24, 1988, S. TREATY
Doc. NO. 100-19, 1589 U.N.T.S. 474 [hereinafter MontrealAirportsProtocol].
53. See, e.g., Franck and Lockwood, supra note 36, at 70.
54. Tokyo Convention, supra note 5 1.
55. Hague Convention, supra note 50.
56. Ikechi Mgbeoji, The Bearded Bandit, The Outlaw Cop, and The Naked Emperor: Towards a
North-South (De)constructionof the Texts and Contexts of International Law's (Dis)engagementwith
Terrorism, 43 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 105, 110 (2005); see also Monica Serrano, The PoliticalEconomy of
Terrorism, in TERRORISM AND THE UN: BEFORE AND AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 198, 198 (Jane Boulden &

Thomas G. Weiss eds., 2004).
57. Hostages Convention, supra note 49.
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exchange for the life of the hostages. 58 The 1988 Maritime Convention5 9 and its
Protocol 60 were responses to the attacks on the Achille Lauro in 198561 and City of
the Law of the Sea 63 applied only to a
Poros in 1988.62 The 1982 Convention on
64
sea piracy, a non-politically motivated act.

While recognizing that these international legal instruments aptly employed
legal bases to address problems of terrorism, some have argued that there has been
no consideration of global responses to the acts of terror initiated either by Western
regimes or their proxies.65 That deficiency is analogous to the weakness of the
1937 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism that allowed its
abuse by Hitler, who justified occupation of other countries' territories by claiming
to suppress terrorism. 66 The non-definition approach to terrorism reflected in the
post-World War II treaties has left the United Nations (UN) open to charges of
applying double
standards, which undermines its goals of legitimacy and
67
universality.
V.

TERRORISM - AN ACT OF CRIME OR AN ACT OF WAR?

All of these international treaties and protocols require states to: a)
68
criminalize the acts covered and make them punishable by appropriate penalties;
b) establish jurisdiction over offenses committed; 69 c) take alleged offenders into
58. See Victor C. Romero, Equal ProtectionHeld Hostage: Ransoming the Constitutionalityof the
Hostage Taking Act, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 573, 573 n.1 (1997) (citing JOSEPH J. LAMBERT, TERRORISM
AND HOSTAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: A COMMENTARY ON THE HOSTAGES CONVENTION 1979 2-3
(1990) (providing a brief description of the Entebbe Hijacking Events).
59. Maritime Convention, supra note 42.
60. Fixed Platforms Convention, supra note 48.
61. See Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed Altri-Gesftione Motonave Achille Lauro in
Amministrazione Straordinaria, 795 F. Supp. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); see also M. Cherif Bassiouni,
Assessing "Terrorism" Into The New Millennium, 12 DePaul Bus. L.J. 1, 7 n.21 (1999-2000).
62. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 2001, at 87 (2002), available at

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/I 0319.pdf (noting that terrorists attacked a day excursion
ship in Greece).
63. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982 1833 U.N.T.S. 397
[hereinafter UNCLOS].
64. Id. art. 101.
65. See Ole R. Holsti, The Three-HeadedEagle: The United States and System Change, 23 INT'L
STUD. Q. 339 (1979); Brian K. Landsberg, United States in Vietnam: A Case Study in the Law of
Intervention, 50 CAL. L. REV. 515 (1962); Susanne Jonas, Eurasia Letters: Dangerous Liasions: The
U.S. in Guatemala, 103 FOREIGN POL'Y 144 (1996).
66. See LoN Convention, supra note 30; Saul, supra note 30, at 81; Proceedings of the
InternationalConference on the Repression of Terrorism, supra note 30.
67. Jane Boulden & Thomas G. Weiss, Whither Terrorism and the United Nations, in TERRORISM
AND THE UN: BEFORE AND AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 3,3 (Jane Boulden & Thomas G. Weiss eds., 2004).
68. See Montreal Convention, supra note 41, art. 3; Maritime Convention, supra note 42, art. 5;
Internationally Protected Persons Convention, supra note 43, art. 2(2); Nuclear Materials Convention,
supra note 45, art. 7(2); Financing Convention, supra note 46, art. 4-6; Bombings Convention, supra
note 47, art. 4-5; Fixed Platforms Convention, supra note 48, art. 3(2), 3(5); Hostages Convention,
supra note 49, art. 2; Hague Convention, supra note 50, art. 2; Montreal Airports Protocol, supra note
52, art. 2-3.
69. See Montreal Convention, supra note 41, art. 5; Maritime Convention, supra note 42, art. 6;
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custody; 70 d) notify, either through the UN Secretary General or directly, states
involved in the actions taken; 71 e) submit the case for prosecution if extradition
does not take place; 72 f) deem the offense to be extraditable for the purpose of any
extradition treaty between the parties; 73 and g) assist one another in connection
with criminal proceedings regarding the offenses covered.74
These treaties and conventions establish international standards that designate
specific criminal acts as terrorism. With regard to civil aviation, the 1963 Tokyo
Convention 75 applies to acts committed on board of an aircraft in flight over the
surface of the high seas or outside the territory of any state.76 This Convention was
reinforced by the 1970 Hague Convention, 77 which specifically outlaws any
seizure or exercise of control of any aircraft unlawfully by force or threat thereof,
or by any other form of intimidation. 78 The 1971 Montreal Convention 79 further
bans both the seizure of an aircraft and any conduct that may endanger the safety
Internationally Protected Persons Convention, supra note 43, art. 3; Nuclear Materials Convention,
supra note 45, art. 8; Financing Convention, supra note 46, art. 7(1); Bombings Convention, supra note
47, art. 6; Fixed Platforms Convention, supra note 48, art. 3(1); Hostages Convention, supra note 49,
art. 5; Hague Convention, supra note 50, art. 4; and see generally Montreal Airports Protocol, supra
note 52.
70. See generally Montreal Convention, supra note 41, art. 6(1); Maritime Convention, supra note
42, art. 4, 6(1); Internationally Protected Persons Convention, supra note 43, art. 6(1); Nuclear
Materials Convention, supra note 45, art. 9; Financing Convention, supra note 46, art. 9(2); Bombings
Convention, supra note 47, art. 7(2); Hostages Convention, supra note 49, art. 6(1); Hague Convention,
supra note 50, art. 6(1); and see generally Montreal Airports Protocol, supra note 52.
71. See Montreal Convention, supra note 41, art. 6(4), 13; Maritime Convention, supra note 42,
art. 7(3), 7(5), 15; Internationally Protected Persons Convention, supra note 43, art. 6, 11; Nuclear
Materials Convention, supra note 45, art. 14; Financing Convention, supra note 46, art. 7(3), 9(6);
Bombings Convention, supra note 47, art. 7(6); Fixed Platforms Convention, supra note 48, art. 3(3);
Hostages Convention, supra note 49, art. 6(2), 7; Hague Convention, supra note 50, art. 6(4); and see
generally Montreal Airports Protocol, supra note 52.
72. See Montreal Convention, supra note 41, art. 7; Maritime Convention, supra note 42, art. 6(4),
10; Internationally Protected Persons Convention, supra note 43, art. 7; Nuclear Materials Convention,
supra note 45, art. 10; Financing Convention, supra note 46, art. 7(4), 10(1); Bombings Convention,
supra note 47, art. 8(1); Fixed Platforms Convention, supra note 48, art. 3(4); Hostages Convention,
supra note 49, art. 8; Hague Convention, supra note 50, art. 7; and see generally Montreal Airports
Protocol, supra note 52.
73. See Montreal Convention, supra note 41, art. 8(1); Maritime Convention, supra note 42, art.
11(1); Internationally Protected Persons Convention, supra note 43, art. 8(1); Nuclear Materials
Convention, supra note 45, art. 11(1); Financing Convention, supra note 46, art. 11(1); Bombings
Convention, supra note 47, art. 9(1); Hostages Convention, supra note 49, art. 10(1); Hague
Convention, supra note 50, art. 8(1).
74. See Montreal Convention, supra note 41, art. 11; Maritime Convention, supra note 42, art.
6(2), 12, 13; Internationally Protected Persons Convention, supra note 43, art. 5, 10; Nuclear Materials
Convention, supra note 45, art. 13; Financing Convention, supra note 46, art. 12; Bombings
Convention, supra note 47, art. 10; Hostages Convention, supra note 49, art. 4. 11; Hague Convention,
supra note 50, art. 9, 10.
75. Tokyo Convention, supra note 51.
76. Id. art. 1.
77. Hague Convention, supra note 50.
78. Id. art. 1.
79. Montreal Convention, supra note 41.
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of civil aviation.80 This Convention was supplemented in 1988 by the Montreal

Protocol, 8' which extends its scope over terrorist acts at airports serving
international civil aviation.82 These treaties seem to apply in peacetime only, not
in wartime. These aircraft safety and hijacking conventions include prosecution
or extradition provisions,84 which85 experience has shown to be problematic, as in,
for example, the Lockerbie Case.
Among all thirteen treaties 86 the 1999 Financing Convention 87 recognizes a

new form of terror-any act of funding to carry out an act that constitutes an
offense as defined in one of the treaties listed in the annex of the Convention.88
However, all these treaties are discriminatory in that they conclude that terrorist
activities can be committed only by non-state actors and, conversely, that state
actors can never be terrorists or that a state will never employ terror for its political
benefit. For example, the 1997 Bombings Convention 89 identifies terrorism on the
basis of the means used 9 and the place of occurrence, 9' but then clearly provides
80. Id. art. 1.
81. Montreal Airports Protocol, supra note 52.
82. Id. art. 2.
83. See Montreal Convention, supra note 41, art. 4 (the common language of these conventions is
that they "shall not apply to aircraft used in military, customs or police services."); Hague Convention,
supra note 50, art. 3(2); Tokyo Convention, supra note 51, art. 1(4).
84. See Montreal Convention, supra note 41, arts. 5, 6, 8; Hague Convention, supra note 50, arts.
4, 6-8; Tokyo Convention, supra note 51, art. 13, 16(2).
85. The Lockerbie Case deals with the December 21, 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over
Lockerbie (Scotland), in which several UK and US citizens lost their lives. Two Libyan nationals were
suspected of the terrorist attack and on November 27, 1991, the US and the UK jointly demanded their
extradition from Libya. However, Libya refused on the grounds that the 1971 Montreal Protocol
permitted Libya to conduct its own prosecution. After several years of litigation, (see Questions of
Interpretation and Application of 1971 Montreal Convention Arising From Aerial Incident at Lockerbie
(Libya v. U.S.), 1992 I.C.J. 114, 115-16 (Apr. 14)) as well as economic sanctions by the United Nations
Security Council, (see SC Res. 748,
3-7, available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/
GEN/NR0/0 I1/07/IMG/NR001 107.pdfOpenElement) against Libya, an agreement was arrived at to
hold the trial in a neutral state-Holland-under Scottish law. It has been said that witnesses lied to
identify the suspects and the trial was not fair. See JEFFREY L. DUNOFF, STEVEN R. RATNER & DAVID
WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS, A PROBLEM ORIENTED APPROACH 963972 (2006).
86. See the following treaties and accompanying text: Montreal Convention, supra note 41;
Maritime Convention, supra note 42; Internationally Protected Persons Convention, supra note 43;
Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, supra note 43; Plastic
Explosives Convention, supra note 44; Nuclear Materials Convention, supra note 45; Financing
Convention, supra note 46; Bombings Convention, supra note 47; Fixed Platforms Convention, supra
note 48; Hostages Convention, supra note 49; Hague Convention, supra note 50; Tokyo Convention,
supra note 51; Montreal Airports Protocol, supra note 52.
87. Financing Convention, supra note 46.
88. Id. art. 2(l)(a); see also the following treaties from the Financing Convention annex:
Montreal Convention, supra note 41; Maritime Convention, supra note 42; Internationally Protected
Persons Convention, supra note 43; Nuclear Materials Convention, supra note 45; Bombings
Convention, supra note 47; Fixed Platforms Convention, supra note 48; Hostages Convention, supra
note 49; Hague Convention, supra note 50; Montreal Airports Protocol, supra note 52.
89. Bombings Convention, supra note 47.
90. Id. art. 1(3).
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that states are not covered under this convention but are covered under
international humanitarian law.92
Another important aspect of these treaties further demonstrates their
discriminatory nature: all the offenses are defined in terms of acts occurring in
times of peace and therefore those offenses are acts of crime 9 3 rather than acts of
war. Non-state sponsored terrorism committed against the citizens, property, or
territory of a state is a violation of domestic criminal law of the victim state or the
state where the act of terrorism occurs. 94 The prescribed mechanism under these
treaties requires states to rely upon one another to effectively combat the crime of
terrorism.95 In other words, these international legal instruments provide a
framework for international cooperation among states to prevent or suppress
terrorism by requiring state parties to cooperate in the prevention and investigation
of terrorist acts, 96 criminalize terrorist acts, 97 and either prosecute or extradite
terrorists. 98
The states are designated enforcers of anti-terrorist measures from which they
themselves are exempt. This state terrorism exemption is one of the legal
91. Id. art. 2(l).
92. The Preamble of the Bombings Convention provides that "the activities of military forces of
States are governed by rules of international law outside the framework of this Convention and that the
exclusion of certain actions from the coverage of this Convention does not condone or make lawful
otherwise unlawful acts, or preclude prosecution under other laws[.]" Id. at pmbl.
93. See Maritime Convention, supra note 42, art. 2; Financing Convention, supra note 46, art. 2;
Hostages Convention, supra note 49, art. 12.
94. See Montreal Convention, supra note 41; see also supra text accompanying note 41.
95. See Montreal Convention, supra note 41, art. 6(4), 8, 11, 13; Maritime Convention, supra note
42, art. 6(2)-(3), 7(5), 11(1), 12-13, 15; Internationally Protected Persons Convention, supra note 43,
art. 5, 6, 8(1), 10, 11; Nuclear Materials Convention, supra note 45, art. 11(1), 13-14; Financing
Convention, supra note 46, art. 7(3), 9(6), 11(1), 12; Bombings Convention, supra note 47, art. 7(6),
9(1), 10; Fixed Platforms Convention, supra note 48, art. 3(3); Hostages Convention, supra note 49, art.
4, 6(2), 7, 10(1), 11; Hague Convention, supra note 50 art. 6(4), 8(1), 9-10; Montreal Airports Protocol,
supra note 52.; see also supra text accompanying notes 71, 73-74.
96. See Montreal Convention, supra note 41, art. 11; Maritime Convention, supra note 42, art.
6(2), 12-13; Internationally Protected Persons Convention, supra note 43, art. 5, 10; Nuclear Materials
Convention, supra note 45, art. 13; Financing Convention, supra note 46, art. 12; Bombings
Convention, supra note 47, art. 10; Hostages Convention, supra note 49, art. 4, 11; Hague Convention,
supra note 50, art. 9-10; Montreal Airports Protocol, supra note 52.; see also supra text accompanying
note 74.
97. See Montreal Convention, supra note 41, art. 3; Maritime Convention, supra note 42, art. 5;
Internationally Protected Persons Convention, supra note 43, art. 2(2); Nuclear Materials Convention,
supra note 45, art. 7(2); Financing Convention, supra note 46, art. 4-6; Bombings Convention, supra
note 47, art. 4, 5; Fixed Platforms Convention, supra note 48, art. 3(2), 3(5); Hostages Convention,
supra note 49, art. 2; Hague Convention, supra note 50, art. 2; Montreal Airports Protocol, supra note
52; see also supra text accompanying note 68.
98. See Montreal Convention, supra note 41, art. 7, 8; Maritime Convention, supra note 42, art.
6(4), 10, 11(1); Internationally Protected Persons Convention, supra note 43, art. 7, 8(l); Nuclear
Materials Convention, supra note 45, art. 10, 11(1); Financing Convention, supra note 46, art. 7(4),
10(1), 11 (1); Bombings Convention, supra note 47, art. 8(1), 9(1); Fixed Platforms Convention, supra
note 48, art. 3(4); Hostages Convention, supra note 49, art. 8, 10(1); Hague Convention, supra note 50,
art. 7, 8(1); Montreal Airports Protocol, supra note 52;,see also supra text accompanying notes 72-73.
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narratives existent in these treaties that has given states the incentive to employ
terror in their counter-terrorism actions by declaring that a terrorist attack against
them or their subjects is an act of war. Thus, states do not have to be responsible
for their terrorist activities other than through observance of the
necessity/proportionality doctrine of international humanitarian law in their use of
force. 99

The paradox of these conventions is that states have responded internationally
to individual events as they occur without adopting a comprehensive approach to
the problem of terrorism. This makes it convenient for states to characterize issues
as falling within the treaties' legal parameters, and then to argue for response to an
event as either an international issue or a domestic issue, whichever stance may
suit the objective of the state involved.100
VI.

TERRORISM AS A CRIME UNDER GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND SECURITY COUNCIL

RESOLUTIONS

The General Assembly has responded to terrorism for more than four decades
by adopting a multitude of resolutions condemning acts of terrorism. In 1965, the
General Assembly adopted a resolution stating that "no State shall organize, assist,
foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed
towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State. . . ,,1'0This

prohibition was recognized again in 1970.102 In 1972 terrorism found a permanent
place on the General Assembly agenda when Resolution 3034 addressed the
problem of terrorism directly and specifically. 10 3 This resolution was titled

99. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, art. 51, 57, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3; Lieutenant Commander Stuart Walters Belt, Missiles Over Kosovo: Emergence, Lex Lata,
Of A Customary Norm Requiring The Use Of PrecisionMunitions In Urban Areas, 47 NAVAL L. REV.
115, 167 (2000) ("[T]he most 'current' treaty language regarding the concepts of necessity and
proportionality is contained in the Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions."); see also
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in
the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Geneva
Convention for the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at
Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention It]; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S.
135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention IV].
100. The Lockerbie incident provides one example. The United States and the United Kingdom did
not agree with Libya's assertion of its right to prosecute the bombing suspects in its territory. Libya
justified its demand to prosecute and refusal to extradite by reference to the 1971 Montreal Protocol and
its own domestic law. However, the US and the UK took the issue to the United Security Council and
secured two resolutions to warn Libya to comply with their request and to impose economic sanctions
against Libya. See Questions of Interpretation and Application of 1971 Montreal Convention Arising
From Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), 1992 I.C.J. 114 (Apr. 14, 1992), supra note 85, at
115-16.
101. G.A. Res. 2131, 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2131 (Dec. 21, 1965).
102. G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970).
103. G.A. Res. 3034, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3034 (Dec. 18, 1972). G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 102.
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"Measures To Prevent International Terrorism Which Endangers Or Takes
Innocent Human Lives Or Jeopardizes Fundamental Freedoms, And Study Of The
Underlying Causes Of Those Forms Of Terrorism And Acts Of Violence Which
Lie In Misery, Frustration, Grievance And Despair And Which Cause Some
People To Sacrifice Human Lives, Including Their Own, In An Attempt To Effect
Radical Changes." This Resolution expressed concern over the increasing number
of terroristic acts and urged states to find "just and peaceful solutions to the
underlying causes which give rise to such acts of violence. 1 °4
While there is still a lack of a clear and acceptable definition of terrorism,
starting in 1979, the General Assembly made the distinction that terrorism is a
crime which should be prosecuted within the legal system, rather than viewing
terrorism as an act of war. In Resolution 34/145, the General Assembly called
upon states to work together in order to prevent and combat terrorism through the
exchange of information, and creation of treaties allowing for the "extradition and
prosecution of international terrorists. 1 °5
In Resolution 40/61, the General
Assembly recognized the importance of the relevant international conventions
addressing terrorism and the necessity of States to take "appropriate law
enforcement measures. . . in connection with the offences addressed in those
Conventions.16 Additionally, Resolution 40/61 condemned "as criminal, all acts,
methods and practices of terrorism wherever and by whoever committed, including
those which jeopardize friendly relations among States and their security.' 0 7 In
1987, the General Assembly, again condemned terrorism, and called upon States to
co-operate with one another "on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis, which
will contribute to the elimination of acts of international terrorism and their
underlying causes and to the prevention and elimination of this criminal
scourge."' 10 8
In 1991, the General Assembly recognized all of the above provisions and
determined that the issue of terrorism should be included in its provisional agenda
under the shortened title "Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism."' 1 9 In
1995, the General Assembly appeared to take a more direct stance that terrorism is
This title was utilized in subsequent resolutions, see G.A. Res. 31/102, U.N. Doc. A/RES/31/I02 (Dec.
15, 1976); G.A. Res. 32/147, U.N. Doc. A/RES/32/147 (Dec. 17, 1977); G.A. Res. 34/145, U.N. Dec.
A/RES/34/145 (Dec. 17, 1979); G.A. Res. 36/109, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/109 (Dec. 10, 1981); G.A. Res.
38/130, U.N. Doc. A/RES/38/130 (Dec. 19, 1983); G.A. Res. 40/61, U.N. Doc. A!RES/40/61 (Dec. 9,
1985); G.A. Res. 42/159, U.N. Doc. A/RES/42/159 (Dec. 7, 1987); G.A. Res. 44/29, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/44/29 (Dec. 4, 1989).
104. G.A. Res. 3034, supra note 103, 1-2.
105. G.A. Res. 34/145, supra note 103, 11. This provision was included again in G.A. Res.
38/130, supra note 103, 6; G.A. Res. 40/61, supra note 103, 8. See also G.A. Res. 42/159, supra
note 103, 5; G.A. Res. 44/29, supra note 103, 4.
106. G.A. Res. 40/61, supra note 103, at pmbl.
107. Id., 1 (emphasis added); see also G.A. Res. 42/159, supra note 103, 1; G.A. Res. 44/29,
supra note 103,

1.

108. G.A. Res. 42/159, supra note 103, pmbl. and 7. See also G.A. Res. 44/29, supra note 103,
pmbl. and 5.
109. See G.A. Res. 46/51, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/51 (Dec. 9,1991).
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a crime, not an act of war, by approving the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate
International Terrorism, attached in the annex of the resolution. In the Preamble,
this Declaration listed terrorism as a crime closely connected to crimes such as
"drug trafficking, unlawful arms trade, money laundering and smuggling of
nuclear and other potentially deadly materials...

"

and reiterated that those

responsible for acts of terrorism "must be brought to justice."' 110 Additionally, in
the Declaration, the General Assembly appears to have created a cursory definition
of terrorism, which stated "[c]riminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state
of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political
purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a
political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that
may be invoked to justify them." 11' This Declaration clearly views terrorism as a
criminal act, rather than an act of war. This "definition" was cited throughout the
subsequent resolutions issued up until September 11, 200 1.112
After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the General Assembly
could have taken steps to change the dimension of terrorism from a crime, to an act
of war; however, in Resolution 56/1, the General Assembly condemned the
terrorist attacks on ' the
United States and called for those responsible to be
3
"brought to justice.

1

The wording of this Resolution indicates that the General

Assembly continued to view terrorism as a "crime" rather than an act of war. By
January 2002, the General Assembly reiterated the "definition" that terrorism is a
crime, as set forth in the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International
Terrorism.1 14 Resolution 56/88 also stressed the need for states to become parties
to those conventions and protocols that address terrorism, and to enact the
legislation "necessary to implement the provisions of those conventions and

110. G.A. Res. 49/60, pmbl, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/60 (Feb. 17, 1995).
111. Id.
112. See G.A. Res. 55/158, 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/158 (Jan. 30, 2001); G.A. Res. 54/110, 1-2,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/1 10 (Feb. 2, 2000); G.A. Res. 52/165, 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/165 (Jan. 19,
1998); G.A. Res. 51/210, 2, U.N. Doc. A!RES/51/210 (Jan. 16, 1997) (containing a supplement to the
1995 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism); G.A. Res. 50/53, 2, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/50/53 (Jan. 29, 1996).
113. G.A. Res. 56/1, 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/1 (Sept. 12, 2001).
114. See supra note 109-110, and accompanying text. See also G.A Res. 56/88,
2, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/56/88 (Jan. 24, 2002). There were a number of additional resolutions issued from 2002-2008
indicating that terrorism is a crime. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 62/175,
3, 9, U.N. Doc. AiRES/62/175
(March 20, 2008); G.A. Res. 62/159, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/159 (March 11, 2008); G.A. Res. 61/181,
3, 4, 6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/181 (March 8, 2007); G.A. Res. 61/151,
9, U.N. Doc. AJRES/61/151
(Feb. 14, 2007); G.A. Res. 60/288,
IV(4), U.N. Doc. A/RES/60i288 (Sept. 20, 2006); G.A. Res.
60/177, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/177 (March 20, 2006); G.A. Res. 59/290, pmbl, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/290
(April 15, 2005); G.A. Res. 58/162, 9, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/162 (March 2, 2004); G.A. Res. 58/140,
pmbl, 2, 5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/140 (Feb. 4, 2004); G.A. Res. 58/136, pmbl, 10, U.N. Doc.
A/R.ES/58/136 (Jan. 26, 2004); G.A. Res. 57/196, 8, U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/196 (Feb. 25, 2003); G.A.
Res. 57/174, Preamble, U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/174 (Jan. 28, 2003); G.A. Res. 57/173, 4, 6, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/57/173 (Jan. 21, 2003); G.A. Res. 56/261, 22-24, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/261 (April 15, 2002);
G.A. Res. 56/232, 8, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/232 (Feb. 26, 2002); G.A. Res. 56/160, pmbl, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/56/160 (Feb. 13, 2002).
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protocols, to ensure that the jurisdiction of their courts enables them to bring to

trial the perpetrators of terrorist acts."'1 15 The provisions in Resolution 56/88
relating to terrorism as a crime have continued to be adhered to and reiterated in
the subsequent "Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism" Resolutions issued
by the General Assembly to the present date. 1 6 It is crystal clear that the General
Assembly (majority view of the international community) has, with its series of
resolutions, determined that terrorism is a crime, not an act of war, despite the US
self-styled declaration of terrorism as an act of war.
Similarly, the Security Council has taken the position that terrorism is a crime
rather than an act of war. Immediately after 9/11 the Security Council issued
Resolution 1368 in which it condemned the terrorist attacks in New York, and
called upon all States to "work together urgently to bring to justice the
perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these terrorist attacks and stress[ed] that
those responsible for aiding, supporting or harbouring the perpetrators, organizers,
and sponsors of these acts will be held accountable."1' 17 Here the Security Council
likewise could have defined terrorism as an act of war; however, they carefully
crafted their words to define terrorism as a crime for which the perpetrators of such
acts must be brought to justice.
Although the Security Council members defined terrorism as a crime
immediately after 9/11, its approach did not remain consistent, and a mixed
response followed only sixteen days later.11 8 In Resolution 1373, the Security
Council contradicted its earlier statement that terrorism is a crime, when it
reaffirmed the right to individual or collective self-defense under the UN Charter,
and reaffirmed the "need to combat [terrorist acts] by all means" in accordance
with the UN Charter.1 19 Later in the same Resolution, the Security Council
required that terrorist acts be established as "serious criminal offences in domestic
laws and regulations and that the punishment duly reflects the seriousness of such
terrorist acts.' 20 This mixed response was a result of the lack of a clear and
acceptable definition of terrorism. Since that time, states have used this mixed
response as a justification for waging war against terrorists.1 21 Since Resolution
1373, the Security Council has returned to its original definition of terrorism as a
crime, rather than an act of war. In further Resolutions issued by the Security
Council from 2001 through 2008 the Security Council has continued to maintain

115. G.A. Res. 56/88, supra note 114, 7 (emphasis added).
116. See G.A. Res. 57/27, 2, 7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/27 (Jan. 15, 2003); G.A. Res. 58/81, 2, 7,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/81 (Jan. 8, 2004); G.A. Res. 59/46, 2, 9, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/46 (Dec. 16,
2004).
117. S.C. Res. 1368, 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001) (emphasis added).
118. See S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
119. Id. pmbl (emphasis added).
120. Id. 2; see also id. 1-4 (indicating in various ways that terrorism should be implemented as a

crime).
121. See Hans K6chler, The United Nations Organization and Global Power Politics: The
Antagonism Between Power and Law and the Future of World Order, 5 CHrNESE J. INT'L L. 323, n.17
(2006).
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that terrorism is a crime.

Over ten years ago, the General Assembly took steps to reach consensus in
the international community regarding terrorism. In 1996, the United Nations
created an Ad Hoc Committee of Terrorism, charged with the mission of creating a
comprehensive convention on international terrorism. 123 The ultimate goal of the
Committee is to establish an international conference for the international
community to "formulate a joint organized response... to terrorism in all its forms
and manifestations. 12 4 Twelve years have passed since that time, yet no
international summit has taken place. Thus, there is still a need for a clear, definite
and concise definition of terrorism. Hopefully, if such a convention is created, it
will set forth a definition of terrorism on which the international community can
agree, a definition that expands terrorism to include acts committed by states
(whether failed or so-called civilized) and that is not limited to non-state actors.
VII.

FROM AN ACT OF CRIME TO AN ACT OF WAR: PRE AND POST

9/11

The General Assembly has soundly endorsed the concept of terrorism as a
criminal act rather than an act of war. The Security Council also seems to be
convinced of that idea, despite the inconsistency reflected in its September 28,
2001, resolution. 125 Nevertheless, an acceptable definition of terrorism is still
likely to remain a moonshine. It is not a question of unwillingness by a majority of
nations to define terrorism, but rather a question of the obstacles to reaching
agreement as well as skepticism about using any universal definition for narrow
purposes. Why would a powerful country want to become a signatory to any treaty
that would limit its power to unilaterally declare war on terrorism? Defining
terrorism and instituting an international legal mechanism to address it would pose
a limitation to those powerful countries that currently are privileged to exercise
power unilaterally. Absence of an accepted definition and an international legal
mechanism to address terrorism provides room for powerful countries to act
flexibly based upon their political agenda, which are:
122. See e.g., S.C. Res. 1377, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1377 (Nov. 12, 2001); S.C. Res. 1435, 4, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1435 (Sept. 24, 2002); S.C. Res. 1438, 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1438 (Oct. 14, 2002); S.C.
Res. 1450, 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1450 (Dec. 13, 2002); S.C. Res. 1456, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1456
(Jan. 20, 2003); S.C. Res. 1511, 16, 18, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1511 (Oct. 16, 2003); S.C. Res. 1530, 3,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1530 (March 11, 2004); S.C. Res. 1566, 2, 3, 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566 (Oct. 8,
2004); S.C. Res. 1611, 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1611 (July 7, 2005); S.C. Res. 1636, pmbl, 2, 3, 7, 11,
14, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1636 (Oct. 31, 2005); S.C. Res. 1644, pmbl, 6, 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1644 (Dec.
15, 2005); S.C. Res. 1664, pmbl, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1664 (March 29, 2006); S.C. Res. 1735, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1735 (Dec. 22, 2006); S.C. Res. 1757, pmbl and Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007);
S.C. Res. 1822, pmbl, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1822 (June 30, 2008); S.C. Res. 1852, pmbl, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1852 (Dec. 17, 2008).
123. G.A. Res. 51/210, 9-13, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/210 (Jan. 16, 1997); G.A. Res. 60/43, 1, 2, 7,
10, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/43 (Jan. 6, 2006); G.A. Res. 61/40, 1, 4, 9, 12, 18, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/40
(Dec. 18, 2006); G.A. Res. 62/71, 1, 4, 12, 18, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/71 (Jan. 8, 2008).
124. G.A. Res. 58/81, supra note 116, at pmbl; G.A. Res. 59/46, supra note 116, at pmbl; G.A. Res.
60/43, supra note 123, at pmbl; G.A. Res. 61/40, supra note 123, at pmbl; G.A. Res. 62/71, supra note
123, at pmbl; G.A. Res. 51/210, supra note 123, at 9.
125. See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 118, pmbl.
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1. The ability to declare terrorism an act of war;

2. Unilateral use of force against non-state/state terrorism with extra127
jurisdictional reach;
3. Justification of the unilateral use of force in other countries'
28
territories by claiming self-defense.1

The practice of the use of force to suppress terrorist activities in the name of
self-defense is not new and not solely the product of 9/11.
For example, in response to the murder of seven Americans in two
Libyan-sponsored bombings in Rome and Vienna in December of 1985
and the terrorist bombing of a West German discotheque in April of
1986, the United States justified the lawfulness of its April 1986 air
strikes against terrorist training camps and military targets in Libya as
an exercise of its right of self-defense as recognized by Article 51 of the
29

Charter. 1

An attempt by the Security Council to issue a resolution condemning the actions
taken by the United States was vetoed by the United Kingdom, France and the
United States; 130 however, the General Assembly subsequently passed a resolution
condemning the United States' action of use of force in self-defense.' 3' The
United States also has relied on Article 51's self-defense provisions in using force
based upon an accumulation of terrorist events. For example, the United States,
based on "highly reliable evidence" that Osama Bin Laden's network was making

126. See President George W. Bush, Transcriptof Statement by United States President George W

Bush on Wednesday (Sept. 12, 2001) available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1540544.stm
(stating that "[tihe deliberate and deadly attacks, which were carried out yesterday against our country,
were more than acts of terror. They were acts of war.").
127. See Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President'sRemarks at the United Nations

General Assembly (Sept. 12, 2002) available at http://merln.ndu.edu/MERLN/PFIraq/archive/
wh/20020912-1.pdf.
128. Id. See also Lucy Martinez, September lth, Iraq And The Doctrine Of Anticipatory Self-

Defense, 72 UMKC L. Rev. 123, 150 (2003) (discussing the unilateral use of force based on
anticipatory self-defense in the invasion in Iraq); See also Megan K. Stack & Henry Chu, Syria Asserts
Its Right to Self-Defenses, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2003, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2003/oct/
12/world/fg-mideastl 2 (discussing Syria's right to self-defense and also discussing the Israeli claim to a
right of preemption); Ahmad Ali Ghouri, US Attacks Inside Pakistan Territory: An Insight on
International Law and Use of Force, HG.ORG, available at http://www.hg.org/article.asp?id=5447
(discussing the doctrine of preemptive self-defense to justify attacks against Pakistan); see also
President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation - Ultimatum to Saddam Hussein, AMERICAN
RHETORIC
(March
17,
2003)
available at http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/

wariniraq/gwbushiraq31703.htm.
129. Sharp, Walter Gary Sr., The Use of Armed Force against Terrorism: American Hegemony or
Impotence, 1 CHI. J. INTL. L. 37, 41 (2000). See also Letter to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate on the United States Air Strike Against
Libya, THE RONALD REAGAN PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY (Apr. 16, 1986), available at

http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1986/41686d.htm.
130. See UN Doc. S/PV.2682 (Apr. 21, 1986). See also Sharp, supranote 129, at 42.
131. G.A. Res. 41/38, 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/38 (Nov. 20, 1986).
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nerve gas in a synthetic chemical plant in Sudan to produce chemical weapons
with the assistance of the Sudanese government 132 and of Afghanistan's assistance
to Bin Laden in allowing terrorist training camps on its territory,133 ordered cruise
missile attacks against the training facilities in Afghanistan and a pharmaceutical
plant in Sudan in 1990.134 The United States justified these missile strikes in
Afghanistan and Sudan as an exercise of its inherent right of self-defense in
response to anticipated attacks-preventive self-defense.135 Thus, characterizing
terrorism as an act of war is a convenient tool in the propaganda and political
arsenal of powerful nations seeking to justify the use of force in the territories of
alien-minded nations.
The 9/11 event increases the risk of the establishment of state practices
justifying the use of force as self-defense. The 9/11 event differs from previous
incidents in that it led so-called civilized nations to focus our legal attention-at
least currently-on a narrow concept of globalized terrorism centered on Bin
Laden, Al Qaeda and the Taliban, creating the fiction that civilized nations can
never be a part of terrorist actions. The subsequent open endorsement and naked
pursuit of a "War on Terror" is a convenient and'expedient shift from terrorism as
a crime to terrorism as an act of war. It is convenient and expedient because the
notion of a War on Terror allows a state (generally a powerful state) to use force
against another state in self-defense if there is any link or connection with
terrorism based on a unilateral or coalitional determination. 136 At the same time,

132. See John Quigley, InternationalLaw Violations By The United States In The Middle East As A
Factor Behind Anti-American Terrorism, 63 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 815, 825 n.66 (2002) (citing Department of
State Fact Sheet, Aug. 21, 1998, Department of State's Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Strike on
Facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan (Aug. 21, 1998), in 9 Foreign Pol'y Bull. 13 (No. 5, 1998) ("The
U.S. is confident this Sudanese government-controlled facility is involved in the production of chemical
weapons agents."); Steven Lee Myers, Dozens of Ship-Launched Cruise Missiles Strike at Same
Moment, 2,500 Miles Apart, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1998, at AI0; Address by the President to the
Nation (Aug. 20, 1998), in 9 Foreign Pol'y Bull. 6-8 (No. 5, 1998) ("Our forces also attacked a factory
[that] was involved in the production of materials for chemical weapons."); Excerpts from Press
Briefing by Secretary of State Albright and National Security Advisor Berger (Aug. 20, 1998), in id. at
8-12 (claiming Sudanese complex used to develop VX gas).
133. See President William Jefferson Clinton, Address to the Nation by the President (Aug. 20,
1998), available at http://clinton6.nara.gov/1998/08/1998-08-20-president-address-to-the-nation.ht(President Clinton addressed the nation stating that Afghanistan maintained "one of the most active
terrorist bases in the world. It contained key elements of the bin Laden network's infrastructure and has
served as a training camp for literally thousands of terrorists from around the globe.")
134. See id. (President Clinton "ordered our Armed Forces to strike at terrorist-related facilities in
Afghanistan and Sudan because of the imminent threat they presented to our national security.").
135. See President William Jefferson Clinton, Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on
Military Action Against Terrorist Sites in Afghanistan and Sudan (Aug. 21, 1998), available at
http://clinton6.nara.gov/1998/08/1998-08-21 -text-of-a-letter-on-afghanistan-and-sudan-strikes.html
("These strikes were a necessary and proportionate response to the imminent threat of further terrorist
attacks against U.S. personnel and facilities. These strikes were intended to prevent and deter additional
attacks by a clearly identified terrorist threat."); see also John Yoo, International Law and the War in
Iraq, 97 Am. J. Int'l L. 563, 573 (2003) (describing the United States strikes against Libya as necessary
to prevent future terrorist attacks).
136. Yoo, supra note 135, at 573; see also President George W. Bush, supra note 126, and
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captured individuals can be brought into domestic criminal legal systems and tried
in domestic courts or even military tribunals. Investigations by torture, lacking due
137
process, may also be justified without regard to international humanitarian law.
In this way 9/11 has become a convenient justification for treating terrorism either
as a crime or as an act of war as suits the purposes of powerful countries, based
solely on their determinations of what is appropriate rather than on international
law. 138 There are examples in which civilized states have engaged in terrorist
activities and yet remain exempt from the term terrorism and the responsibilities
thereof. The 1986 decision in the case of Nicaragua against the United States in
the International Court of Justice is an apt example. While the United States was
ordered to make reparations for its violation of international law in supporting
Contra guerillas, it was not tagged as a terrorist nor was made responsible for its
state-sponsered terrorist activities.139
The invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 are direct and clear
examples of the use of force in the name of the War on Terror. 140 These further
provided incentives to use force in other territories. The United States' attack on
terrorist suspects in Syrian territory in October 2008 was justified on the basis that
a network of Al-Qaeda-linked foreign fighters was moving through Syria into
Iraq. 141 Similarly, U.S. forces have attacked a village in Pakistan's south
accompanying text.
137. See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. §2241(e) (2005) (amended 2008) (held
unconstitutional by Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2230 (2008)); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.
Ct. 2749, 2810 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that once the DTA was adopted, the Court lost
the right to render judgment on it "The DTA provides: [N]o court, justice, or judge shall have
jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an
alien detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. This provision "t[ook] effect
on the date of the enactment of this Act," which was December 30, 2005. As of that date, then, no court
had jurisdiction to "hear or consider" the merits of petitioner's habeas application. This repeal of
jurisdiction is simply not ambiguous as between pending and future cases. It prohibits any exercise of
jurisdiction, and it became effective as to all cases last December 30. It is also perfectly clear that the
phrase "no court,justice, or judge" includes this Court and its Members, and that by exercising our
appellate jurisdiction in this case we are "hear[ing] or consider[ing]
an application for a writ of
habeas corpus.") (internal citations omitted); see Jens David Ohlin & George P. Fletcher, Special Issue
the Law of Cruelty: Torture as an InternationalCrime, 6 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 157, 157 (2008) ("[T]he
Bush Administration now maintains the right to use torture in the war against terror, or at the very least
to use harsh interrogation measures that fall just short of an elusive definition of torture as a federal or
international crime.").
138. See Bush Statement After 9/I1, supra note 126; see also President's Remarks at the United
Nations General Assembly, supra note 127 (justifying the 2003 invasion of Iraq); see also Megan K.
Stack & Henry Chu, supra note 128 (addressing Syria's right to self-defense); Ahmad Ali Ghori, supra
note 128 (addressing the U.S. attacks inside Palestinian Territory); President George W. Bush, Address
to the Nation - Ultimatum to Saddam Hussein, supra note 128.
139. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
257, (June 27, 1986).
140. See President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress (Sept. 20, 2001),
available at http://www.historyplace.com/speeches/gw-bush-9-1 1.htm; President George W. Bush,
Address to the Nation - Ultimatum to Saddam Hussein, supra note 128; see infra notes 160-161 and
accompanying text.
141. See Jennifer Griffin et al., U.S. Official: Unclear If Al Qaeda CoordinatorKilled in Syria

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 37:4

Waziristan. 142 In both attacks, there was no self-defense justification under Article
51 of the UN Charter and no approval from either country.
A new dawn of the War on Terror began when President Bush gave a speech
before a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001.143 On October 7, The
United States and its allies attacked Afghanistan.
People were killed
indiscriminately. He declared war with the following statement:
We will direct every resource at our command .
every means of
diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law
enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of
war. . to the destruction and to the defeat of the global terror network.
. We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another,
drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or no rest. And
we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every
nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with
us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that
continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United
States as a hostile regime. 144
In Afghanistan, the United States' use of self-defense was justified by some
scholars based on the International Law Commission's draft articles on
Responsibility of States for International Wrongful Acts (200 1). 14' This document
provides that "[e]very internationally wrongful act of a State entails the
international responsibility of that State. ' ' 146 The articles relied on by these
scholars include: Article 8 (conduct of a person directed or controlled by the
state), 147 Article 9 (conduct carried out in the absence or default of the official
149
authorities), 148 and Article 11 (conduct acknowledged or adopted by the state).

Raid, FOXNEWS, Oct. 28, 2008, available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,444199,00.html;
see also U.S.: Syria Raid Killed Al Qaeda Leader, CBS NEWS, Oct., 27, 2008, available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/10/27/world/main4547352.shtml.
142. See Deadly Missiles Strike Pakistan, BBC Jan. 23,
2009,
available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south-asia/7847423.stm.
143. See President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress, supra note 140.
144. Id.
145. See Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of "Armed Attack" In Article 51 Of The U.N.
Charter,43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 41, 50-51 (2002). See also International Law Commission, Responsibility
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10
(2001) [hereafter ILC].
146. Id. at art. 1.
147. "The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under
international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the
direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct." Id. at art. 8.
148. "The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under
international law if the person or group of persons is in fact exercising elements of the governmental
authority in the absence or default of the official authorities and in circumstances such as to call for the
exercise of those elements of authority." Id. art. 9.
149. "Conduct which is not attributable to a State under the preceding articles shall nevertheless be
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The United States' use of self-defense against Afghanistan is arguably justifiable
under this document. Some scholars have proferred that:
"[d]epending on the facts, one might find the de facto government
responsible because of the omissions of its organs or officials in
allowing Al Qaeda to operate from Afghanistan even after its known
involvement in terrorist acts prior to the September 11 incidents...
because the de facto government by default essentially allowed Al
Qaeda to exercise governmental functions in projecting force abroad
(Article 9), or because after the September 11 incidents the de facto
government declined to extradite Al Qaeda operatives and thus, in
150
effect, adopted Al Qaeda's conduct as its own."'
Similarly, President Bush justified the use of force in Iraq by declaring that
Security Council Resolutions 678 and 687 authorized the United States and allied
nations to use force against Iraq to destroy weapons of mass destruction. 151 The
British and Australian governments issued similar statements. 52 This marked the
start of "Operation Iraqi Freedom," which has now turned into the United State's
"Operation Freedom from Iraq." After the United States' use of the controversial
Security Council Resolution 687 (that contained Iraq after the 1991 war) 153 as a
basis to go to war (Operation Iraqi Freedom),1 54 the United States and the United
Kingdom then proposed Resolution 1441 in 2002 that stated "further material
breach of Iraq's obligations. . . authorizes member states to use all necessary
means 155 to restore international peace and security .... ,156 However, because of

considered an act of that State under international law if and to the extent that the State acknowledges
and adopts the conduct in question as its own." Id. art. 11.
150. Murphy, supra note 145, at 50-51 (citing W. Michael Reisman, InternationalLegal Responses
to Terrorism, 22 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 3, 39 (1999); see Luigi Condorelli, The Imputability to States of Acts
of International Terrorism, 19 Israel Y.B. H.R. 233 (1989); YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION,

182-83 (3d ed. 2001) ("[A]n armed attack is not extenuated by the subterfuge of
indirect aggression or by reliance on a surrogate. There is no real difference between the activation of a
country's regular armed forces and a military operation carried out at one remove, pulling the strings of
a terrorist organization (not formally associated with the governmental apparatus.")).
151. See President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President in Address to the United Nations
General Assembly, (Sept. 12, 2002), (transcript available at http://merln.ndu.edu/MERLN/PFIraq/
archive/wh20020912-I .pdf;
http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/wariniraq/gwbushiraq
31703.htm).
152. See United Kingdom Attorney General Lord Goldsmith, Parliamentary Answer on The Legal
Basis for the Use of Force Against Iraq, British House of Commons (Mar. 17,2003) available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/uk-politics/2857347.stm (arguing that U.N. Security Council Resolution
1441 (2002), in conjunction with previous Resolutions 678 (1990) and 687 (1991), authorized
Operation Iraqi Freedom); Australia Prime Minister John Howard, Address Made to Australian
Parliament, (March 18, 2003) (transcript available at http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/reps/
dailys/drl80303.pdf) (shortened transcript available at http://www.thestar.com/federalelection/
article/508755).
153. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc. S/RES/0678 (Nov. 29, 1990).
154. See Remarks by the President, supra note 151.
155. S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (Nov. 8, 2002) (emphasis added).
156. Id.
AND SELF-DEFENSE
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Chinese, Russian and French threats to veto the resolution declaring "material
breach" by Iraq, Resolution 1441 was revised. 157 On September 17, 2002,
President Bush first released what has become known as "the Bush Doctrine of
preemptive self-defense" in the National Security Strategy.158 In the case of Iraq,
President Bush made clear that the United States could always proceed in the
exercise of its inherent right of self-defense recognized in Article 51 of the United
Nations Charter. 59 President Bush used the 9/11 attack and the War on Terror to
justify the 2003 invasion of Iraq as a preemptive use of self-defense with mixed
rationales. Some of the reasons given were that Iraq had weapons of mass
destruction, 160 the Iraqi people's need for freedom,
and the establishment of
16 1
democracy in Iraq as an example for the region.
VIII.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE WAR ON TERROR

More complicated questions have arisen, such as whether an act of terrorism
may be channeled through the rules of criminal law, either national or
international, as the majority of treaties and resolutions have suggested; whether an
act of terrorism constitutes an act of aggression in breach of Article 2(4), justifying
an armed response in self-defense within the scope of Article 51 of the UN
Charter; or whether an act of terrorism constitutes an act of aggression in breach of
international peace and security that justifies a collective security approach by the
Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Without considering
relevant questions with regard to the present and future course of handling
terrorism, states have acted based on unilateral security prospects, which is by no
means a responsible security policy. It has been suggested that militarily strong

157. See Tim Youngs and Paul Bowers, Iraq and UN Security Council Resolution 1441, 11-13,
available at http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2002/rp02-064.pdf. Compare, Full Text
Draft UN Resolution, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle-east/2831607.stm with S.C. Res.
1441, supra note 155.
158. "For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they
can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack.
Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence
of an imminent threat-most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to
attack." The National Security Strategy Of The United States Of America, 15 (Sept. 17, 2002),
available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/national/nss-020920.pdf [hereinafter
The National Security Strategy].
159. William H. Taft and Todd F. Buchwald, Preemption, Iraq, and InternationalLaw, 97 AM. J.
INT'L L. 557, 557 n.1, (citing Report in Connection with Presidential Determination Under Public Law
107-243, reprinted in 149 CONG. REC. H1957, H1958 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2003) (on resolution
authorizing use of force against Iraq).
160. See President George W. Bush, President Discusses Beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom,
(March 22, 2003) (transcript available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/18137/president-discusses
beginning-of operation iraqi-freedom.html?breadcrumb=%2Fbios%2F I 1324%2Fgeorge-w.bush%3 F
groupby%3D3%26hide%3D I%26id%3 D 11324%26filter%3 D2003).
161. See President George W. Bush, President Discusses the Future of Iraq (Feb. 26, 2003)
available at http://www.mafhoum.com/press4/bushl34.htm; see also President George W. Bush,
Address to the Nation - Ultimatum to Saddam Hussein, (March 17, 2003), available at
http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/wariniraq/gwbushiraq31703.htm (providing transcript and
audio recording).
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countries such as the United States are power-oriented and have a tendency not to
recognize relevant international law or to disregard it, whereas Europe has a
tendency to be law-oriented because of its militarily weak position.162 Because of
its power-oriented approach, the United States' War on Terror has raised questions
on the future of international law.
There are three primary sections contained in the Charter of the United
Nations that govern the use of force against Member States. 163 First, Article 2(4)
of the Charter provides a blanket mandate against the use of force "in any manner
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations." ' 64 Specifically, "[a]ll
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. ' 6 5 Second,
66
Article 51 of the UN Charter is the initial legal structure for self-defense.'
Article 51 provides that:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence
shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in
any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council
under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and
security.

167

Third, Chapter VII of the UN Charter168 empowers the Security Council to take
those actions necessary to maintain international peace and security. In essence,
Chapter VII allows the Security Council to "determine the existence of any threat
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" and to authorize the
Member Nations to'1take
nonmilitary and military actions to "restore international
69
peace and security."
The United States' action in going into Afghanistan in self-defense and the
post 9/11 War on Terror have a number of serious implications on international
law by amending and expanding Article 2(4) and Article 51 of the UN Charter.

162. See generally ROBERT KAGAN, OF POWER AND PARADISE: AMERICA AND EUROPE IN THE
NEW WORLD ORDER (2003) (providing a realist perspective and author firmly supports Bush's foreign
policy).
163. See U.N. Charter arts. 2(4), 39-45, 51.
164. Id. art. 2(4).

165. Id.
166. Id. art. 51.
167. Id.
168. See id. arts. 39-45.
169. Id. art. 39.
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Previously, Article 2(4) was limited to state actors; 170 however, after 9/11 not only
state actors but also non-state actors can violate Article 2(4) by disturbing the
territorial integrity and political sovereignty of a country. This means that Article
2(4) has been extended to include any non-state actors who initiate or plan to
attack another country. The entire international community rushed to embrace the
de facto amendment of Article 2(4) by endorsing the use of self-defense as a
justification of the United States' actions against Al Qaeda, a non-state actor, in
Afghanistan, which in turn eviscerated the thrust of Article 2(4). 171
The doctrine of self-defense has been stretched from self-defense under
Article 51 of the UN Charter to preemptive self-defense or anticipatory selfdefense as described in the Caroline Doctrine, 173 and now is further stretched to
preventive self-defense as utilized by the Bush Administration during its invasion
of Iraq. 174 After 9/11, Article 51 has been amended in two ways. First, the post
9/11 War on Terror has amended Article 51, initially a structure for self-defense, to
encompass "preemptive" self-defense, which is similar to the preemptive selfdefense or anticipatory self-defense under the Caroline Doctrine.' 75 This means
that a state can now justify the use of preemptive self-defense under Article 51 of
the Charter without regard to the words and intent of the Article's provisions.
Second, after 9/11, a state or non-state actor does not have to actually attack or
violate Article 2(4) of the Charter prior to a self-defense claim being utilized. 176 If
any state or non-state actor initiates or plans in a host country to attack another
country, the host country is subject to a self-defense attack. This is recognition of
the preventive self-defense justification used by the Bush Administration during its
invasion of Iraq.' 77 Thus, Article 2(4) and Article 51 have been expanded to
include not only the inherent right of self-defense after an actual attack occurs but
now also are being used to justify preemptive and preventive self-defense in
situations where a state or non-state actor is believed to have plans for an attack,
based solely on the unilateral prediction of the country using force that an attack
will occur in near or remote future - even though that prediction may be wrong.
The War on Terror saga of the Bush Administration, by (ab)using Article 51
of the UN Charter, has caused not only defacto amendment of Articles 2(4) and 51
but has also undermined the use of collective security under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter. 178 The United States acted unilaterally by not bringing the 9/11 case

170. See id. art. 2(4).
171. See YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE, 207-08 (4th ed. 2005); see
also Colonel Kenneth Watkin, Canada/UnitedStates Military Interoperabilityand Humanitarian Law
Issues: Land Mines, Terrorism, Military Objectives and TargetedKilling, 15 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L.
281, 293 n.54 (2005).
172. U.N. Charter, art. 51.
173. See R.Y. Jennings, The CarolineandMcLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82, 92 (1938).
174. See The National Security Strategy, supra note 158, at 15.
175. See Jennings, supra note 173, at 92.
176. See The National Security Strategy, supra note 158, at 15.
177. See Taft & Buchwald, supra note 159, at 557.
178. Chapter VII entitled "Action With Respect To Threats To The Peace, Breaches Of The Peace,
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before the Security Council, usurping the UN Security Council's authority under
Article 39. In doing so, the United States not only missed the opportunity to
adhere to the UN charter and international law but also missed an "opportunity
knocking" chance for international leadership. If the Bush Administration was
honest in its determination that 9/11 was a threat of or breach of international
peace and security, it could have brought the issue before the Security Council
rather than unilaterally declaring a global War on Terror and imposing its
consequences upon the world. Unfortunately, the Bush Administration did not
bring the 9/11 issue before the Security Council. It decided to take the
responsibility upon itself, along the way limiting the scope of terrorism to the
conduct of Al-Qaeda, Bin Laden and the Taliban. It further embellished this
restricted view of terrorism (Al-Qaedism) by invading Iraq, which in turn led to the
invitation of Al-Qaedists into the country. The international community was
forced to fix the humanitarian conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan that were caused
by the destruction of a war waged without the authority of international law. This
missed opportunity to bring the 9/11 issue before the Security Council has led to a
new problem in international law - the prospect of never-ending terror wars. The
United States' action in pursuing a global War on Terror has energized the side
claimed to be terrorists in terms of their scattered but collective intent to network
and has unified scrambled but common anti-US sentiment.
What if the United States had, prior to invading Afghanistan, brought the case
before the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter by arguing that
9/11 was a threat to and breach of international peace and security? Considering
the worldwide support of the United States based on the 9/11 event,17 9 there is a
little or no doubt that the Security Council would have determined that 9/11 was in
fact a threat to, and breach of, the peace and security under Article 39 of the UN
Charter.180 This determination would have given the Security Council the ability
to enforce Article 42, allowing the United States along with the other Members of
the United Nations to "take action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to
maintain or restore international peace and security,"' 181 without applying Article
40 (requesting compliance with provisional measures)182 or Article 41 (complete or
partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic,
radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic
relation). 183 Further, all Member states would have had to undertake actions under

And Acts Of Aggression" of the U.N. Charter sets forth the basis for use of collective security. U.N.
Charter ch. VII. See infra notes 180-185 and accompanying text (providing a summary of the collective

security abilities under Chapter VII).
179. See Watkin, supra note 171, at 281 n.54.
180. "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the

peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security." U.N.
Charter, supra note 163, art. 39.
181. Id. art. 42.

182. Id. art. 40.
183. Id. art. 41.
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Article 43.184 If the application of Article 43 would have taken too much time, the
United States and other countries could have cooperated in providing combined
international enforcement action under Article 45 of the Charter.1 85 If these actions
had been considered, the international community would not have struggled with
the meaning of self-defense and the applicability of Chapter VII of the UN Charter
IX. CONCLUSION

The absence of an internationally accepted definition of terrorism has led to
international lawlessness and unilateral vigilantism. The post 9/11 War on Terror
resulted from the longstanding failure of the international community to agree on a
definition of terrorism, which in turn has intensified the war of terrors between the
two sides. From the viewpoint of one side, this is a justified (unilaterally, because
this side has capability to move and manage military might and resources) War on
Terror to protect human rights, freedoms, civilization and the (self-styled) global
rule of law. This side has labeled its War on Terror a just war by definition,
defocusing a possible response mechanism to address the very real problem of
international terrorism. The method of this War on Terror by the coalition of
willing nations against insurgents and failed states will lead to likely forfeiture of
sovereign equality, hot pursuits of terrorists under the claim of international rule of
law without proper application of the UN charter, and so-called justified preventive
war and regime change without regard to the interests and human rights of the
people of weak or failed states. The result is a fiercely proclaimed or professed
new international law and order. On the other side, weak or failed states and
stateless actors view terror as a justified response to a history of terrorism (a series
of events resulting in victimization by domination, colonization, hegemonization,
and the silencing of dissent). This side, then, views terrorism as perhaps the only
available tool against the so-called civilized and powerful nations' asserted
responsibility to unilaterally guarantee international stability, peace and security,
and against horror produced by a good Samaritan global hegemon.
The concept of the War on Terror, particularly after 9/11, has emerged in a
form in which only failed states and less powerful and resourceful people engage

184. Id. art. 43. Art. 43 of the U.N. Charter provides that "1. All Members of the United Nations,
in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make
available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements,
armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of
maintaining international peace and security. 2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the
numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the
facilities and assistance to be provided. 3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as
possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council
and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to
ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes." Id.
185. Id. art. 45. "In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members
shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement
action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action
shall be determined within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in
Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee." Id.
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in the act of terrorism, a form in which (self-styled) civilized nations will never
employ terrorism or engage in terrorist activities. But because there is no legal
basis to respond to terrorist activities, both sides can now assert an ethical basis for
their respective terror wars. This division between nations and societies will create
enormous tension between the populace of both sides, leaving open the question of
whether terrorism is an effect or a cause of the horror that follows. 186 In order to
avoid such a division and debate, the definition of terrorism needs to include the
terrorist activities conducted not only by the failed or likely to be failed states and
scattered non-state actors, but also should include the terrorist activities engaged in
by the powerful states. This inclusive approach in defining terror has the potential
to create an international acceptability to the definition of terrorism. At the same
time, this approach will provide an objective standard for all state and non-state
actors to use in response to the problem of terrorism. Such a clear and inclusive
standard might suffer from the lack of traditional enforcement mechanisms in
international law; however, it will provide a legal basis for international consensus
to criticize and to pressure a country or a group that engages in terrorist activities.

186. Angelica Nuzzo, Reasonsfor Conflict: PoliticalImplications of a Definition of Terrorism, 35
METAPHILOSOPHY 330, 336 (2004).

ILLEGAL RENDITIONS AND IMPROPER TREATMENT:
AN OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE REFUGEE REMEDIES
PURSUANT TO THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE
KRISHMA C. PARSAD*

I. INTRODUCTION

The state of International Law has been significantly influenced in recent
years by the terrorist attacks which took place on United States soil on September
11, 2001. Since that time, in an effort to combat terrorism, the United States has
engaged in a number of questionable practices in relation to the treatment of
suspected terrorists.
Specifically, suspected terrorists are rendered to third
countries where they are subject to torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment (CIDT).
Not only are these acts prima facie violations of international law to which
the United States has obligated itself, but they disrupt the lives of innocent
civilians who are unlawfully detained and improperly interrogated. Often times
those accused of acts of terrorism are denied re-entry into their home countries
because they are stigmatized as terrorists or are denied refugee status in the United
States due to stringent application of these international conventions which seek to
protect individuals from torture and CIDT. The conventions to which the United
States has bound itself which are applicable in this context include the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (CAT)', the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) 2, and the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
(Refugee Convention) 3. Instead of adhering to its obligations pursuant to these
conventions, the United States application of these obligations has the effect of

* B.A., Lewis & Clark College (2002); J.D., University of Denver, Sturm College of Law (2009).
The author would like to thank Professor Regina Germain for whose Asylum Law Seminar this paper
was originally composed as well as Professors Ved Nanda and Phoenix Cai for their profound guidance,
inspiration and teachings in the area of International Law.
1. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
G.A. Res. 39/46, Annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984)
[hereinafter CAT].
2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 999 U.N.T.S.
171, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR].
3. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter
Refugee Convention]. Note that the United States is only a signatory to the related but independent
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, which is a treaty that incorporates articles 2 through 34 of
the Refugee Convention. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T.
6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. The Refugee Convention covers only those persons who have become
refugees as a result of events occurring before January 1, 1951, whereas the Protocol covers those who
have become refugees after January 1, 1951. See id; see also Refugee Convention.
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subjecting individuals to indefinite and improper detention within the United States
or leading to the removal of individuals to countries where they are subject to
torture and CIDT.
Thus, this paper seeks to explore the manner in which the United States has
interpreted and applied international law when it renders persons to countries
where they will be tortured and subject to CIDT and evaluates the legal obligations
that the United States has under international law - whether or not those persons
As all other countries which are signatories to
are considered terrorists.
international human rights conventions and which are bound to comply with
customary international law, the United States must too adhere to extraterritorial
application of international obligations and provide proper remedy to those likely
to be subject to improper treatment under all circumstances.
1I.

"EXTRAORDINARY" RENDITION, NON-REFOULEMENT, TORTURE, AND

TERRORISM DEFINED

A. Rendition, Extradition, and "Extraordinary"Rendition
Notions of rendition and extradition are not new to international discourse and
international law jurisprudence. Renditions occur when persons are abducted from
their home countries without administrative process. 4 Such renditions may be
found to be in and of themselves violations of international law norms because
they constitute violations of state sovereignty. 5 Extraditions generally take place
between two countries that have an extradition treaty and occur when one country
requests that its citizen who is residing in another country be returned for criminal
prosecution. 6
In recent years, international law scholars have also been confronted with the
notion of "extraordinary rendition" which does not have a definition under
international law.7 The term extraordinary rendition is generally used to refer to
the situation where a person is taken to a third country in a manner such that he or
she does not know where he or she is and is subject to torture or CIDT.8 These
individuals are transferred before they enter United States borders to negate any
constitutional protections they might have received had they been transferred
directly from U.S. soil. 9 These acts have caused controversy over whether or not
4. See Prosecutor v. Nikolic, Case No. IT-94-2-AR73, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal
Concerning Legality of Arrest, paras. 22, 29 (June 5, 2003).
5. Id. at paras. 22-26.
6. See Abel v. Minister of Justice & Others, 2000 (4) All SA 63 (C) (S. Aft); see also United
States v. Shulman, [2001] I S.C.R. 616 (Can.).
7. Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary,Rendition and the Rule of
Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1333, 1334-36 (2007) (explaining that the United States has presented no
legal justification for the practice of "extraordinary" rendition).
8. ALL PARTY PARLIAMENTARY GROUP ON EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION, THE CTR. FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS AND GLOBAL JUSTICE N. Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, TORTURE BY PROXY: INTERNATIONAL LAW
at
available
6
(2005),
RENDITIONS"
TO
"EXTRAORDINARY
APPLICABLE
http://www.chrgj.org/docs/APPG-NYU%/20Briefing%/20Paper.pdf (hereinafter TORTURE BY PROXY].
9. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) ("It is well established that certain constitutional
protections available to persons inside the United States are unavailable to aliens outside of our
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the United States, as a party to the CAT, violates principles of non-refoulement, or
improper return, by engaging in these practices.' 0
B. The Customary InternationalLaw PrincipleofNon-Refoulement

Non-refoulement is a principle of customary international law by which a
person may not be returned to a country where he or she may face persecution or
be subject to torture or CIDT. 11 The concept of non-refoulement has taken many
forms in treaties of international human rights law. Those which are pertinent here
include the non-refoulement provision within the Refugee Convention and the nonrefoulement provision embodied in both the CAT and the ICCPR.
The Refugee Convention provides that a person who will likely be subject to
persecution on the basis of race, nationality, political opinion, religion or
membership in a particular social group may not be returned, or refouled, to the
country where he or she faces such persecution. 12 The standard under the CAT and
the ICCPR has a broader range of applicability. The provision for non-refoulement
in the CAT is distinguished from the non-refoulement provision of the 1951
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees on the basis that there are no
exceptions to the provision under the CAT as there are under the Convention. 13 In
this regard, the non-refoulement provision is non-derogable and "[t]he nature of the
activities in which the person concerned engaged cannot be a material
'4
consideration when making a determination under article 3 of the Convention.'
The principle of non-refoulement has been widely held a norm of customary
international law such that all states are bound by this principle whether or not they
are parties to any of the aforementioned conventions. 15 Thus, there are two bases
geographic borders."); see also Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659-60 (1892) ("It is an
accepted maxim of international law that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in
sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions,
or to admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe.").
10. CAT, supra note 1, art. 3(1).
11. Refugee Convention, supra note 3, art. 33(i); CAT, supra note 1, art. 3(i).
12. Refugee Convention, supra note 3, art. 33. It is important to note the distinction between the
definition of persecution as referenced in the Refugee Convention as compared to torture in the CAT
and the ICCPR. It has been noted that there is no internationally accepted definition of persecution
under international law. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES
AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967
PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES para. 51 (1992). The definition of torture, on the
other hand, has been widely acknowledged and accepted in the international community. See
Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Judgment, 146 (Dec. 10, 1998). For purposes of
this paper, the focus is on the definition of torture as it relates to rendition and the principle of nonrefoulement.
13. GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL & JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 301 (3rd

ed. 2007).
14. U.N. Comm. Against Torture [UNCAT], Gorki Ernesto Tapia Paez v. Sweden,

14.5, U.N.

Doc. CAT/C/18/D/39/1996 (Apr. 28, 1997).
15. SIR ELIHU LAUTERPACHT & DANIEL BETHLEHEM, REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 163-64 (Erika Feller, Volker Ttirk & Frances Nicholson eds., Cambridge University Press 2003)
(2001) (articulating that the customary norm of non-refoulement prohibits return of a person to a

country where there are "substantial grounds" for asserting that the person will be subject to torture). It
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of international law by which a state may be bound by the obligation of nonrefoulement: 1) by treaty, or 2) by customary international law. Each form
for states, such as the United States,
constitutes a separate binding obligation
6
which are parties to these conventions.'
C. Torture as a Jus Cogens Norm of InternationalLaw
Torture is defined at Article 1 of the CAT which provides that:
[T]he term "torture" means any act by which severe pain or suffering,
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for
such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a
confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed
or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or
a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind,
when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with
the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in
arising only
an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering
17
sanctions.
lawful
to
incidental
or
in
inherent
from,
The prohibition of torture has been widely held as a jus cogens norm 1 , or a
preemptory norm of international law from which no derogation is permitted. 9
Thus, no state is permitted to engage in acts of torture at any20time. Likewise, no
state is permitted to subject persons to torture via refoulement.

is once again important to note the distinction between the non-refoulement provision articulated in the
Refugee Convention and that referenced in the CAT. The Refugee Convention provision limits the
scope of non-refoulement protections on the basis of persecution for race, religion, nationality, political
opinion and membership in a particular social group. Non-refoulement for torture as provided in the
CAT is widely recognized as custom, and some authors have even asserted that it constitutes a norm of
jus cogens. See, e.g., Jean Allain, The Jus cogens Nature of Non-refoulement, 13 Int'l Journal Refugee
Law 533, 538 (2001).
16. See North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den./F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, at paras. 37,
63 (Feb. 20) (distinguishing between being bound by "specific assent" by ratifying a treaty and being
bound by customary international law which is automatic and does not require assent and to which no
reservations may be made); see also, id. at para. 69 (noting that a treaty provision might embody or
crystallize a norm of customary international law, or contribute to its later development into customary
international law).
17. CAT, supra note 1, art. 1.
18. U.N. Office of the High Comm'n for Human Rights [UNHCHR], Comm'n on Human Rights,
Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 24. Issues relating to reservations made upon
ratification or accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in relation to
declarations under article 41 of the Covenant, 1 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR!C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (Nov. 4,
1997); see also Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, Request for the Indication of
Provisional Measures (New Application: 2002) (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda), 2002 I.C.J. 219, 289
(July 10).
19. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, done May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8
I.L.M 679 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter VCLT].
20. See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 15, at 163-64.
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The scope of acts which constitute torture is not limited. 2' To establish
torture, there must be intent to carry out a "prohibited" purpose.2 2 Such prohibited
purposes include inhuman treatment for obtaining information, imposing
punishment or discrimination for any reason. 23 Regardless of who imposes the
torture, states have the obligation to impose legislation that prohibits torture by
either public officials or private individuals. 24 A state may be responsible for acts
25
of torture where it engages in torture or does not prevent torture from occurring.
Torture is distinguished from CIDT on the basis of the severity of the
treatment. 26 A number of factors such as "physical or mental condition of the
victim, the effect of the treatment and, ... age, sex, state of health and position of
inferiority" may be considered in determining whether the conduct arises to the
required level of severity.27 Examples of conduct which have been found to
constitute torture include: beating, falanga, extraction of nails, bums, electric
shock, sexual violence, deprivation of senses, and threats.28
D. The Definition of Terrorism under InternationalLaw
The international community has not adopted a uniform definition of
terrorism. Instead, a number of treaties concerning terrorism have been adopted
over the years which embody several varying definitions of terrorism. 29 While the
Security Council of the United Nations has recognized terrorism as an important
issue in international law, it too declined to affirmatively define terrorism in its
most prominent resolution concerning the issue.30 In addition to condemning acts
of terrorism, the Security Council used its United Nations Charter Chapter VII
powers to prohibit Member States from providing "safe haven" to those who
commit or who aid in the commission of terrorist acts.3 1

21. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, para. 470 (Nov. 16, 1998).
22. Id. para. 471.
23. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Judgment, paras. 478, 485 (Feb.
22, 2001).
24. U.N. Int'l Human Rights Instruments [HRI], Compilation of General Comments and General
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 150-51, U.N. Doc. HRL'GEN/1/Rev.7
(May 12, 2004).
25. Prosecutor v. Furundzija,, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Judgment, para. 142 (Dec. 10, 1998).
26. Compare CAT, supra note 1, art. 1(1), with CAT, supra note 1, art. 16(1) (distinguishing
between torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment).
27. Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, para. 484 (Sept. 1, 2004).
28. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm'n on Human Rights, Report: Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or DegradingTreatment or Punishment, 119, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1986/15 (Feb.
19, 1986) (preparedby P. Kooijmans).
29. See Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14,
1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219; see also International Convention for the Suppression of
Terrorist Bombings, G.A. Res. 52/164, U.N. Doc. A/52/49 (Dec. 15, 1997); see also International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, G.A. Res. 54/109, U.N. Doc. A/54/49
(Dec. 9, 1999); see also International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism,
G.A. Res. 59/290/Annex, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Apr. 13, 2005).
30. See S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
31. Id. para. 2(c).
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Even so, the Security Council has passed resolutions to remind the
international community of its obligations pursuant to non-refoulement in
assessing treatment of alleged terrorists. For example, Security Council Resolution
1624 calls upon states to comply with non-refoulement as articulated in the
Refugee Convention and comply with international standards of human rights and
refugee law.32 The United Nations Human Rights Committee which evaluates
Member State implementation of the ICCPR has also emphasized the need to
comply with treaty provisions in implementing Security Council Resolution 1373
by stressing, in particular, the prohibition on torture and CIDT.33
III.

TORTURE AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION

The primary legal reasons for condemning renditions which result in improper
treatment include 1) the manner in which persons are abducted from their home
countries without administrative process; 2) the treatment that these persons are
subject to once they are detained in third countries; and 3) the validity of the
jurisdiction a court has in trying these individuals by virtue of unlawful
treatment.34 The practice of rendering such individuals to countries where torture
and CIDT occur is frequent in a number of countries around the world.
For example, Sweden has been found to be in breach of both the ICCPR and
the CAT for violating their non-refoulement provisions by returning Egyptian
citizens to Egypt where it was substantially more likely than not that they would be
subject to torture.35 According to Human Rights Watch, similar cases are pending
in Austria, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, the United
Kingdom and the United States.36 Each of these cases involves the question of
whether or not a person should have been extraterritorially transferred to a third
country where torture is practiced based on diplomatic assurances from that
country that the individual in question would not be tortured.
In some of these cases, the relevant immigration court or United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) determined that the individual was eligible
for refugee status due to a substantial likelihood that he or she would be subject to
torture if returned to the home country. 37 In light of cases such as those that took

32. S.C. Res. 1624, para. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1624 (Sept. 14, 2005).
33. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm. [HRC], Concluding Observations of the Human Rights
Committee: Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant,
Est., para. 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/77/EST (Apr. 15, 2003); Yemen, para. 18, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/CO/75/YEM (July 26, 2002); U. K., para. 6, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/73/UK (Dec. 6, 2001).
34. See supra, note 1.
35. Agiza v. Sweden, Decision of the Comm. Against Torture, Communication No. 233/2003,
para. 13.4, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/34/D/233/2003 (2005); Alzery v. Sweden, Views of the Human Rights
Comm., Communication No. 1416/2005, paras. 11.2,11.5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C./88/D/1416/2005 (2006).
36. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CASES INVOLVING DIPLOMATIC ASSURANCES AGAINST TORTURE:
DEVELOPMENTS

SINCE

MAY

2005,

1

(Jan.

2007),

available

at

http://www.hrw.org/en/node/77209/section/1.
37. See, e.g., Russian Supreme Court Rejected Challenge to Extraditions of Uzbek Asylum
Seekers, THE TIMES OF CENTRAL ASIA, Dec. 1, 2006 (holding that notwithstanding a UNHCR
determination of refugee status, extradition to Uzbek was proper; extraditions are on hold pending
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place in Sweden where the detainees were returned to the home country without
review of the order of extradition by an immigration court with authority to grant
asylum, the European Court of Human Rights has begun to enforce "interim
measures" to prevent extraditions from taking place before they are reviewed by
the court.38
When properly applied in this context, the CAT addresses the acts that are
prohibited under international law and positive duties that state parties must
enforce to ensure that torture and CIDT are quelled at the domestic level and
condemned on an international level. 39 Thus, the CAT provides a means by which
people who are subject to unlawful treatment may seek refuge in another country
when traditional asylum relief is not available.4 ° When countries such as the
United States unlawfully render persons to another country and subject them to
unlawful treatment, the United States and other countries who are parties to the
CAT have an international obligation to provide asylum relief to these individuals
notwithstanding any criminal acts in which these detained individuals may have
engaged, even when the renditions occur extraterritorially.
IV.

SEEKING RELIEF PURSUANT TO THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE

A. Basic Proceduresfor Seeking Relief Under the CAT
A party seeking relief under the CAT may file an individual petition with the
Committee Against Torture which is appointed by the United Nations and provides
commentaries on the interpretation of treaty provisions and serves as an
international tribunal before which cases may be brought. 4 1 To assert standing
before the Committee Against Torture, a state must make an optional declaration
pursuant to Article 22 of the convention.4 2 Additionally, the individual asserting
standing must have exhausted all domestic remedies and the issue must not have
been decided by another court of international law. 43 This requirement is a general
principle of international law which must be satisfied before claims before
international courts of law are considered ripe for review. 44
When the Committee Against Torture considers these cases with specific
regard to violation of Article 3 of the CAT and violations of non-refoulement, it
considers whether or not the state that is enforcing the extradition had actual or
constructive knowledge at the time of removal that there were "substantial grounds
for believing that [the detainee] would be in danger of being subjected by . . .

review by the European Court of Human Rights).
38. See EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ANNUAL ACTIVITY REPORT 18 (2005) (enforcing

interim measures to prevent Austria from extraditing detainees to Egypt).
39. CAT, supra note 1, arts. 2, 3.
40. See, e.g., Kamalthas v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 251 F.3d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir.
2001).
41. GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 13, at 298-99.
42. Id.

43. CAT, supra note 1, art. 22.
44. Interhandel Case (Switz. v. U.S.), 1959 I.C.J. 6, 26 (Mar. 21).
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'
The applicant, or "author" has the burden to demonstrate
authorities to torture. 45
general violations of torture, but also that "additional
are
not only that there
'46
that the individual concerned was personally at risk.
show
to
grounds... exist

The author has the overall "responsibility ...to establish a prima facie case
for the purpose of admissibility of his or her communication under article 22 of the
Convention" for Article 3 cases.47 Article 14 of the CAT provides that state parties
who violate its provisions must provide redress to victims including compensation
and rehabilitation.48 It is the duty of the state to take upon itself provision of a
remedy where the Committee Against Torture has found a breach of the
convention and that remedy must be reported back to the Committee Against
Torture for further assessment of the state's compliance with the CAT.49
To apply the Article 3 non-refoulement provision, the Article 1 definition of
torture must be satisfied. Thus, the provision does not apply in instances of CIDT.
Three requirements must be met for a state to be obligated to carry out this
principle. First, there must be "substantial grounds" indicating that torture will
occur upon the person's return to his or her country. 50 Second, the acts of torture
must be state sanctioned. 1 Finally, any pain or suffering that is inflicted on a
52
person as a result of a lawful sanction is exempt from the definition of torture.
Courts are unclear as to whether this last requirement refers to international or
domestic law. It is possible that the provision refers to domestic law based on the
Article 4.1 requirement for domestic legislation to implement the provisions of the
CAT.53
The Committee Against Torture has held that rendering a person to a country
that is not a party to the CAT puts that person at risk of torture. 4 Additionally, the
United Nations Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment has declared that extraordinary renditions
constitute violations of Article 3 of the CAT. 5 Such acts may also be considered

45. Agiza v. Sweden, Decision of the Comm. Against Torture, Communication No. 233/2003,
para. 13.4, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/34/D/233/2003 (2005).
46. Id.para. 13.3.
47. U.N. Comm. Against Torture [UNCAT], General Comment No. 1: Implementation of Article
3 of the Convention in the Context of Article 22 (Refoulement and Communications), 52, U.N. Doc.
A/53/44, annex IX (1998), reprinted in U.N. Int'l Human Rights Instruments [HRI], Compilation of
General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, para. 4,
279 U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 (2003).
48. See CAT, supra note 1, art. 14.
49. See Agiza v. Sweden, Decision of the Comm. Against Torture, Communication No. 233/2003,
para. 15, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/34/D/233/2003 (2005).
50. CAT, supra note 1,art. 3.
51. Id.
52. Id. art. 1.
53. See GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 13, at 303.
54. U.N. Comm. Against Torture [UNCAT], Khan v. Canada, para. 12.5, U.N. Doc. A/50/44, 46
(Nov.15, 1994).
55. See Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Special
Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 29, delivered
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conspiracies to commit torture.56 Thus, countries that engage in acts of rendition

not only violate the basic torture provisions of the CAT, but also the nonrefoulement provision. These decisions and commentaries indicate that violations
of Article 3 rely not on the geographical location of the individual in question, but
rather the act of the state facilitating the rendition to a country where it is known
that a significant risk of torture exists. Without such extraterritorial application of
the non-refoulement provision, the purpose behind the CAT, to prevent torture,
cannot be satisfied because it allows states to renege on their international
obligations. 57 Additionally, since prevention of torture constitutes a jus cogens
norm, even if no part of the CAT calls for extraterritorial application of its
provisions, states have an obligation to prevent torture in any situation.
B. United States Domestic Legislation Addressing CAT Relief
United States refugee law provides varying degrees of remedies for persons
who may face torture upon return to their home countries but who are not eligible
for asylum because they have committed an "aggravated felony." 58 Aggravated
felonies are "particularly serious crimes" such as murder, rape, fraud, theft or drug
and firearm trafficking. 59 Such persons may be provided withholding of removal
pursuant to United States obligations not to refoule persons who will be subject to
torture.60 However, this relief may be denied where a person has committed an
aggravated felony with a five-year aggregate sentence. 61 Thus, United States law
provides that a person may then be eligible for deferral of removal if a more than
substantial likelihood of torture is established.
In this regard, relief provided under the CAT is a separate form of relief from
asylum and requires a separate determination under a unique standard. While the
United States statutes do not require that an "on account of' ground be
demonstrated as the basis for torture, as required in the Refugee Convention62 , the
applicant must demonstrate that if he or she is returned to his or her home country,
that it is "more likely than not" that he or she will be subject to torture.63 This
standard is arguably higher than the "substantial grounds" standard required in the
text of the CAT.64
As required under Article 3, past criminal conduct does not bar relief under
to the GeneralAssembly, U.N. Doe. A/59/324 (Sept. 1, 2004).
56. David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, ExtraordinaryRendition: A Human Rights Analysis, 19
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 123, 144 (2006).

57. See infra Section VI (addressing extraterritorial application of CAT provisions).
58. Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(b)(2)(B)(i) [hereinafter INA].
59. Id. § 101(a)(43).
60. Id. § 241(b)(3)(A).
61. Id. § 241(b)(3)(C).
62. Refugee Convention, supra note 3, art. 33(1).
63. Kamalthas v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 251 F.3d 1279, 1284 (9th Cir. 2001).
64. See id. at 1282 (indicating that in addition to the substantial grounds test articulated in the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the
standard is supplemented by the requirement of country conditions and incidents of past torture and
other relevant evidence).
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the CAT and when denied withholding, an applicant may apply for a deferral of
removal in the alternative.65 United States statutes also limit the review of an
application for deferral of removal to the final removal proceedings such that an
applicant may not apply for the relief until all other forms of relief have been
denied.66 Since ratifying the CAT, the United States Department of State has
maintained that it interprets the definition of torture in a narrow fashion and that it
of torture as an extreme practice
conforms only to "the common understanding
67
condemned.,
universally
which is
Applications for withholding of removal or deferral of removal relief have
had little success. Approximately 3% of applications were granted in 2002 and
1,700 were granted in 2003.68 When determining whether it is more likely than not
that torture will occur in the future, United States Courts consider incidents of past
torture, patterns and practice of torture in the removal country and any other
relevant information including country conditions. 69 United States courts have
found that instances of rape, domestic violence condoned by law enforcement, and
cigarette bums and beatings may constitute torture.7
Deferral of removal is a minimal protection offered to those who are found to
be removable because they engaged in persecution themselves or are considered a
security threat to the United States. 7 ' Such deferrals are granted such that the least
amount of protections are provided while the person does not have to be removed
to a country where he or she is more likely than not to face torture.7 2 U.S.
regulations also require consideration of a likelihood of torture for instances of
extradition.73 The United States Supreme Court found in the case of Zadvydas v.
Davis that in cases where a person is subject to deportation under immigration law
but extradition is prohibited under the CAT, under certain circumstances, indefinite

65. In re Y-L- In re A-G- In re R-S-R, 23 I&N Dec. 270, 279 (A.G. 2002).
66. Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 § 2242(d) [hereinafter FARRA]; see
also INA § 242(a)(4).
67. MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, U.N. CONVENTION AGAINST
TORTURE: OVERVIEW OF U.S. IMPLEMENTATION POLICY CONCERNING THE REMOVAL OF ALIENS 2

(2006) (quoting President's Message to Congress Transmitting the Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Summary and Analysis of the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, May
23, 1988, S.Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, reprintedin 1387 U.S. Cong. Serial Set at 3 (1990)).
68. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FY 2002
STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, at A-1 (2003); Immigration Relief under the Convention Against
Torture for Serious Criminals and Human Rights Violators: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on
Immigration, Border Security, and Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 26 (2003)
(prepared statement of C. Stewart Verdery, Assistant Secretary for Policy and Planning, Border and
Transportation Security Directorate).
69. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3) (2000).
70. Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463 (3rd Cir. 2003); Aliv v. Reno, 237 F.3d 591 (6th Cir. 2001);
A1-Shaer v. INS, 268 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2001).
71. INA § 241(b)(3)(B).
72. FARRA § 2242(d).
73. 22 C.F.R. § 95.2(b) (2008).
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detentions are permissible. 74 Indefinite detentions are permitted when there are
potential foreign policy consequences if the person is released, if the person has
committed a violent crime, has a mental illness, or if the person is prone to
violence.75
United States acts in extraditing persons to third countries
extraterritorially indicate that the United States does not believe such
"extraordinary" renditions constitute violations of the CAT.76
C. Review of Cases by the Committee Against Torture and Other International
Tribunals
International tribunals have made a number of specific findings regarding the
nature of treatment of individuals who have been illegally rendered from one
country to another. Some courts have determined that the nature of the abduction
does not preclude a court from maintaining jurisdiction over an individual for
potentially criminal acts. 77 These assertions of jurisdiction were based on the
premise that the country from which the defendant was abducted made no claim
that its sovereignty had been violated. Other international courts have held that the
nature of illegal renditions alone strips the court of jurisdiction.7 8
Perhaps the most controversial international case on this precise issue is that
of People of Israel v. Eichmann from 1962 in the Supreme Court of Israel. In that
case, a German citizen was residing in Argentina where he was apprehended by the
Israeli government and brought to trial before its courts. 79 The Israeli court
asserted jurisdiction over Mr. Eichmann despite widespread international protest
based solely on the nature of the rendition which shocked the conscience of the
international community.80 Prior to Israel's assertion of jurisdiction, the United
Nations Security Council issued a resolution specifically condemning the acts and
declaring them a violation of Argentina's territorial sovereignty.81
The Eichmann case illustrates that the issue of rendition is not a new one in
international law and that courts have struggled to deal with the question of
whether or not renditions, in and of themselves, are severe enough to strip a court
of its jurisdiction. When coupled with unlawful treatment by the court in question,
treatment that specifically violates the CAT, the response of international courts is

74. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 679.
75. 8 C.F.R. § 241.14 (2009).
76. See Joan Fitzpatrick, Rendition and Transfer in the War against Terrorism: Guantanamo and
Beyond, 25 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 457, 480-81 (2003); see also Theodor Meron,
ExtraterritorialityofHuman Rights Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 78 (1995).
77. See In Re Argoud, Cass. crim. [highest court of ordinary jurisdiction], June 4, 1964, 45 I.L.R.
90, 91, 97 (Fr.); see also Stocke v. Fed. Republic of Germany, App. No. 11755/85, 53 Eur. Comm'n
H.R. Dec. & Rep. 166, 170-71 (1987).
78. See State v. Ebrahim 1991 (2) SA 553 (AD), 95 I.L.R. 417,442,445 (S. Afr.); see also Regina
v. Horseferry Rd. Magis. Ct. (ex parte Bennett) (1993) 3 All E.R. 138, 138, 139, 95 I.L.R. 380, 380,
381(H.L.).
79. S.C. Res. 138, U.N. Doc. S/RES/138 (June 22, 1960).
80. See id.
81. Id.
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more forceful. 8

82. See Prosecutor v. Nikolic, Case No. IT-94-2-AR73, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal
Concerning Legality of Arrest, para. 24 (June 5, 2003).
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UNITED STATES APPLICATION IN COMPARISON TO INTERNATIONAL

OBLIGATIONS

A. The CurrentState of InternationalLaw in Relation to Renditions
As noted earlier, renditions generally constitute a violation of a state's
sovereignty. 83 The case that most clearly articulates the current state of
international law in this area is the case of Prosecutor v. Nikolic out of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. There, the court
outlined a three-part test that may be used in assessing whether or not renditions
are illegal under international law. 84 The court stated first, that all renditions
constitute violations of sovereignty, particularly when the state whose sovereignty
was violated claims a violation. 85 Next, the court stated that jurisdiction may be
stripped based on the nature of the rendition alone and the fact that such renditions
may compromise the credibility of the court at issue. 6 Such jurisdiction stripping
measures are negated where the person who is being detained has committed a
crime of an egregious nature, such as genocide or a war crime. Finally,
jurisdiction of the87court may be stripped if the detainee is subject to torture while
held in detention.
The Human Rights Committee has asserted that if "a State party extradites a
person within its jurisdiction in circumstances such that as a result there is a real
risk that his or her rights under the Covenant will be violated in another
jurisdiction, the State party itself may be in violation of the Covenant." 88 If torture
is foreseeable, the state that renders the person is in violation of the ICCPR. 89 In
these cases, the Human Rights Committee placed the responsibility in the hands of
the transferring state regardless of the location of the person in question. Here,
there may be a conflict of interest between United States policy and international
law in that the U.S. is likely to claim that persons outside the geographical territory
of the United States are not technically within the jurisdiction of the United States
even if it is facilitating the transfer of a person to a state where torture is
foreseeable. These cases indicate that such a position by the U.S. would be
erroneous in nature.
The Geneva Conventions also provide a variety of protections for persons
considered Prisoners of War (POWs) and Civilians. These protections are
83. Id. paras. 24-27.
84. Prosecutor v. Nikolic, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, Decision On Defense Motion Challenging The
Exercise of Jurisdiction By The Tribunal, para. 97 (June 5, 2003) available at

http://www.icty.org/case/dragannikolic/4.
85. See id. paras. 97, 99.

86. Id. para. 108.
87. Id. para. 114.
88. Kindler v. Canada, Views, Communication No. 470/1991, Human Rights Committee, para.
13.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/48/D/470/1991 (Nov. 11, 1993).
89. Ng v. Canada, Views, Communication No. 469/1991, Human Rights Committee, para. 6.2,

U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/49/D/469/1991 (Jan. 7, 1994) (holding that the "foreseeability of the consequence
would mean that there was a present violation by the State party, even though the consequence would

not occur until later on.").
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applicable in times of international armed conflict. 90 Article 13 of the Third
Geneva Convention requires that "prisoners of war must at all times be humanely
treated ... prisoners of war must at all times be protected, particularly against acts
"91 POWs cannot be transferred to states that are
of violence or intimidation..
92
Civilians or "protected persons" under the
Conventions.
the
Geneva
party
to
not
Fourth Geneva Convention cannot be subject to "physical or moral coercion... in
particular to obtain information from them or third parties., 93 Like POWs,
Civilians may not be transferred to countries that are not parties to the
conventions.94 Such a transfer may constitute a grave breach of the convention.95
Also, as noted earlier, the provisions under the Refugee Convention are less
restricting than those under the CAT. Article 33(2) provides that states may
engage in refoulement when the person in question:
(a) He has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime
against humanity... ;
(b) He has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country
of refuge to his admission to that country as a refugee;
(c) He has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes of the United
96
Nations.
Even if the United States were to justify an extradition on the basis of the
Refugee Convention, it may still be in violation of the CAT. Overall, the status of
treaty law indicates that any extraditions of persons to states that practice torture
are prohibited under international law and redress must be afforded.
B. Applying CAT Relief to Rendition and Treatment
As articulated above, the primary remedy available to persons who may not
be returned to their countries for fear of torture under United States law is deferral
of removal where those persons have been convicted of serious crimes or
aggravated felonies.97 While this is not the equivalent of being granted refugee
status or even withholding of removal, it still is a form of relief that prevents a
person from being returned to unlawful treatment.
Both the Human Rights Committee and the Committee Against Torture have
addressed these important issues of rendition and "extraordinary" rendition in the

90. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GCIII]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter
GCIVI.
91. GCIII, supra note 90, art. 13.
92. Id. art. 12.
93. GCIV, supra note 90, art. 31.
94. Id. art. 45.
95. Id. arts. 147-48.
96. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees arts. I(F), 33(2), July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S.
150.
97. See supra Part IV(b).
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context of their respective treaties and have articulated appropriate relief for those
who were improperly rendered to their home country and more likely than not
subject to torture.
The first case, which was mentioned earlier, is that of Agiza v. Sweden where
Agiza was a national of Egypt where he was tortured as a suspect in the
assassination of former President Anwar Sadat. 98 He was denied asylum in
Sweden for unknown reasons and subject to removal proceedings on the basis that
he was involved in supporting terrorism. 99 Sweden also received diplomatic
assurances from Egypt that it would not subject Agiza to improper treatment and
00
used such assurances to justify its extradition of Agiza back to his home country.
In making its findings on the case, the Committee Against Torture asserted
holdings which pertain directly to the United States and its use of "extraordinary"
rendition tactics. Most prevalent in this regard is the Committee's finding that
while Security Council Resolutions are binding in nature under international law,
they do not preclude a state from compliance with Article 3 of the CAT.1 ' This
recognition is particularly important because it recognizes the importance of
preventing and punishing terrorism but does not allow terrorist acts to serve as a
justification for subjection to torture. This finding also highlights the Security
Council's recognition that responses to terrorist acts must comply with refugee
law. 10 2 Here, the Committee found an explicit violation of Article 3 by Sweden for
extraditing Agiza notwithstanding the existing diplomatic assurances.0 3 The
Committee thus makes the point that such assurances are not sufficient enough to
outweigh findings of a "real risk" of torture. 10 4 The Committee also found an
Article 3 violation on the basis that there was no judicial review of the Swedish
government's decision to extradite Agiza and thus found a violation of the
"procedural obligation to provide for effective, independent and impartial review
'0 5
required by article 3 of the Convention."
Finally, the Committee, for the first time, held that there was an express
violation of Article 22 which is the jurisdiction provision of the CAT. 10 6 While the
United States has not signed the optional declaration implementing this provision
of the CAT, the Committee sends a signal to other state parties engaged in

98. Agiza v. Sweden, Decision of the Comm. Against Torture, Communication No. 233/2003,
para. 2.1, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/34/D/233/2003 (2005);
99. Id.paras. 2.4-2.5.
100. Id.para. 4.29.
101. Id.para. 13.1.
102. S.C. Res. 1456, para. 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1456 (Jan. 20, 2003) (providing that "States must
ensure that any measure taken to combat terrorism comply with all their obligations under international
law, and should adopt such measures in accordance with international law, in particular international
human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law.") (emphasis added).
103. Agiza v. Sweden, Decision of the Comm. Against Torture, Communication No. 233/2003,
para. 13.4, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/34/D/233/2003 (2005).
104. Id.
105. Id.para. 13.8.
106. Id.para. 13.10.
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renditions that all domestic processes must be exhausted before such transfers are
facilitated. The Committee chose to highlight this violation because Agiza was
transferred before there was any review of the final order by either a higher
Swedish court or the Committee Against Torture. Thus, Agiza did not have any
to Egypt. 10 7
time to file a complaint before the Committee before he was extradited
As a result of these breaches, Sweden had the obligation to formulate a remedy and
present its remedy to the Committee within 90 days. 10 8
This case serves as an illustration of the manner in which the CAT can
provide protections for individuals who are unlawfully subject to refoulement.
While these procedures do not apply to the United States, it still has an
international obligation to abide by the provisions of the CAT and prevent torture
from occurring to persons within United States control. In instances where a
person is in U.S. custody, even if extraterritorially, it is difficult to argue that any
other state other than the United States has the ability to prevent that person from
being subjected to unlawful treatment. The Committee's decision also emphasizes
the need for judicial review of a denial of asylum in these cases before extradition
takes place.
These same concerns were highlighted by the Human Rights Committee in
the case of Alzery v. Sweden. 10 9 The facts of that case were similar to those of the
Agiza case where Alzery was improperly extradited to Egypt under the auspices of
diplomatic assurances despite a high probability that he would be subject to
torture.110 The Human Rights Committee found that there was a violation of
Article 7 of the ICCPR along with a violation of Article 2 which requires an
"effective remedy" for Article 7 violations. 1 1 In making its determination, the
Committee adopted the findings of the Committee Against Torture in the Agiza
case where the diplomatic assurances were not sufficient to negate evidence of
Committee in this case was
likely torture.1 12 The remedy suggested by11the
3
treatment.
unlawful
for
compensation
monetary
C. Ineffectiveness ofDiplomaticAssurances
Importantly, both of these cases asserted that diplomatic assurances are not
sufficient in guaranteeing that a person will not be subject to torture or CIDT.
Such assurances cannot be relied upon in international law to protect a person from
torture unless certain circumstances are met. The United Nations Special
Rapporteur on Torture has stated that such assurances must be "unequivocal" and
that there must be a "system to monitor" the person and ensure that-he or she is

107, Id. para. 13.9.

108. Id. para. 15.
109. Alzery v. Sweden, Views of the Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 1416/2005,
paras. 4.3, 11.3, 11.5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/88/D/1416/2005 (2006).
110. Id. paras. 3.6 -3.9.
111. Id. para. 11.7.
112. Id. para. 3.24.
113. Id. para. 13.
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protected.114
Most recently, the General Assembly noted that diplomatic
assurances do not release states from an obligation not to refoule a person who is
115
substantially likely to be subject to torture and CIDT.
United States law allows for diplomatic assurances in application of the CAT.
Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(c), the Secretary of State may seek assurances for
extradition and if those assurances are found to be "sufficiently reliable" the person
may be returned without further consideration of CAT protections. The factors
considered include "the identity, position, or other information concerning the
official relaying the assurances, and political or legal developments
in the
' 16
requesting State that would provide context for the assurances provided."'
The failure of such assurances is evident in cases such as that of Maher Arar
who was detained by the U.S. government and transferred to Syria despite his
insistence that he would be subject to torture there.' 17 The U.S. transferred him
based on assurances by Syria that he would not be harmed. Instead, he was subject
to ten months of detention and torture. 118 He has now filed suit in U.S. Federal
Court for violations of the Torture Victim Protection Act.1 19
The European Court of Human Rights has also been active in determining that
diplomatic assurances are not sufficient means of ensuring that a person will not be
subject to torture upon return to his or her home country. 120 As referred to earlier,
it has also made an effort to intervene on cases before
people are extradited
121
unlawfully and their asylum claims are effectively denied.
These efforts by the European Court of Human Rights illuminate the
importance of judicial review for asylum seekers and scrutiny over provisions of
diplomatic assurances. This example can be used by the United States to
determine which assurances are more reliable than others and to establish a higher
standard of review for such assurances. The difficulty here in comparison to the
European Court of Human Rights is that the European Court has access to conduct
fact-finding missions in the countries in question while the United States courts
must rely on expert testimony and reports of country conditions which may not be
as accurate. Overall, however, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that

114. The Special Rapporteur, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture, Mission to Uzbekistan,
49, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/68/Add.2 (Feb. 3,2003).
115. G.A. Res. 63/166, para. 15, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/166 (Feb. 19, 2009).
116. Declaration of Samuel M. Witten at para. 9, Cornejo-Barreto v. Seifert, No. 01-cv-662-AHS
(October 2001).
117. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, "EMPTY PROMISES:"

DIPLOMATIC ASSURANCES No SAFEGUARD

AGAINST TORTURE 16 (April 2004).
118. Id.
119. Id. at17.
120. Chahal v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R., No. 70/1995/576/662 at para. 105 (1996) (holding
that despite its acknowledgment that India gave assurances in good faith, they were not sufficient to
indicate that Chahal would not be tortured); Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R.,
No. 36378/02 at paras. 29-31 (2005) (where Russia did not comply with diplomatic assurances and
refused to give a fact-finding team access to detainees).
121. See CAT,supra note 11; see also Refugee Convention, supra note 11.
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diplomatic assurances are not guarantees and may still cause a country to be in
violation of the CAT where overwhelming evidence of torture and CIDT exist.
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EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS

An additional means by which the United States may be held accountable for
unlawful renditions under international law implicates the acknowledged
extraterritorial application of obligations embodied in human rights treaties.
International law jurisprudence has recently recognized the importance of holding
states accountable for human rights obligations when acting within the territory of
other states. 122 The difficulty in holding states accountable as such is that an
obligation under international law must be established by which the state has an
obligation to uphold human rights when acting in the territory of another country.
This is particularly difficult to establish in cases of extraordinary rendition where
alleged terrorists are not rendered from U.S. soil, but instead are transported from
country to country in U.S. aircrafts.
A. Effective Control of Territoryas a Means to ExtraterritorialApplication

The most widely recognized manner by which states are held to their
international human rights obligations when acting in the territory of another
country is by establishing that the state has effective control of the territory where
it is acting. The International Court of Justice as well as the European Court of
Human Rights have addressed this issue with regard to implementation of the
ICCPR extraterritorially, as well as the application of human rights treaties in
general.
In the Legal Consequences Concerning the Construction of a Wall in
Occupied Palestinian Territory Advisory Opinion, the International Court of

Justice established that ICCPR provisions apply extraterritorially where a state
123
acting outside its territory has effective control of another state's territory.
There, the Court looked to Article 2 of the ICCPR which confers responsibility for
the obligations embodied in the covenant with respect to persons within a state's
jurisdiction.1 24 This was supported by decisions of the Human Rights Committee
which held that Uruguay was responsible for ensuring protection of persons who
were arrested in Argentina and Brazil. 125 The Court thus came to the conclusion
that where a State exercises jurisdiction outside of its own territory, it is still
obligated to uphold the provisions in the ICCPR. 26 The Court affirmed this
decision in Congo v. Uganda where it held that Uganda was bound by human
rights obligations because its authority within
the territory superseded Congolese
27
governmental authority due to occupation.1
122. See, e.g., U.N. Comm. Against Torture [UNCAT]; Burgos v. Uruguay, para. 12.3, U.N. Doc.
A/36/40 (July 29, 1981).
123. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, para.109 (July 9) [hereinafter Wall].
124. Id. para. 108.
125. Burgos, supra note 122, para. 13-14; U.N. Comm. Against Torture [UNCAT], Casariego v.
Uruguay, para. 12, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 (July 29, 1981).
126. Wall, supra note 123, para. 111.
127. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo. v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J.
No. 116, para. 173, at 59 (Dec. 19).
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Likewise, the European Court of Human Rights has also established the
application of human rights treaties where states act outside their respective
territories. For example, the Court asserted that areas of Northern Cyprus occupied
by Turkey incurred Turkey's responsibility in upholding human rights of local
citizens. 128 Such occupation, or effective control, is established when the
occupying power "exercises all or some of the public powers normally to be
exercised by [the occupied Government].', 129 Thus, these cases only apply to the
situation where a government has established control of territory such that it has
the responsibility to uphold the customary norm of non-refoulement when acting
outside its territory.
The challenge, then, is to determine whether a state may be held accountable
for human rights violations when not in effective control of the territory, but where
the state maintains jurisdiction over persons who are improperly rendered to third
countries where they face torture and CIDT.
B. Effective Controlover Personsto Establish Jurisdictionand an Obligation to
Uphold Human Rights Obligations
It is apparent that it may be difficult to establish effective control over
territory in each instance where the United States acts to render a person to a
country where he or she will be subject to torture or CIDT. Under such
circumstances, it is necessary that countries like the United States be held to the
same standard as countries with effective control of territory outside their
traditional jurisdiction such that where a state has effective control over a person,
that state is responsible for ensuring that person's human rights remain in tact.
There is some support for this notion in Article 2 of the ICCPR which
provides that Member Stats have the responsibility to protect persons within their
jurisdiction regardless of nationality. 130 This was further supported by the Human
Rights Committee comment to Article 2 which states that anyone within the power
or jurisdiction of a State must be afforded protections pursuant to the covenant by
that state. 131 The General Assembly also supported this notion in its recent
resolution regarding
protections for terrorists who might be subject to
1
refoulement. 32
International law also restricts a state's ability to premise failure to protect
133
human rights on the basis that domestic laws are contrary to treaty protections.
Thus, even where the United States may justify return on the application of
withholding or deferral of removal under domestic laws, those provisions may not
be used to excuse an improper return that violates the ICCPR and the CAT.
128. Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser A) para. 62, at 23-24 (1995).
129. Hussein v. 21 States, App. No. 23276/04, 42 Eur. H.R. Rep. SEI6 at 223, 224-25 (Mar. 14,
2006) (Court Decision on Admissibility).
130. ICCPR, supra note 2, art. 2.
131. Human Rights Comm., General Comment 31 [80]: Nature of the General Legal Obligations
on State Partiesto the Covenant, 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add. 13 (May 26, 2004).
132. G.A. Res. 63/185, paras. 9-10, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/185 (Mar. 3, 2009).
133. VCLT, supra note 19, art. 27.
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Because of the jus cogens nature of the prohibition on torture and the customary
status of non-refoulement, the United States must be held responsible for acts of
improper rendition which occur outside of United States territory even though
effective control of that territory might not be established. Instead, effective
control, or jurisdiction, over the person should be sufficient to invoke United States
treaty and human rights obligations.
C. Acts of United States Rendition and ExtraterritorialObligations
The most widely publicized acts of United States sponsored renditions which
result in torture and CIDT occur outside of United States territory, but pursuant to
United States command authority. For example, there have been an increased
number of renditions taking place between Somalia and Ethiopia at the instruction
of United States officials. 134 There, persons of Canadian, American, Ethiopian,
Kenyan and Somali nationality have been removed from Somalia and Kenya
without administrative process and detained in Ethiopia without access to legal
counsel and without notification to family. 135 While these renditions benefit
Ethiopian authorities, they also allow United States officials to engage in improper
interrogations of detained individuals outside of United States territory.136
The transport of Agiza in the aforementioned Agiza v. Sweeden decision, took
place via United States aircraft. 137 United States Central Intelligence Agents were
also allegedly involved in the transfer of Hassan Osama Nsar from Italy to Egypt
where Nsar was subject to torture. 38 Jamil Qasim Aseed Mohammed was
extradited from Pakistan to Jordan via United States
aircraft without any
139
administrative process and subject to improper treatment.
In each of these circumstances, it is questionable whether the United States
had effective control of the territory where these persons were transferred.
However, in each case it does appear that United States officials had a significant
degree of control over capturing and transferring these people to detention in third
countries where they were subject to improper treatment. Where it appears that a
state has such a degree of control over a person in custody outside that state's
territory, the state should still be obligated to uphold human rights obligations and
refrain from refoulement of persons who will be subject to torture.
Presumably, United States government officials are working within an
undefined loophole of international law by which they have not been held
accountable for being complicit in the improper treatment to which these
individuals are subject. The resolutions coming out of the General Assembly
combined with reports from the Human Rights Committee and cases out of the

134. Jennifer Daskal, More Blowbackfrom the War on Terror, HUM. RTS. WATCH, Oct. 1, 2008,
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/1 0/01/more-blowback-war-terror.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. TORTURE BY PROXY, supra note 8, at 7.

138. Id.
139. Id.
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European Court of Human Rights seem to suggest that the trend in international
law is moving toward holding states accountable for human rights violations that
occur to people within a state's jurisdiction even where control of the territory
might be absent.
VI. CONCLUSIONS

The reality of "extraordinary" renditions is one that we cannot ignore in
today's world. Because of this practice, people are subject to torture and cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment that only international norms seek to address.
When states such as the United States refuse to comply with the provisions set
forth in international instruments that address issues of torture and CIDT, it is the
responsibility of the international community not to condone such acts.
Refugee law and policy seek to provide remedies for people who are in
danger of being sent back to countries that engage in unlawful practice.
Extraterritorial application of this law and policy is the only way to ensure that
unlawful renditions do not continue to take place. Such acts offer countries like
the United States a manner in which they can escape responsibility for serious
breaches of international law andjus cogens norms which are not acceptable under
any circumstances. The strong weight the international community has put behind
the prevention of torture and the obligation states have to uphold the prevention of
torture is justification in and of itself for this extraterritorial application - with or
without effective control of territory.

